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Mohamed El Sioufi 
 
 
This publication is a timely contribution as it addresses the mounting unmet 
demand for housing that stems from the almost global absence of government 
interventions since the 1990s. During the last few years, the international com-
munity has joined hands to articulate and formulate major goals, agendas and 
strategies. These 15- to 20-year perspectives set the backdrop against which key 
actors, including governments, academia, professionals, developers, civil society 
and the private sector, should further develop them into programmes, interven-
tions and actions on the ground. 
 
Challenges: Access to affordable housing globally is becoming more and more 
elusive to large numbers of urban populations. As many cities mature and ex-
pand, affordable land for housing becomes increasingly scarce and costly and 
thereby beyond the reach even of the middle class. In most developing countries, 
housing demand, from the rapidly growing lower and middle-income group, is 
neither met by the public sector (national and local authorities) nor by the private 
sector (the forces of the market). Planning the development of affordable ser-
viced land and housing as well as providing financial and mortgage schemes are 
either absent, undeveloped or, if they exist at all, they do not target the informal-
ly employed lower-income groups. 
 
Government responses: Over the last 60 to 70 years, housing policies have 
shifted the roles of the public sector from direct delivery by the central govern-
ment to a laissez-faire role that is limited to enabling the market. Only in rare 
situations has the market worked and, even then, there has had to be some sup-
port to vulnerable groups through social and financial programmes. The private 
sector, in the majority of cases, favoured earning rapid high profits by focussing 
on housing for higher income groups that could buy housing units thus enabling 
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the developers to recoup their investments in the shortest possible time. In many 
cases, housing plans are sold before construction commences. In most countries, 
long-term investment in rental housing and other tenure modalities has nearly 
vanished, depriving the younger generations from accessing decent affordable 
housing. For the most part ‘enablement of the market and the withdrawal of the 
public sector from the housing scene has proved ineffective as it has resulted in 
disastrous urban and human consequences. 
In cases where governments have addressed housing through delivery they 
have, unfortunately, failed to reach the target populations. Often, housing poli-
cies and strategies aimed at building a certain number of housing units per year; 
for example, “building 100,000 housing units”, etc. These output-based, quanti-
tative policies only provide photo opportunities for officials who stand in front 
of usually towering housing projects. In reality, however, these schemes result in 
vacant abandoned settlements in a phenomenon referred to as “Ghost Towns”. 
These are now abundant globally. 
These expensive urban failures are the result of strict zoning regulations that 
segregate residential areas from other urban uses. The myth of low-cost public-
owned land situated far away from urban areas is another culprit. It is only cheap 
for ministries of housing that are looking to reduce the costs of these housing 
units. However, this type of urban development shifts the real costs of infrastruc-
ture to other ministries (infrastructure, transportation, etc.). The real costs, how-
ever, are shouldered by the targeted low-income groups who have to commute to 
jobs, or to seek employment and social and economic amenities. Commuting 
costs are usually prohibitive for lower-income groups as they reduce their net 
incomes by 30% to 50%, thereby resulting in their moving back to well-located 
informal areas. Such cases are documented in a variety of developing countries. 
Finally, many of these housing programmes have incurred very high costs 
that resulted from centralised delivery, inefficiencies and, in many cases, corrup-
tion. The failed laissez-faire policies and attitudes of the public sector towards 
producing affordable land and housing have left one third of urban dwellers 
living in informal settlements. 
 
People’s responses: In response to the absence of affordable options for land 
and housing, about 1 billion lower-income urban dwellers have taken it upon 
themselves to find alternatives through the development of informal settlements 
and housing. In extreme cases, they have resorted to illegally squatting on land 
which they then developed into their own settlements. In other cases, they have 
acquired land that was unsuitable for development, usually in climatically vul-
nerable areas, including in cyclone paths, and flood- and mudslide-prone areas. 
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In other cases, they have settled in hazardous zone where they have been ex-
posed to high-tension power lines, or situated along railway lines or in toxic 
areas etc. Consequently, the most vulnerable urban residents are exposed to life-
threatening and health hazards and end up living under inhumane conditions. 
 
Global Responses: In recognition of past policy failures and in order to address 
the increasing housing demand, social segregation and urban divides; there has 
been a recognition for the need for new approaches to both urban development 
and housing delivery. The international community has developed some high-
level frameworks for addressing these challenges: 
The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11 “Sustainable Cities and Com-
munities” surpasses the ambitions of its predecessor Millennium Development 
Goals’. It’s first target aims to “By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe 
and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums”. 
The New Urban Agenda (NUA) further unpacks SDG 11 by developing ap-
propriate concepts and strategies. Paragraph 109, for example, calls to “… con-
sider increased allocation of … resources for: upgrading and … prevention of 
slums … with strategies that go beyond physical and environmental improve-
ments, to ensure that slums are integrated into the social; economic; cultural; 
and, political dimensions of cities. These strategies should include … access to 
sustainable, adequate, safe, and affordable housing; basic and social services; 
and safe, inclusive, accessible, green, and quality public spaces; and they should 
promote security of tenure and its regularisation, as well as measures for conflict 
prevention and mediation.” 
UN-Habitat developed The Global Housing Strategy (GHS) as a collabora-
tive global movement towards further supporting the concept of adequate hous-
ing for all and improving the housing and living conditions of slum dwellers. It 
was developed to explore ideas to be included in the NUA. Its main objective is 
to assist member states in working towards the realisation of the right to ade-
quate housing. 
 
Paradigm shift in thinking and practice: The above frameworks aim to go 
beyond the classic ‘in the box’ thinking that confines the housing debate to its 
limiting components: land, infrastructure, design, building materials and labour. 
Housing is to be situated “at the centre” of urban thinking and of cities as an 
integral part of urban development, thus avoiding many of the previous draw-
backs. 
The NUA treats housing as an integral part of an urban development ap-
proach within a larger cluster of thematic areas. The aim is to achieve sustaina-
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ble urbanization that is based on the urban planning principles of high density 
and mixed land uses and integrating social groups with efficient street networks 
while reducing the urban environmental footprint. Through urban land manage-
ment, fiscal instruments are combined with a focus on available affordable ser-
viced land for urban uses that are intermixed with housing. Legal and regulatory 
frameworks would aim to enable and encourage investments in housing at all 
levels, thereby contributing to local economic development and income-
generating opportunities for lower-income groups. Revitalised urban economic 
development would target growth in sustainable affordable jobs and the devel-
opment of income-generating opportunities that would render housing and other 
services affordable. Policies are to include cross-subsidies between various land-
use categories and, when necessary, subsidies and incentives are to be utilized to 
stimulate the supply and demand sides of housing. Slum upgrading and preven-
tion are central to ensuring human rights are respected and are a corner stone to 
leaving no one behind. 
Further effectiveness would be achieved through ensuring that a variety of 
housing tenure types provide a diversity of options that address different social, 
economic and cultural needs. Governance and maintenance of housing and 
neighbourhoods should ensure that the housing rights and needs of women, 
youth, and special groups are addressed through inclusive, affordable and cultur-
ally adequate solutions. Post-disaster reconstruction and the development of 
resilient solutions for housing in disaster-prone and climate change areas are also 
growing in importance. 
 
Systemic reforms should promote an active role for the public sector beyond 
enablement so as to ensure universal access to adequate affordable housing. 
Linking housing with other parts of the economy should be strengthened to en-
sure economic development, employment generation and poverty reduction. 
Decentralized housing production and empowering different actors and modali-
ties of housing development are to be encouraged within these frameworks. 
Sustainable building and neighbourhood designs and technologies are to be pur-
sued with an aim towards more cost-effective, flexible and energy-efficient solu-
tions. Most importantly, all efforts should result in significant and measurable 
improvements in housing and living conditions for all, while facilitating the role 
of housing as an important support for poverty reduction. 
 
Forward looking – working together: While these recommendations might 
seem overwhelming, they rather provide a variety of avenues to better address 
housing needs. These frameworks are designed to support key stakeholders in 
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focussing on targeted conceptualisation and innovations and the research needed 
to operationalise them. Concerted integrated collaborative partnerships between 
key actors are vital to mobilising the added values they can each contribute, 
including central and local government leaders’ political will; academia’s crea-
tivity and innovation; the private sector’s efficiency; civil society and the me-
dia’s advocacy; the professional community’s knowhow; and local communities’ 
and individuals’ deep understanding of their needs and their abilility to harness 








My input1 might seem rather provocative as it is very difficult to talk about the 
Right to the City and the Right to Adequate Housing these days. I think it is 
crucial for us, who are related to questions of housing and cities, urbanism and 
urban planning, to understand that a new colonial empire that is faceless and 
flag-less – is seizing territories and reshaping cities. The name of this new colo-
nial empire is global finance. It is a global process, which means that it is a pro-
cess that is de-territorialized, abstract, fictitious and speculative. This is the very 
nature of finance. In this process, built space has more and more a key role in the 
promotion and expansion of finance. It is a global process, it is general, it is 
everywhere, but it is also particular in each place (states, and even regions and 
cities), path-dependent on political economies of land, housing and built space. 
We will talk more specifically about how central the role of built space is as 
a fundamental part of the circuits of appreciation and valorisation of finance and 
how much it affects and shapes cities and urban policies. We could then talk 
about those rent-seeking landscapes that are made of shopping malls, corporate 
towers, international chain hotels, cultural centres, all built by brand architects, 
which look exactly the same everywhere. They look spectacular in their unique-
ness but nevertheless repeat themselves everywhere, as abstract and disconnect-
ed from real territories as is finance itself. 
When I received my mandate as Special Rapporteur on the Right to Ade-
quate Housing, I had to travel long hours and sometimes arrived in some city 
half dead, half sleepy. From my taxi or car, I then saw those towers and shop-
ping malls, and I found myself asking: Am I in Chicago? Or am I in Dubai? Am 
I in Astana? …the same rent-seeking landscapes were everywhere. This kind of 
 
1    This Keynote was delivered at the 19thN-AERUS conference on “Housing and Human 
Settlements in a World of Change”, held in Stuttgart 8-10th of November 2018. 
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built space is precisely the type of architectural and urban products that are per-
fectly suitable for international investors. 
However, let us talk about these rent-seeking landscapes through the lenses 
of housing and urban policies, which actively create the material, symbolic and 
normative conditions for the capture of lived territories by finance. I have not 
mentioned the word “neo-liberalism” so far, but now it is time to name it: Yes, I 
am talking about neo-liberalism, which among its discourses includes a big lie: 
“State get out of the business and let the market do what is needed!” Yet in truth 
states, through their public policies, have actively created and reproduced all of 
the conditions for financial capital to seize cities and the built space. So, we are 
not talking about having the state in or out but about the specific new role of the 
state, from a distributive role, where it captures part of surplus capital so as to 
deliver goods and services to citizens, to one where it is dedicated to open terri-
tories being captured by surplus capital. We are not even talking about having 
state money or not, because most of the state money is directed towards promot-
ing development that is made for providing interest to the capital invested in real 
estate. 
When I had arrived in Dubai during one of my trips as Rapporteur, I realised 
that some of the fantastic buildings that were created were empty. By that time I 
was so idiotic and thought: “Poor investor, they must have lost a lot of money 
with these investments”. But no! One of the crucial things about financial capital 
and its relation to the built space is that the built space is an asset, a sort of park-
ing place in a wide financial circuit. As such, it can be “on the books” and by 
that alone it provides interest and rating for those investors and investment 
funds, even if it’s not used. We can see this around the world, a lot of empty 
spaces, which eventually become wonderful opportunities for future funds to 
take over. Yet, we are not only talking about the opening of the ground for these 
international fluxes of financial capital to come and take over the space but also 
a global process of dispossession. 
Accumulation by dispossession – there is nothing new about that, but it is a 
new version with a new scale and a new speed. We need to ask ourselves and 
inquire: who is dispossessed, where are the displaced, and, even more important-
ly, what are the forms and tactics of the displaced, of the dispossessed, to em-
place themselves and to create, what I call in opposition to the rent-seeking land-
scapes, generating their landscapes for life? 
During my mandate as Special Rapporteur for the Right to Adequate Hous-
ing from 2008 to 2014, I could witness the effects of the financial crisis of 2008, 
which was the first crisis of this new form of financial capital in its relation to 
real estate and built space, especially with its new relation to housing. By that 
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time, in 2008, what I could witness was a housing crisis. A housing crisis in 
countries like the US, like the UK, countries that used to have residual problems 
of housing, I would say, compared with other countries in Latin America, Asia 
or Africa. Of course, we cannot say that everybody in the US, UK, Netherlands 
or Sweden was living in wonderful and adequate housing before 2008, but I 
would say that most of the people had access to adequate housing. Which was a 
result of years of promoting housing as an essential part of the welfare state, a 
result of a particular political pact which was generated in those countries, from 
the late 19th/ early 20th century (depending on the particular history of the coun-
try), between capital, labour and the state to direct some surplus of the wealth 
produced towards social housing and social housing products. But in 2008 we 
saw foreclosures and homelessness worldwide, in the US, in Spain, in Ireland. I 
could witness a hunger strike in Kazakhstan, where the government and the new 
president – the former head of the communist party – convinced everybody to 
take out loans, to take credit, to buy homes that were built by Turkish construc-
tion companies with basically German and other European investment capital. 
By the time the crisis of 2008 started, the invested capital just went away from 
the construction companies, which went bankrupt, leaving buildings unfinished 
and people, whose savings were in the buildings, homeless. In Spain or the US, 
thousands and millions of houses were foreclosed, forcing people who had 
bought apartments or houses built by private entrepreneurs to give them back to 
the banks as they could not pay their debt any more. Worse even, in the case of 
Spain, these people still have a debt as the value of their houses after the crisis 
was much lower and insufficient to cover all the value of their mortgages. I also 
witnessed demonstrations in Tel Aviv, demonstrations of young Israelis without 
homes and without any possibility of getting one, because Israel also embarked 
on a neo-liberal policy of taking housing out of the welfare state; instead, trans-
forming it – and this is the common thread between all those countries – from 
being a part of the welfare state, from a social policy with different versions, into 
a commodity or financial asset through policies of promoting home ownership as 
the one and only solution for housing. 
So, we are talking about the financialisation of housing, in many terms. One 
is the possibility of opening a new frontier for this mass of surplus capital which 
is floating around the planet. Built space is especially relevant for finance for 
three reasons. First, because one spends a lot of money with built space, this 
space can absorb much investment capital surplus at once. Just to give you some 
figure: the investment fund of Apple, the corporation, is bigger than that of the 
national bank of Germany. And we are talking about national banks, sovereign 
funds, workers’ pension funds, because one part of the dismantling of the wel-
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fare system was the dismantling of the public welfare system and pushing all the 
workers to pension funds. Including us trying to figure out how to maintain some 
savings to assure retirement and old age in countries where public pension funds 
do not exist anymore. Secondly, for its durability. It is common, probably in 
Europe as well, certainly in Latin America, that one’s mother or father or aunt 
advises to put one’s money in built space, because it will not disappear over 
time. The materiality of the house, the fact that the built space can stay for 30, 
40, 50 years and more, makes it especially useful for the medium- and long-term 
investments that need to have returns over time, like pension funds. Finally, built 
space and (urban) land in general is very important collateral in the financial 
world. If one has land, if one has built space, then one has an asset that allows 
one to raise more, ask for more at the bank or on the financial circuit. And this is 
also something that everybody has experienced: we go to a bank and ask for a 
loan, and the first question the bank manager asks is whether one has a property 
or an apartment as a collateral. Built space is collateral. For these three reasons, 
the building of spaces is tightly integrated with the process and circuits of appre-
ciation of financial capital. Finally, new innovative products that link built space 
with financial circuits – like real-estate investment funds – made the entry and 
exit of financial capital into built space much easier, without transaction costs, 
just with a digital bit. 
I have another wonderful story to tell you about the housing crisis in the UK. 
At the end of the 1960s, 40% of the whole housing stock in the UK was social 
housing, built either by councils or other non-profits, like churches or unions. 
Under Margaret Thatcher (and also Reagan in the US) the whole stock was prac-
tically privatised, to the sitting tenants. Which, of course, was great for Margaret 
Thatcher and the way she could enter and destroy Labour-based constituencies, 
as all the workers practically gained a home: they could buy the home they lived 
in with a great discount and could become owners of these apartments and 
homes. We had different versions of this dismantling everywhere: in Eastern 
Europe, all the social housing stock was privatised, in Britain it was privatised to 
the sitting tenants. Even in places where there is still social housing, like Germa-
ny, some social housing companies were completely privatised, some privatised 
parts of their housing stock. So, we are talking about the dismantling of housing 
as a social policy, as part of the dismantling of the welfare state, as a human 
right, transformed into a commodity and financial asset, through strategies of 
privatisation (in the UK, Eastern Europe) and financialisation (in the Nether-
lands, Germany). 
But then the question is: What about countries in Latin America and Africa 
that never had housing policies as a part of a welfare state? While the welfare 
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state was dismantled in Europe, that was not the reality in countries like Brazil or 
South Africa. Instead, we had a “Southern” version of the commodification and 
financialisation of housing: the massive production of housing in the peripheries 
in Chile, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, adopting a version of the same model of 
promoting ownership of homes produced by private developers, with, in the case 
of Latin America, a heavy subsidy from the state. These homes are provided in 
the outskirts not because of planning problems but because land is cheaper there 
and thus provides for higher profits for developers. Cheap land, in Latin America 
for instance, means non-urbanized land, land without a city, which means living 
in jobless amenities-less environments. 
Financial capital was invested directly in construction companies and the 
owners of these companies became shareholders through IPOs2 or investment 
funds, hedge funds and equity funds, through the securitization of mortgages, 
which allows mortgages to circulate as one type of financial product, from one 
bank to the other bank, and then to an investment fund, and so on. I found one 
case in New York, right after the crisis, in which the mortgage of buildings 
passed through the hands of 80 different investment funds and groups within ten 
years. So, nobody really knew who the owner was. This is nothing new, this is 
surplus capital promoting geographical restructuring, the expansion of borders. 
This is also nothing new in the history of urban planning, the history of the re-
building of Paris under Haussmann is part of this story. David Harvey talks 
about the spatial fix, a fix in terms of a situation that needs to be restored but a 
fix also in terms of fixing something, grounding something. Yet what is new 
about the process is its scale, its speed: Capital arrives and leaves in a bit. More-
over, now there is instrumental titularization, which is essential to understanding 
this process as transforming fixed objects into paper, into assets. The new finan-
cial instruments, such as real-estate investment trusts, are completely different, 
because one does not buy or sell a piece of a shopping mall, for instance, but 
holds a piece of paper, not even a piece of paper, a piece of an electronic gesture, 
which represents the right and expectation to receive interest payments over 
time. These new instruments promote a possibility that the space can circulate 
without changing hands or without being precisely tied to anyone. Yet when it 
comes to housing, at the end of the day someone took out a mortgage in the first 
place. This is the one that will be dispossessed at the end, and that is exactly 
what happened with the foreclosures. Whereas investment banks received their 
returns from passing these papers from one to the other, to the other, each time 
 
2    Initial Public Offerings 
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receiving some per centage, it was the people that had mortgaged their lives who 
lost their homes and became homeless when the whole system collapsed. 
All of this would have been impossible without the active role of the state, 
which since the late 1970s removed all barriers for the free circulation of capital, 
dismantled social housing policies, pushed everybody towards buying their 
homes, and created home ownership as the one and only model for everybody, 
everywhere, heavily subsidised by the state. We are not talking about the state 
not spending money, we are talking about redirecting state money towards home 
ownership. Another way was to make rental housing less protected, for instance, 
through the Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos in Spain or the reform of rent con-
trol in New York and Berlin. ‘Affordable’ in inverted commas, because as a 
matter of fact, it is not meant for those who do not have any money, and it is 
seizing and taking out big tranches of land. Chile in the 1970s was the big labor-
atory for countries where social policies were residual. The housing policy of the 
Pinochet dictatorship was the destruction of all of the campamentos, the self-
built informal settlements, and the displacement of their residents into home 
ownership on the peripheries. This ‘opened’ the valuable land in the cities for 
use that provides more earned interest for the capital that was invested in the 
place. And the dispossession machinery did not act only in the Global South by 
evicting informal settlers. In the US and Spain, for example, expanding suburbs 
were produced during the housing boom years, emptying the centres of the cities 
and making them more and more playgrounds for rent-seeking capital. That is 
exactly what happened when renters were pushed out of their well-located 
apartments, or social housing was demolished to open ground to “affordable” 
and “mixed” housing, which basically raised the rent of the places and pushed 
out former inhabitants. 
One of the books that are fundamental to understand housing policies and 
urban policies under neo-liberalism is entitled “Housing: Enabling markets to 
work” (Mayo et al. 1993), which describes the recipe to reforming housing poli-
cies in order to promote home ownership through credit and unlocking land 
value. The latter is the idea that very well-located land cannot be occupied by 
poor people. This ‘unlock land value’ is the idea that one can build thousands of 
houses in the middle of nowhere with the money gained by reallocating very 
valued land. 
In cities were most of the homes are self-built in squatter or non-developed 
land, there is a specificity. We don’t have proper names for these “informal”, 
“illegal”, “irregular”, “self-built” spaces because our rational utopia is the order-
ly market of home owners of modernist architecture on private property. But 
what happens with these other spaces that have no name? They exist in our cities 
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in multiple dimensions of this ‘other’, often being the majority of the built space, 
especially in the so-called Global South. What is the role of this space, what is 
the role of this ‘other’ and what is the role of housing and urban policies in rela-
tion to this ‘other’. 
The essential condition for space to circulate freely in global markets is that 
space has one and only one permitted form of relationship between individuals 
with the territories they occupy: private property. Private property is the very 
base, the very condition, for titularization and financialisation. It is not necessari-
ly the safer kind of tenure relationship, and we saw this with the housing crisis. 
But private property is the freest to circulate, is the freest to be part of a market 
of commodities and a market of finance. To that end it is very important to deny 
the existence of the hundreds of other types of tenure, especially during the co-
lonial period. Colonialism was based on the denial of these ties, and this permit-
ted massive land grabbing in America, in Africa, in Asia, and in Europe as well, 
with for instance the denial of the relationship the Roma have with territories. 
We are talking about 200 years, since the enlightenment, when property is now 
connected to freedom and citizenship and is becoming a very foundation of the 
modern state. Utopia is a democracy of freeholders, meaning property holders. 
And the rest is the rest. 
In colonized territories, planning was essential to setting the borders between 
what is in and what is out: the orderly planned space based on the idea of private 
property was a way of affirming the cultural hegemony of the elites and also to 
draw the border between the ‘others’ and the racialized bodies and the racialized 
space, which are basically the landscapes for life, the self-built neighbourhoods 
that were produced under scarce resources without any material support of the 
state. Today, this precarity has nothing to do with tenure relations or with cultur-
al characteristics. The precarity has to do only with the fact that the wealth of 
society is not directed towards there. There are no resources and no money di-
rected toward the favelas, bastilles, slums. But if we take the word “slum”, we 
see that “slum” means criminal, scum in English. We are not only talking about 
a spatiality but also about a territorial stigma, we are talking about discriminato-
ry gestalt. In Brazil, the official statistics institute, IBGE, nominates self-built 
urban settlements as “aglomerados subnormais”, subnormal agglomerates, clear-
ly relating a certain form of spatial arrangement with outlawed criminality and 
irregularity. 
However, it is very interesting to see that those spaces are not completely de-
stroyed. They are maintained, they are tolerated, they are reproduced, including 
with the action of the state. Rarely are they displaced to the peripheries or de-
stroyed. The most common situation is the ambiguity of everyday life, the per-
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manent transitoriness, a state of exception that is over those settlements. Plan-
ning provides the language that sets the perimeter and the borders in order to see 
who has all of the rights and it is not ambiguous, and who has to live under the 
“perhaps” – “perhaps you can stay”, “perhaps you will be urbanized”, “perhaps 
displaced”, “perhaps regularised”. And even more perverse, being under the state 
of exception is the condition which permits, for instance, that the police can 
enter there, shooting in the streets and houses, killing randomly without any 
judicial mandate. 
The expansion and reproduction of those settlements were, according to the 
classic analysis of Brazilian sociologist Francisco de Oliveira in the 1970s, an 
essential condition to maintain wages that were too low to bear the housing cost. 
And what about today? Today, the ambiguity is essential to maintaining certain 
parts of the cities as a “reserved” target for financial capital, spaces to be cap-
tured by financial capital. Because slum evictions are, first of all, politically 
justified; because slums are marginal, outcast, outlaw, irregular. And at the same 
time, slum evictions are very practical because no expropriation has to be paid, 
basically, so they are cheap, cheaper at least than expropriating land in middle-
class neighbourhoods or private property. We have thousands of examples of 
this, such as evictions that take place during preparations for mega events, for 
which new urban developments are often located exactly where those settle-
ments existed before. 
All of that expresses the tight relationship between urban policies and hous-
ing policies, as the massive production of homes in the outskirts of cities are 
connected to the real state of complex financial expansions into central locations, 
with their shopping malls, corporate towers and cultural centres. 
After the 2008 financial crisis ended, the financialisation of housing persisted 
and advanced. The new wave, the new version of financialisation of housing, 
was not home ownership any more, but rental housing, which is corporate land-
lordism. The same hedge funds and equity funds that were behind the construc-
tion companies during the massive production of home ownership have been 
cheaply buying foreclosed apartments and houses so they could rent them out. 
Blackstone alone presently owns 85,000 housing units in 17 different cities in 
the US, and this is only one international investment fund. Some of these funds 
have even bought public housing in Madrid or Berlin and put them up for rent, 
of course pushing out ‘bad’ renters, that is, the ones who have been either unable 
to pay the higher rents or are considered racialized bodies. Those evicted in New 
York or Atlanta have been mainly African-Americans, the ones evicted in some 
German cities are basically immigrants and the ones having difficulties paying 
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rent in Spain are mostly Latin American immigrants. This machinery of dispos-
session has now been reproduced through rental housing. 
Let me finish my input on a brighter note, outlining some responses. What 
can we do with this powerful electronic cloud that made all states, even states 
under the rule of socialist parties or coalitions, adhere to adopting the same in-
struments, removing the same barriers, and developing and upholding the same 
policies? I think we have to reverse this story. Saying that the only constraint, 
the only barrier to financial capital taking over of all territory and all cities are 
the very places that are occupied by the poor, by the people with not-so-clear 
tenure relations. These people are the real constraint for this massive wave to go 
on. Here, we are not only talking about resistance to evictions. More than about 
resistance, I want to talk about existence. I want to talk about emplacements, 
which means the construction of the city by the people, and the fact that these 
people are there and that these cities are built under the logic of people’s lives 
and prosperity. 
We are talking about an urban warfare (Rolnik 2019), a contemporary rebel-
lion in which space is more than the scenery where the battles take place, but are 
the object of the battles themselves, battles around appropriation. We are seeing 
battles around the occupation of public space, thus creating a symbolic geogra-
phy, which means a political confrontation between territories that are either 
understood as landscapes for life or as playgrounds for financial capital. Long-
time occupations can exercise forms of organisation, decision-making and self-
government, and can rehearse possible futures. Today, they are, of course, con-
fronted by a militarized control of space, which also corresponds to private con-
trol, or the so-called new forms of governance, which are embedded in public-
private partnerships, public-private transformations and urban transformations, 
with their use of repressive technologies in the absence of the necessary political 
mediation of space. 
I finish by interrogating the Right to the City in this context. The Right to the 
City is not a set of words written in a by-law, in a resolution, or in conference 
proceedings. The Right to the City is the recognition and valorisation of the 
material and cultural landscapes that emerge from urban struggles everywhere: 
in movements against evictions, in the platform for people affected by mortgages 
in Spain, in the rebuilding of tenant unions in Spain, the UK and the US, in the 
demonstrations against gentrification in the Global North and Global South. The 
Right to the City is alive and on the streets. 
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Introduction: Housing and Human Settlements 
in a World of Change 
Md Ashiq Ur Rahman, Josefine Fokdal and Astrid Ley 
 
 
The housing challenge is becoming increasingly recognised in international 
policy discussions1; however, its broader links to the processes of migration, 
climate change, and economic globalisation are not yet fully understood. Despite 
the fact that, in principle, housing is recognised as a basic human right and is 
essential for human development, in practice, securing safe and adequate hous-
ing for everyone remains a major global development challenge of the 21st centu-
ry – as pointed out in the two forewords by respectively El Sioufi and Rolnik. 
Issues associated with housing, such as its scarcity (including the lack of acces-
sible land), affordability and quality, are persistent but changing in magnitude, 
over time. This book aims to situate housing in relation to the processes of global 
transformation. In this sense, it highlights the processes of economic globalisa-
tion, migration, and climate change as three major dynamics in relation to the 
global housing crisis. Obviously, there are also further global transformations in 
place but they are either not yet as widely discussed in terms of their effects on 
housing (such as information and communication technology) or they include 
very particular local forms and effects (such as demographic changes). This 
book is an attempt to identify the influencing dynamics of the three key trans-
formation processes. As such, it does not discuss housing in isolation but rather 
 
1 International agreements address housing and its role in urban development and call 
for systematic approaches to the housing challenge (Agenda 2030 for Sustainable De-
velopment, with goals to reduce extreme poverty, the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015; the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development 
2015; the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change 2015; and the New Urban Agenda 2016). 
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takes a holistic perspective toward housing in a world that is changing on both 
local and global scales. 
Over the last twenty years, the process of economic globalisation has result-
ed in significant changes that have not only affected livelihoods in human set-
tlements and reshaped the institutional settings of a housing delivery that is often 
framed under neo-liberal policies and so-called enablement approaches but has 
also turned housing into a product that is traded under a system of globally oper-
ated finance. Thus, the commodification of housing largely affects the overall 
housing process (see Rolniks’ contribution in the foreword for an elaboration). 
Apart from this financialisation process of housing, rural-urban migration as well 
as the upsurge in forced migration across international borders (due to crises, or 
economic or environmental reasons) are also emerging issues which have impli-
cations for cities and human settlements (UN-Habitat 2016). 
Independent of these diverse push factors, the process of migration is directly 
resulting in rapid urbanisation, globally. This process is also causing the spatial 
expansion of urban settlements through the annexation and reclassification of 
rural areas to make more space for housing provision for a growing urban popu-
lation. However, the question is whether these changes are addressing the hous-
ing needs of migrants and how these processes are taking place in different con-
texts. Apart from the two dynamics of migration and economic globalisation, 
this book also highlights the influence of climate change. The question, here, is 
whether climate change and its direct link with housing and human settlements is 
a persistent or emerging issue. This book seeks to highlight how a changing 
climate is affecting the housing process and how human settlements are respond-
ing through everyday practice and policies. The three global trends discussed 
here (economic globalisation, migration and climate change) apply to develop-
ing, transitional and developed countries alike but are most strongly discussed in 
relation to developing countries, which are severely affected but have addressed 
these issues only to a limited degree in spite of their relevance. This is reflected 
in this book in the number of chapters that contextualise the three global dynam-
ics of economic globalisation, migration and climate change in relation to hous-
ing in developing and transitional countries across diverse regions worldwide. 
This chapter raises three different but interlinked questions related to the 
aforementioned dynamics. These questions are: (i) What outcomes have eco-
nomic globalisation and related neo-liberal policies and “enabling” ideas brought 
to the ground to address the issue of housing over the last two decades? (ii) How 
are the dynamics of migration reshaping the urban housing provision? And (iii) 
How are human settlements able to respond with different housing approaches to 
extreme climate events? To frame the above questions, this chapter draws on 
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various sources to understand the housing processes in relation to the impacts of 
the three global dynamics addressed in this book. Later, this chapter contextual-
ises the theoretical discourses by reflecting on the case studies outlined in the 
following chapters of this book.2 
 
 
HOUSING AND ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION 
 
The evolution of pro-poor housing policies is not an isolated event; rather, these 
policies have been enacted with the various macro-economic changes that took 
place in developing countries, starting since the post-WWII period. This evolu-
tionary process is related to the development discourse that associates urban 
poverty within the political, economic, social and cultural context (Jenkins et al. 
2007). The particular link between the destruction of local economies and liveli-
hoods through extending production chains to low-income countries is a case in 
point for economic globalisation as it is affecting livelihoods and thereby hous-
ing finance. Moreover, over the last three decades, neo-liberal policies have been 
particularly influential in reshaping housing systems and housing opportunities 
globally. Neo-liberal housing approaches have involved the privatisation of state 
housing assets, the promotion of individual home ownership, and increased 
rents, reduced subsidies, the deregulation of private housing and mortgage lend-
ing, the weakening of planning controls for new and existing housing, reduced 
state intervention in social and economic affairs and the firmly established asser-
tion of the superiority of market processes (Rolnik 2013; Forrest and Hirayama 
2009; Mukhija 2004).The consequence has been a deliberate attempt by policy-
makers to make housing policies more market friendly and to encourage the 
private sector to be further involved in housing delivery (Sengupta 2009; Berner 
2001). However, the type of neo-liberalism implemented and its particular out-
comes in relation to housing differ across political, economic, social and cultural 
contexts. 
Although, conceptually, the neo-liberal approach refers to the market and the 
withdrawal of the state, in practice, there is a duality. As Peck and Tickell (2006) 
have observed, “Only rhetorically does neo-liberalism mean less state” (p. 33). 
Brenner and Theodre (2005) explain this understanding of neo-liberalism as 
 
2 This publication and its contributions are based on selected papers that were presented 
at the 19th N-AERUS conference on “Housing and Human settlements in a World of 
Change”, held in Stuttgart 8-10th of November 2018 and financed by the German Re-
search Foundation (DFG).  
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being a “neo-liberalism [that] is not a fixed end-state or condition; rather, it rep-
resents a process of [a] market-driven social and spatial transformation” (p. 102). 
Thus, this approach is always intensely contested by diverse social forces con-
cerned with preserving non-market forms of actions (ibid). This proposition 
provides the scope for understanding different forms of neo-liberalism. In an 
effort to clarify how neo-liberal policy has developed, Peck and Tickell (2002) 
identify two interrelated phases or processes: “roll-back neo-liberalism” and 
“roll-out neo-liberalism” (p. 36). Roll-back neo-liberalism refers to “the active 
destruction or discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist insti-
tutions” (Ibid, p. 37). This process is often termed privatisation and involves a 
retreat from state regulations and the governmental control of resources, includ-
ing public services, nationalised industries, and labour and social rights (Aguirre 
et al. 2006). The second neo-liberal process, roll-out neo-liberalism, refers to 
“the purposeful construction and consolidation of neo-liberalised state forms, 
modes of governance, and regulatory relations” (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 37). 
The concept of roll-back neo-liberalism has always been contested by the fact 
that the local context depends on both the political regime and the impact of the 
market on urban social structures (Brenner and Theodre 2005). In the context 
where roll-back neo-liberalism fails to cater to the urban poor, roll-out neo-
liberalism acts as an alternative form of urban governance by involving different 
actors (ibid). This approach to roll-out neo-liberalism is evident, in developed 
countries, in different urban upgrading and housing programmes (e.g., social 
housing programmes in the United Kingdom). However, roll-out neo-liberalism 
as a modality of urban governance is still limited and Brenner and Theodre 
(2005) mention it as being a problem of political will as opposed to criticising 
the idea of neo-liberalism. Therefore, it is of significance to contextualise how 
the globalised economy has made an impact on livelihoods and housing. Against 
this notion it becomes relevant to ask how neo-liberal “enabling” ideas have 
been modified in different countries in order to address the issue of housing, 
particularly housing for the urban poor. 
 
 
HOUSING AND MIGRATION 
 
Worldwide more than 65 million people are on the move due to conflict or natu-
ral disasters (UNHCR 2015). In addition, rural-to-urban migration continues to 
increase pressure on urban infrastructure and housing demand. While this issue 
has persisted in the developing countries and countries in transition for decades, 
the recent influx of refugees in Europe has put affordable and safe housing back 
on the agenda in the Global North. Here, high pressure on urban areas and the 
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failure of local governments to provide access to affordable housing has led to a 
condition where more than one billion urban dwellers are living in informal and 
underserviced settlements worldwide (UN-Habitat 2016). This situation calls for 
addressing inefficient housing policies, stringent regulations and inaccessible 
housing finance as well as to acknowledging the informal solutions and efforts 
undertaken by the urban poor, themselves, in order to achieve an inclusive and 
empowering approach. The role of migrants in this process has always been 
conceptualised as a cheap source of labour (Schiller and Caglar 2009). However, 
the role of migration can be conceptualised at different scales as migrants are 
creating and reproducing different social institutions in the absence of states’ 
responses to their basic needs, including housing and employment. 
Therefore, the link between migration and housing can be explained through 
a process of symbiotic relationship-building. As Saunders (2011) explains, the 
arrival of migrants or the development of transitory neighbourhoods that often 
lie at the fringes of established cities provide hope for migrants in making use of 
their socio-cultural resources and economic capital for a better future. However, 
this hope is always contested through physical segregation and the policy 
measures of different actors who want to make their cities competitive in a neo-
liberal way (Sassen 2016; Saunders 2011; Schiller and Caglar 2009). In response 
to these segregation policies and in order to explore the opportunities available 
in their arrival cities, migrants often resort to their own informal and adaptive 
solutions to make use of a spectrum of available housing options. Therefore, 
informality is a common feature when we discuss the provision of housing for 
migrants. This notion of informality has two interrelated outcomes. One is relat-
ed to migrants’ housing prospects and the other is related to a speculative future. 
In terms of prospects, informal housing support and housing solutions are often 
self-arranged. More often, these housing solutions are the determinants of mi-
grants’ identity and self-actualisation; they strengthen confidence among mi-
grants who act collectively for their survival in their arrival cities, from both the 
social and economic perspective (Moser and Stein 2011; Tipple 2005; Rakodi 
2002; Mitlin 2001). The speculative future is associated with the temporary sta-
tus of such housing provision and citizen rights. Migrants’ autonomous adapta-
tion to secure housing is often constrained by a lack of secure tenure and house-
hold capacity, with most migrants having neither the physical nor the financial 
capacity to afford large-scale market-driven housing projects (Banks 2012; 
Schiller and Caglar 2009). Therefore, it is of great importance to understand 
whether and how the dynamics of migration reshape the provision of urban 
housing. 
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HOUSING AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The continuing extension of the built environment has severe effects on climate 
change and is a key factor that needs to be addressed in climate-change mitiga-
tion measures. The third part of this book, however, sets its focus on the vulner-
ability of human settlements due to climate change. In particular, cities in devel-
oping countries and countries in transition are at risk due to the impacts of cli-
mate change for a number of reasons: high population density, where sometimes 
the majority of people are living in slums or informal settlements; a high concen-
tration of solid and liquid wastes in these settlements; informal urban growth that 
disrupts natural drainage systems and urban expansion on particularly risky sites 
(Tanner et al. 2009; Pelling 2003), to mention just a few. 
Climate change is having an increasingly important influence in that it is ex-
acerbating the already vulnerable livelihoods of the urban poor (Banks 2012; 
Roy et al. 2012). The effects of climate change are adding an additional layer of 
shocks the urban poor must face in the context of limited services and infrastruc-
ture, densely populated and environmentally vulnerable habitats, and their lim-
ited adaptive capacity to cope with climate-change impacts (Roy et al. 2012; 
Banks 2012; Banks et al. 2011; Roy et al. 2011; Jabeen et al. 2010). Despite 
these challenges, present climate-change-adaptation strategies have largely ig-
nored the issues of housing (Hossain and Rahman 2018; Tanner and Mitchell 
2008; Mitlin 2005). A large proportion of informal urban dwellers reside in risky 
locations that are prone to natural disasters; for instance, on river banks that are 
prone to flooding or in areas that face the potential danger of landslides. With 
climate change, the frequency of natural disasters and issues such as urban heat 
islands often intensify, in many instances leading to disastrous consequences for 
the most vulnerable groups (UNISDR 2012). Thus, access to safe and adequate 
housing also means access to land that is situated in safe locations (Boonyaban-
cha 2009). The assessment and perception of risk, however, is not without con-
testation. Poor urban communities that are situated in high-risk sites are also 
exposed to the threat of eviction and relocation, which causes further vulnerabil-
ity. This contested situation calls for upscaling all of the levels on which housing 
is being discussed and, thus, for city-wide approaches to move toward a strategy 
of safe and affordable housing. Housing can provide a pathway and has been 
identified, in the literature, as being the major component of the physical capital 
that contributes to urban resilience (Rakodi 2002). Here, resilience can be under-
stood as “the capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to 
hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an ac-
ceptable level of functioning and structure,” and this implies learning from past 
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experiences to improve future protection by implementing “risk reduction 
measures” (UNISDR, 2012). Thus, a capacity-based understanding of resilience 
contemplates the poverty issue that is at the heart of the disaster-risk reduction 
and climate-change-adaptation nexus. In this context, the development of capaci-
ty within a social system that includes poor communities and different organisa-
tions is built on a system that links climate-change adaptation and disaster-risk 
reduction as an important step because it creates an enabling environment for 
poverty reduction in a changing climate (Béné et al. 2014). Therefore, integrat-
ing (community-based) risk-mapping into urban development and a discussion 
of land and infrastructure development tools that are associated with housing can 
be a first step in identifying safe, well-connected locations city-wide. In this 
context, to understand the dynamics of urban resilience, it is important to identi-
fy how human settlements are able to respond with different housing approaches 
to extreme climate events. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK 
 
The book is divided into three parts, each covering one thematic area. Part I 
deals with the issue of housing in a globalising economy as it relates to market-
oriented policies. In this section, three chapters illustrate the evolution of hous-
ing policies and the emergence of alternative modes of housing provision under 
the process of the financialisation of housing. These three chapters cover case 
studies on approaches to social housing in Indonesia, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Brazil. Part II of the book contains four chapters that highlight the issue of mi-
gration and its relation to housing and human settlements in the context of 
Oman, Bolivia, China and Bangladesh. These chapters also use the case-study 
method to highlight the exclusion of migrants from policy initiatives on housing 
and the everyday routines and habits of migrants in relation to tenure, housing 
and the collective spaces they use to develop intervention strategies for housing 
and employment in the face of government neglect. The final section - Part III of 
the book presents three chapters that cover the issues of housing and climate 
change. Here, the authors showcase case studies from Egypt, South Africa, Co-
lumbia and Brazil to portray different strategies of adaptation to extreme climatic 
events in order to reduce the physical vulnerability of different urban neighbour-
hoods. In the following, we will reflect on the major arguments of each of the 
chapters under the thematic areas. 
Part I consists of contributions related to the link between “Housing and 
Economic Globalisation”. The first chapter in this section is entitled “Indonesian 
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Housing Policy in the Era of Globalisation”. Here, Jo Santoso discusses two new 
housing initiatives of the national government of Indonesia; namely, the “City 
Without Slums” and “The National Affordable Housing Program”. Drawing on 
the case-study context, he argues that the successful implementation of these 
housing programmes depends not only on their ability to effectively overcome 
the conditions of the existing stock of housing but it also has to deal with the 
negative impacts of the transnational-global orientation of Indonesian economic 
development, which continuously deepens social gaps and produces urban pov-
erty. Finally, he argues that Indonesia’s housing problems cannot be overcome 
only by successful governments programmes but, in the long run, this highly 
depends on the success of the community-based programme “City for All” in 
empowering urban communities to develop their own capacities to be part of the 
solution. This does not mean withdrawing the state’s responsibility but rather 
sharing the responsibility between the state and the communities. 
The second chapter of Part I is entitled “Let’s get down to business – Private 
Influences in the Making of Affordable Housing Policies: The case of Minha 
Casa Minha Vida in Brazil.” Anthony Boanada-Fuchs focuses on the involve-
ment of market actors in the housing sector and the impact of the global financial 
crisis on Brazil. The findings of this chapter underline the high level of policy 
influence developers and construction companies have had on the affordable 
housing programme, from introducing the idea of a large-scale national housing 
program to the constant policy and regulatory adjustments to the Minha Casa 
Minha Vida housing programme, over the years. He argues that formal commu-
nication channels have enabled these actors to influence housing policy, but they 
have also benefitted from informal or, at best, institutionalized practices that 
have developed in the absence of any official regulation. Finally, this chapter 
argues that the lack of democratic participation and accountability in the housing 
process has led to a biased institutionalization that guarantees profit margins and 
preferential development conditions for developers at the expense of Brazilian 
cities and society at large. 
The final chapter of Part I, by Marielly Casanova, is entitled “Mutual Aid, 
Self-Management and Collective Ownership: Social Capital as a Housing Fi-
nance Counter-Mechanism to Neo-liberal Policies”. This chapter draws on dif-
ferent sources of international literature. Casanova argues that the economic 
system has been putting intense pressure on the housing market as it has been 
following a logic of accumulation and speculation, which has driven up prices 
and excluded a great majority of the urban population. Referring to the case-
study context of Argentina and Uruguay, the author claims that, in response to 
these challenges, transformative initiatives from social groups or organised 
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communities are fostering mutual aid, self-management and the development of 
collective property assets from social organisations and these have become the 
tools the urban poor use to counteract their unfulfilled citizen rights. As evi-
dence, Casanova presents the case of the tenant movement in Argentina called 
MOI (Movimiento de Ocupantes e Inquilinos) to secure housing rights against 
the threat of forced evictions, by developing tenant cooperatives and taking over 
and occupying abandoned properties. She further draws on the case of a housing 
cooperative called FUCVAM (Federación Uruguaya de Cooperativas de 
Viviendapor Ayuda Mutua–the Uruguayan Federation of Mutual-aid Housing 
Cooperatives), which developed its activities by learning from Argentina’s MOI 
movement. Casanova identifies that, in both case-study contexts, self-
management, mutual aid and collective ownership played important roles in 
developing social capital as an alternative mechanism to financing low-income 
housing. 
Part II of this book contains the contributions of different authors on the is-
sue of “Housing and Migration”. In the chapter entitled “Influence of Migrants’ 
Two-Direction Linkage on Urban Villages in China: The case of Shigezhuang 
village in Beijing”, Shiyu Yang notes that, in China, urban villages grow infor-
mally and with their prime location and low living costs they have become ideal 
destinations for China’s internal migrant population. Highlighting the case-study 
context, she argues that migrant workers’ constant linkage to their rural origins 
and social networks are based on place bonds which may contribute to more 
working opportunities, a better sense of belongingness and strong neighbour-
hood attachments. At the same time, however, this deepens their vulnerable and 
inferior status in their urban destinations. Drawing on the everyday lives of mi-
grants in urban villages, Shiyu explains that temporary migrants as circulators 
consider the city as a place for work instead of a place for living; thus, they are 
reluctant to invest money in their city living and only demand substandard hous-
ing. Therefore, strong community leadership is a missing element in urban vil-
lages in China in terms of negotiating with other stakeholders regarding mi-
grants’ right to the city. 
The second chapter of Part II by Fabio Bayro Kaiser, entitled “Need for 
Housing or Speculation? Urban Expansion of the City of Tarija-Bolivia”, raises 
the question of land speculation in the City of Tarija in Bolivia and reflects on 
the severe consequences of neglecting this issue in the context of the recent in-
flux of migrants and the increasing levels of population density due to rural-
urban migration. In this chapter, Bayro Kaiser identifies that urban expansion in 
the case-study context is the outcome of centralism in housing policies and pro-
grammes that make the operationalisation of development agenda(s) quite diffi-
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cult as existing programmes are not designed to respond to site-specific circum-
stances. Referring to the case-study context, he explains that land speculation has 
deprived the city of valuable natural land and has also destroyed important water 
bodies in an illegitimate way. He also argues that informal urbanisation is an 
opportunity to develop cities, but inadequate municipal controls and/or regula-
tions mean that speculation has led to over-priced plots of land. Moreover, 
through an analysis of the urban expansion that has taken place in the areas stud-
ied, he argues that the new (planned) neighbourhoods as an outcome of urban 
expansion are larger in terms of surface than the older neighbourhoods; however, 
they house significantly fewer people. 
In her chapter entitled “Understanding the Housing Needs of Low-Skilled 
Bangladeshi Migrants in Oman”, Shaharin Elham Annisa identifies that cities 
across the Gulf region are increasingly shifting the location of migrant workers’ 
housing away from city centres and closer to the work sites of low-skilled mi-
grants. This chapter seeks to reveal these migrants’ housing needs by studying a 
labour camp and shared housing developed in Al-Hamriya, Muscat. Annisa 
notes that the temporary alteration of indoor and outdoor spaces, in the case-
study settlements, can be considered an indication of city management’s failure 
to cater to the basic social and spatial needs of these low-skilled migrants. In this 
chapter, she argues that such alterations to housing units and the built environ-
ment are linked to the livelihood strategies of low-skilled migrants, ranging from 
finding income-generating opportunities to building strong social cohesion. Fi-
nally, she identifies that housing for low-skilled migrants in the Gulf region does 
not comply with these migrants’ livelihood opportunities, and the manner in 
which migrants alter their housing and the built environment, in an informal 
way, brings about more opportunities in terms of enhancing their capital so as to 
pursue different livelihoods. 
The fourth and last chapter of Part II is entitled “Urban Environmental Mi-
grants: Demands for a Unique Category of Human Refugees to Ensure Their 
Right to Land and Resettlements”, by Syed Mukaddim and his co-authors. Using 
the case-study context of Khulna city, Bangladesh, the authors call for the basic 
recognition of people who are forced to migrate due to environmental events. 
They argue that environmental factors are not the sole influence but they certain-
ly put heavy pressure on to the other drivers of migration. This chapter identifies 
that even though the link between environmental factors and migration has been 
realised in the different policies and programmes of governmental and non-
governmental organisations, the people who face forced resettlement either due 
to conflict or to climate-related disasters are yet to be categorised separately so 
as to receive appropriate assistance. Finally, the authors argue that environmen-
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tal migrants are largely acknowledged as either a usual “migrant” or a “refugee”, 
both terms that undermine the significance and gravity of the conditions in 
which they live. 
Part III covers the issue of “Housing and Climate Change” and opens with 
the contribution by Franziska Laue, on “Heat Stress Related Climate Change 
Adaptation in the MENA Region - Reflections on Socially Inclusive Approach-
es”. In this chapter, the author explains the theoretical interconnected aspects of 
housing and climate change and claims that climate-change-related vulnerabili-
ties differ across neighbourhoods, based on the physical conditions of the hous-
ing structures, the built environment and the demographic compositions. Laue 
uses the case-study method to highlight this issue and identifies that all neigh-
bourhoods in the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) are exposed to heat stress, but 
climate-change-related vulnerabilities are an increasingly relevant topic particu-
larly for low-income neighbourhoods and neglected and contested historic areas 
and informal settlements. She argues that, in the context of the above-mentioned 
vulnerable neighbourhoods, adaptation can crucially rely on the local communi-
ty’s awareness, interactions, and mechanisms for adaptation. To highlight the 
importance of community involvement, Laue presents the findings of a project in 
a neighbourhood called Ezzbet El-Nasr, which is located in the GCR and had 
received aid from an international organisation. Her findings are that communi-
ty-based climate-change adaptation requires a particular balance of individual 
and collective awareness and community interaction and support, whereas these 
communities (potentially) face continuous neglect in terms of both the services 
they need and formal governance. 
The following chapter, “From the Hyper-Ghetto to State-Subsidised Urban 
Sprawl: Old and New Vulnerabilities in Buffalo City, South Africa”, by Gerhard 
Kienast, highlights the local practice of emergency resettlement and the redevel-
opment initiatives that are triggered by shack fires and severe floods in Duncan 
Village, Buffalo City, South Africa. Kienast uses the case-study method and 
argues that a non-participatory relocation has created new vulnerabilities in the 
area studied. He notes that the new settlements, in the case-study area, were only 
serviced with the most basic infrastructure, lacked integration in the local econ-
omy and were also problematic for inhabitants because transport costs were 
prohibitive. In addition, he points out that the spaces that opened up due to the 
relocation of shack owners were soon filled by migrants who set up new infor-
mal housing. Therefore, he argues that the reoccupation points to the simple fact 
that there is a high demand for a place in the city, that the state-subsidised hous-
ing programme is nowhere close to filling this gap and that the formal, bureau-
cratic, long-term planning system has failed to reduce the risk of disasters. Final-
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ly, he argues that when the formal long-term planning process fails to implement 
climate-change adaptations, a poverty-ridden area like Buffalo City must be 
balanced with interim services and disaster-management plans. 
The final chapter of Part III and of the book is on “Learning from Co-
Produced Landslide Risk Mitigation Strategies in Low-Income Settlements in 
Medellín (Colombia) and São Paulo (Brazil)”. In this chapter, Harry Smith et al. 
use the case-study method to investigate two projects that involve community-
based efforts that range from developing financial mechanisms to the co-
production of arrangements set up to deal with disaster-prone areas in Medellín 
(Colombia) and São Paulo (Brazil). The authors argue that current risk govern-
ance and management practices focus on post-disaster and recovery scenarios 
rather than prevention and mitigation, with the latter manifesting mostly in inter-
ventions that run counter to establishing relationships of co-production. This 
chapter shows that different levels and ways of understanding disaster risk can 
be found within different communities and are linked to the history of each par-
ticular settlement; this, in turn, affects how such communities engage with exter-
nal agencies (e.g., local government, utilities companies) in relation to dealing 
with disaster risk. In addition, the authors argue that risk governance and man-
agement involve different approaches in different cities but are linked to a gen-
eral approach that is used in informal settlements in each city and also to state 
capacity. The projects described in this chapter showcase alternative ways of 
engaging vulnerable communities and the local government in each city in co-
producing landslide-risk-management strategies. Drawing on the lessons learned 
from the participatory action research projects in the case-study contexts, the 
authors argue that developing ways of co-producing landslide-risk mitigation 
that optimise the use of community and state capacities to provide safe homes 





Reflecting on the contents of this book, we investigated three different but inter-
linked questions related to the thematic issues it addresses: (i) What outcomes 
have the globalising economy and the aligned neo-liberal “enabling” ideas 
brought to the ground to address the issue of housing over the last two decades? 
(ii) How are the dynamics of migration reshaping the provision of urban hous-
ing? And (iii) How are human settlements able to develop different housing 
approaches that will enable them to respond to extreme climate events? The 
three chapters on “Housing and Economic Globalisation”, in part I of this book, 
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give evidence to how market-based enabling mechanisms under neo-liberal de-
velopment approaches have failed to address the housing needs of the urban poor 
and how in contrast a participatory enabling approach has the potential to adopt 
the informal networked actions of the urban poor in order to scale up communi-
ty-led projects and programmes. However, the lack of public policies that affect 
the function and creation of organisational arrangements for social housing is 
detrimental to such participatory approaches. Thus, it is time to bring back the 
state, in a collaborative form, for restructuring housing policy around the condi-
tion and provision of housing for the urban poor. Moreover, this implies that 
political will is essential for such a re-engagement in the era of financialisation. 
Reflecting on the chapter by Jo Santoso, we conclude that the transformation 
of housing policy in Indonesia follows the enabling approach advocated by the 
World Bank, which essentially replicates the roll-back form of neo-liberalism. 
Although the case studies in the chapter present community-led initiatives, it is 
obvious that these have not been mainstreamed through public policy for hous-
ing on a city or country-wide scale. Similar cases have been observed in the case 
of Brazil, as pointed out by Anthony Boanada-Fuchs. In these two chapters, we 
can observe that the common feature of the roll-back form of neo-liberalism 
follows the World Bank approach that asks for the restructuring of organisational 
arrangements and legislation to ensure market friendly environments (Waeyen-
berge 2018). However, in the case-study context of Brazil, Boanada-Fuchs as-
serts that the state’s market-enabling approach to a housing solution did not 
necessarily include legislative restructuring but rather a profit-seeking commodi-
fication process of housing development. Therefore, reflecting on two papers 
that present the roll-back form of neo-liberalism, we want to refer to Raquel 
Rolnik (2013) as she describes the whole process of “the commodification of 
housing and the increased use of housing as an investment asset [that has] pro-
foundly affected the prevailing idea across the world that adequate housing was 
a human right” (Rolnik 2013, p. 1059). Also, Marielly Casanova highlights the 
importance of community-led approaches under an enabling paradigm; however, 
the case study presented in her chapter follows the idea of a “participatory ena-
bling approach” under the roll-out form of neo-liberalism. In these cases, the 
government becomes the facilitator of the actions of all of the participants in-
volved in the production and improvement of shelter (Sarfoh 2010). However, in 
reviewing different international practices, we have observed that these initia-
tives failed to reach the necessary scale and in multiple cases the urban poor still 
face challenges where formal governance has not blended with informal govern-
ance in an institutionalized way (Rahman et al. 2016; Fokdal et al. 2015; Mitlin 
2008). Therefore, we would like to draw attention to our claim that political will 
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is the essential component for reaching the appropriate scale for community-led 
housing initiatives and tackling the commodification of housing in an era of 
economic globalisation under the neo-liberal paradigm. 
The chapters of Part II on “Housing and Migration” point to inefficient hous-
ing policies, stringent regulations and inaccessible housing finance and how this 
is creating an informal bubble of housing solutions for migrants. It seems that 
housing policies and programmes are not at all inclusive in relation to migrants 
and often migrants are treated as a non-existent population. Further, their efforts 
to undertake an empowering approach to achieve inclusion have been very frag-
ile. Highlighting the chapters of Shiyu Yang and Fabio Bayro Kaiser, it is evi-
dent that the physical segregation of migrants is a factor globally, and this is 
mainly due to the policy measures of different actors and the competitive nature 
of cities. In both cases, housing for migrants is provided informally and devel-
oped outside the city not because of planning problems but because land is 
cheaper there. In the case of China, this land has officially remained non-
urbanised land; and in the case of Bolivia, these areas were declared urban with-
out the provision of urban amenities. These cases show a clear policy of the 
segregation and marginalisation of migrants in relation to their housing provi-
sion. Similar issues have also been identified by Syed Mukaddim et al. in the 
case presented on Bangladesh, where environmental migrants do not receive any 
special attention from policy-makers but are left alone in the city, like the rest of 
the urban poor, and this makes their lives more vulnerable. In response to these 
segregation policies, we have often observed, globally, an autonomous response 
from migrants wherein they have developed incremental housing or altered the 
built environment (Moser and Stein 2011; Tipple 2005). The chapter by Shaha-
rin Elham Annisa showcases similar responses from migrants in Oman, where 
they are altering the built environment and going beyond formal rule to appro-
priate spaces for generating different opportunities to pursue livelihoods. How-
ever, these solutions are very fragile and always under threat of demolition 
(Banks 2012). Therefore, as we highlighted in the last section, the issue of mi-
grants must be treated as a political priority in local development plans. The 
motivating factor for such a transformation in the political process could be trig-
gered by the idea of Schiller and Caglar (2009, p. 189), where they noted that 
“migrants may also participate in rescaling a city by contributing to a re-
evaluation of a city’s global image”. 
Reflecting on the issues of housing and climate change, in Part III, it can be 
assumed that the changing nature of climate, together with the housing condi-
tion, increases vulnerability in low-income urban neighbourhoods. In this sec-
tion, the authors have identified that housing can present a pathway for increas-
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ing urban resilience. They point toward acknowledging the nature of the chang-
ing climate and the associated risk of climate-induced disaster and argue that it is 
now essential to explore alternative ways of engaging vulnerable communities 
and the local government at the city scale in co-producing risk-management 
strategies. In the chapter on climate-change adaptation in the MENA region, 
Franziska Laue reflects on those living in environmentally vulnerable settings 
and substandard housing and notes that poor urban households and communities 
are also attempting to find strategies of adaptation in order to reduce their physi-
cal vulnerability to extreme weather events. These strategies can be considered 
as “physical impact minimising strategies” (Hossain and Rahman 2018). There-
fore, institutionalizing these efforts resonates with the capacity-based under-
standing of resilience (Béné et al. 2014). Such institutionalized processes and 
their forms can be applied through the frameworks of co-production/co-
management in which citizen and state relations are amended to take account of 
communities’ potential to self-organise (Mitlin 2008). On one hand, the case 
study presented by Harry Smith et al., in Part III, showcases a perfect example of 
such co-production in dealing with issues of climate change on a neighbourhood 
scale. On the other hand, state negligence and the lack of community leadership 
in the case of Duncan Village in Buffalo City, South Africa, presented by Ger-
hard Kienast, shows a neighbourhood’s vulnerability to different climatic events. 
In summary, the findings indicate that where the representative community-
based organisations can build partnerships with local or national governments, 
the possibilities for building resilience to climate change are much greater. 
Finally, this book unpacks the dynamics of housing under three key thematic 
areas of a world in change. Although the cases presented in this book are very 
much local and reflect on current statuses, they are still connected to global 
transformations and show that the changing nature of economic globalisation 
under neo-liberalism, migration and climate change is producing varied out-
comes in relation to housing. Therefore, a global consensus and an understand-
ing of local issues will be significant to dealing with the challenges of housing in 
the near future. The cases presented in this book are a testimony of the informal-
isation of the housing process, the increased diversity of actors involved and the 
lack of efficient and responsive housing policies to adequately adapt to the re-
spective contexts. The New Urban Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals 
could provide a background of such a consensus. Nevertheless, how to contextu-
alise both agendas in order to deal with the issue of housing needs to be ad-
dressed in both academia and in practice. The contributions of this book provide 
some examples and indications of such a contextualisation. In doing so, this 
volume wants to encourage policy-makers, planners, researchers and social ac-
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tivists to take an integrated perspective on housing and human settlement in a 
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Chapter 1: Indonesian Housing Policy  






In the early1970s, the Government of Indonesia introduced a liberal market-
oriented housing policy that focused on growth-oriented urban development. 
This new housing policy was based on the privatization of the housing sector and 
prioritized home ownership, factors that initiated the establishment of Indone-
sia’s real estate sector. This new liberal policy also produced a number of nega-
tive impacts on housing, particularly in the cities, where the capability to antici-
pate and prepare for the urbanization process was significantly reduced. In the 
three decades that followed, the Indonesian government attempted to overcome 
the negative impacts of these policies by introducing two strategic programmes: 
one aimed to upgrade housing and settlement and the other subsidized housing. 
Between 1980 and 2000 as urbanization in Indonesia reached its peak, its cit-
ies failed to address the problems inherent in urbanization, including the availa-
bility of adequate, affordable housing. Despite efforts to overcome the issues of 
poverty and housing for the poor in urban areas, the social discrepancy within 
the cities grew, resulting in an even bigger problem in new construction of sub-
standard housing and an increase in the incidence of squatters in cities.  In 2001, 
which marked the middle of the region’s recovery from the Asian Monetary 
Crisis, the Indonesian government initiated a study called Enabling the Housing 
market to work in Indonesia(HOMI), which was supported by the World Bank 
(World Bank 2001). In its final report, in 2002, the HOMI study accepted that 
for a certain period of time affordable housing could only be delivered through 
subsidies. At the same time, however, the study maintained the basic concept, 
that housing can only become more affordable if market distortions could be 
48 | Jo Santoso 
 
addressed. In short, housing market needed to work more efficiently. At the 
same time, if the housing were to become more affordable, then the housing 
subsidy could be reduced (Hoek-Smit 2005). The HOMI study’s recommenda-
tion to reform the housing delivery system was never implemented. So, once 
again, the need to reform housing policy became the objective of under President 
Joko Widodo’s government (2014-2019). This government integrated the vari-
ous housing programmes into two “main strategic programmes”:  City without 
Slum (Indonesia: Kota TanpaKumuh – Kotaku) and the National Affordable 
Housing Programme (NAHP), both of which had long-term financing in loans 
from the World Bank. The main question of this chapter is how effective were 
these two strategic programmes in solving the housing problem in Indonesian 
cities and what main hurdles did they need to overcome? Further the chapter 
discusses approaches to affordable housing in the Indonesian context under neo-
liberal conditions; it also provides an overview of the related challenges to the 
implementation of affordable housing on both national and local levels. 
 
Urbanization in the Era of Globalization – The Case of Indonesia 
 
Before continuing with a discussion on housing policy and programmes, it is 
important to understand that in a newly developing country such as Indonesia the 
housing problem has a strong relation with the capacity of cities to deal with the 
impacts of rapid urbanization. The poor condition of housing in a particular city 
is only one of many problems’ cities encounter when they are dealing with rapid 
urbanization.  External factors also influence a particular city’s ability to deal 
with the housing problem, although these factors are not the main reasons for the 
housing problem. One external factor is global financial restructuring, which has 
direct impacts on internal factors that are related to all levels of urban structures 
(Marcuse and van Kempen 2002; Agyeman 2003). This paper points to three 
transformation processes of globalization and their impacts on urbanization as it 
relates to affordable housing.  
The first transformation is in the relationship between cities within the same 
country. It should be noted that due to globalization the function of the “national 
system of cities” has lost its relevance as a tool for states to balance welfare 
across regions (Young 1990; Harvey 1992). Previously, the “national system of 
cities” was the instrument national states implemented the most to provide social 
equity (Kusno 2012). Through state-sponsored interventions, the discrepancies 
between economic regions could be reduced by improving infrastructure and 
public services in under developed regions, so as to create “equity in opportuni-
ties”. Under the neo-liberal economy of the past two decades, the state withdrew 
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from its role as the caretaker of social equity. The national system of cities was 
displaced by individual competition between cities. Now, each city works in 
isolation on a platform of global competition where it must concentrate its ener-
gy on upgrading its international position through the commoditization of its 
local assets (including its natural environment and urban land) and human re-
sources (Logan and Harvey 2002; Friedman 2005). The second transformation is 
the changing relationship between the city and its hinterland. Almost all urban-
ists maintain the same position regarding the overall dominant position of urban 
culture (Marcelloni 2007). In general, the city today is no longer the economic 
and social-cultural centre of its hinterland. The role of the city as a market place 
for products from the hinterland has been substituted by its position as a global-
ized city that provides a market for all kinds of consumer products, including the 
same goods that were previously produced locally, such as vegetables or fruits. 
In short, the formation of the city and its hinterland as a spatial-ecological entity 
no longer exists (Marcelloni 2007). Balanced development in the greater metro-
politan region cannot be achieved because the conversion of the land use cannot 
be controlled and the private sector now drives a development that is heedless to 
a city’s spatial-ecological aspect.  The third transformation process is in the 
restructuring of the city itself, which began in Jakarta during the Soeharto regime 
in the late 1970s. After a short pause due to the 1997-1998 monetary crisis, the 
spatial restructuring of the inner city accelerated. The original domestic land use 
in the inner city has continuously been converted into large-scale commercial 
buildings, sometimes combined with apartment blocks. The subsequent reduc-
tion in the housing stock led to a decrease in the inner-city population. Between 
1980 and 2004 the urban districts of Gambir and Tanah Abang, which are locat-
ed in the centre of Jakarta, lost more than 40% of their registered population or  
from 1.4 to only 0.9 million population over the twenty-five year period (Santo-
so and Al-Hadar 2004).  Lot by lot, land speculators acquired inner city areas 
with development potential and reassembled these areas into bigger lots that 
were later developed as commercial superblocks. The first and second transfor-
mation produced push factors on the process of urbanization. The impacts of the 
third transformation are a reduction in the housing stock in the city centre, fol-
lowed by the city’s expansion to the outskirts. Jakarta’s city centre is occupied 
by what Marcuse and van Kempen (2002) call “the new citadels” or “exclusion-
ary enclaves” of the rich and extremely mobile upper class. The hundreds of 
towers that dot the skyline have shaped Jakarta into an image of a citadel that 
stands out from the rest of the city (Marcuse and van Kempen 2002). New elites, 
professionals, and highly paid managers now occupy some areas behind the city 
centre, and these are all surrounded by historic urban settlements. This mixed 
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characteristic is typical of the central business districts of many large Asian cit-
ies. On the outskirts of the city, the full privatization of urban development has 
caused the disappearance of an integrated “social-mixed new town”. With literal-
ly hundreds of private housing estates, each designed according to its target 
market, there has been a pattern of  uncontrolled growth along with its inherent 
unpredictable social and irreparable environmental impacts (Harvey 1992). 
 
Urbanization and the Problem of Housing 
 
In a very large country like Indonesia, the characteristics of urbanization such as 
speed, dimension, gender and the spatial distribution of migrants differ from 
region to region. Those cities with lower population growth may benefit from 
incoming migrants, while the majority of the cities with higher population 
growth may not. This section presents the negative impacts of rapid urbanization 
on existing urban environments (Santoso 2018a). 
Between 1961 and 1971, Indonesia’s population increased from 97.1 to 
119.2 million or by more than 20% during the 10-year period. At the end of the 
1970s, as the country’s total population growth rate began to decrease its urban 
population increased at a faster rate than the average overall population. Accord-
ing to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, the population of Indonesia between 
2000 and 2010 increased by around 1.5% yearly, with the urban population in-
creasing from between 42% and 50.6%. It is expected that the country’s urban 
population will reach its highest growth rate over the period between 2025 and 
2050, from around 182.1 million to approximately 227.7 million.  After the year 
2050, population growth is expected to gradually decline. But this slower growth 
in urbanization will not reduce the housing problem. Rather, the cities will face 
two new issues: the first is the decreasing number of persons living in one 
household and the second is the need for more urban land coverage. These two 
factors will have negative impacts on the availability of residential land. The 
decreasing average household size (i.e., the average number of persons per 
household) will automatically mean the same population size will create a higher 
demand for housing units. The need for housing will be determined by the 
growth in the number of household units. From 2000 to 2010 the number of 
housing units grew from 21.4 million to 30.0 million units, while the average 
number of persons per household decreased from 4.1 down to 3.9. The forecast 
from 2025 to 2050 is for the average number of persons per household to contin-
ue to decrease from 3.75 to 3.6 persons per household and, thus, an increase in 
the number of households from 44.1 to 63.9 million (see Table A). At the same 
time, a higher income per capita will increase the average size of the housing 
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unit. Table A shows that as the population is expected to grow by around 90% 
from 2010 to 2050; the urban land coverage is expected to grow by 115% from 
30.600 to 65.280 square kilometre; and, accordingly, the average density will 
decrease from 39.22 to 34.88 persons per hectare. All of these factors will create 
additional pressures on housing affordability.  
Table A above shows that between 2000 and 2050 the population density of 
Indonesian cities is predicted to trend downward from an average of 51.59 p/ha 
in 2000 to 34.88 p/ha in 2050. 
 
Table A: Urban Population of Indonesia. 
Year 2000 2010 2025 2050 
Population total 
(Million)    
208.8 237.6   
Urban population 
(Million) 
87.7 120.0 170.0 227.7 










Urban land coverage 
(sqkm) 
17.000 30.600 45.850 65.280 
Density person/Sqkm 5,159 3,922 3,708 3,488 
Source: Urban Laboratory Taumanagara (compiled from different sources). The increas-
ing growth of the urban land coverage is calculated following the methods proposed by 
Angel (Angel 2012). 
 
This reduced density is expected to occur because newly developed urban areas 
will have a much higher percentage of non-domestic land use, such as land for 
commercial use and other uses dedicated to urban services. The population den-
sity in inner-city areas will decline because of the conversion of existing domes-
tic areas to non-domestic land use (Santoso 2016). Other data show that there 
will be a big difference between the average urban density nation-wide and the 
actual densities of large metropolitan cities in Indonesia. Large metropolitan 
cities, like Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya with their high economic growth, 
have densities of between 70 to 150 persons per hectare. Table B shows that, 
currently, the average density of six large metropolitan Indonesia cities is 114.86 
p/ha, which is more than two to three times higher than the density of average-
size cities, which is 34.88 p/ha. The problem of housing in Indonesian cities 
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cannot be generalized only on the basis of the average city density. Every hous-
ing programme must develop appropriate implementation strategies on how to 
accommodate the different characteristics of these cities. 
 
Table B: Population Density in Large Metropolitan Cities in Indonesia (2015). 
City Area (hector) Population Density  
    
Jakarta 65.600 10,075,310 153 
Bandung 16.700 2,470,802 147 
Surabaya 35.000 2,853,661 81 
Medan 26.500 2,191,140 83 
Bandar 
Lampung 
12.900 960,000 73 
Denpasar 12.398 863,000 70 
Total 6 cities 169.098 19.412.914 114.86 p/ha 
Average Densi-
ty 
(from Table A) 
  34.88  
Source: Urban Laboratory Tarumanagara (unpublished data). 
 
 
THE INDONESIAN HOUSING POLICY 
 
The Indonesian government’s neo-liberal market-oriented housing policy has 
given absolute priority to the privatization of the housing supply while at the 
same time supporting the demand for home ownership. This policy has negative 
impacts on the housing situation in the cities and the capability of these cities to 
adjust to the urbanization process.  Two strategic housing programmes have 
been introduced to address the negative impact of this neo-liberal urban policy: 
the first is The Housing &Settlement Upgrading Programme and the National 
Affordable Housing Programme (NAHAP). The following discusses the imple-
mentation of these two housing programmes, with special attention paid to the 
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The Housing & Settlement Upgrading Programme (1999 – 2016)   
 
From 1999 to 2016 the Indonesian government implemented a number of differ-
ent housing and settlement upgrading programmes.  Indonesia’s current housing 
upgrading programme – City Without Slums can be understand as a new variant 
of housing and settlement upgrading with a similar conception.  The following is 
a summary of the differences between the programmes that were introduced 
during this period.   
In 1999, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian government 
implemented a project called Urban Poverty Alleviation (P2KP) (Bahasa: P2KP: 
Proyek Penanggulangan Kemiskinan di Perkotaan). The programme operated 
until 2006 and consisted of two phases: the rescue phase and the consolidation 
phase. The basic concept of P2KP was to empower the urban poor to increase 
their ability to improve their social condition and rise out of poverty. In 2007, 
P2KP was replaced by a new programme called Empowerment Program for the 
Urban Population (PNPM – Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat 
Perkotaan). The target of this new programme was not limited to the urban poor 
but it also included the low-income urban community in general. The remarkable 
characteristics of these two programmes (P2KP and PNPM) was that they fo-
cused on empowerment than to investing in the physical aspects of development. 
In this regard, poverty was understood to be the result of a helplessness that 
should be overcome through community-based social transformation. Of course, 
this focus on empowerment was strongly correlated to the fact that the Indone-
sian state at the time was   close to bankrupt.  
However, turning to the concept of community-based social transformation 
is not due to the state’s lack of funds but on the positive experiences of similar 
previous programmes that show that even the poorest members of the urban 
population have significant potential to help themselves rise out of their poor 
socio-economic and environmental conditions. But there are other reasons be-
hind the government’s decision to substitute the PNPM in 2015 with the pro-
gramme City Without Slums (Kotaku). The first is to accommodate the conse-
quences of Decentralization Law No.22/1999, which is later modified several 
times until its last version, Law No.23/2014, obligates the government to decen-
tralize its administrative structure (Government of the Republic Indonesia 2014). 
Following the promulgation of this new law, the housing sector becomes the full 
responsibility of the local governments. The decentralization of the housing 
sector is also supported through the new Housing and Settlement Area Law (Un-
dang-Undang Tentang Perumahan Dan Kawasan Permukiman, UU no.1/2011) 
(Government of the Republic Indonesia 2011). Following the spirit of the new 
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housing law, the main activities of the national housing agencies moved toward 
capacity building and institutional development. The first initiative of the hous-
ing programme City Without Slums is to accommodate the new decentralized 
structure by giving local governments more authority in the coordination and 
execution of the housing upgrading programme. The second initiative is to sup-
port the first through the mobilization of local financial resources. In line with 
the concept of empowerment, the  national agencies are encouraged to allocate 
their financial resources more toward capacity building as the aim is to shift the 
cost of the physical aspects of housing more to local stakeholders, such as local 
government agencies, CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility), community-based 
organizations, and NGOs, among others (Management Programme NSUP – 
Kotaku, 2019). The third new innovation in the City Without Slums programme 
is an establishment of so-called operations and maintenance committee on the 
neighbourhood/district level; this committee is responsible for managing the 
housing settlements. One of the explicit tasks of these committees is to prevent 
the construction of poorly built houses in district areas, under a programme 
called Transformation Community-based Development Programme, which is 
introduced in 2019.  
These additional innovative components are integrated into the City Without 
Slums programme. However, the implementation of the additional components 
is not without problems.  First, because of its high grade of complexity, City 
Without Slums can only be successful if executed by highly experienced special-
ists. Know-how, such as defining the appropriate size of the upgrading area, 
understanding the importance of community awareness, understanding the tim-
ing for these types of projects and whether and how local governmental institu-
tions should be involved and other prerequisites, can only be delivered by quali-
fied and fully experienced field managers. It is not easy to find persons with the 
requisite training and experience even though Indonesia already has more than 
fifty years of experience in carrying out similar programmes. The main weak-
ness of all upgrading programmes is this type of programme cannot significantly 
influence an increase in the production of affordable housing nor can it prevent 
the replication of new substandard units outside of these projects’ locations (San-
toso 2018b). 
 
The Subsidized Housing Programme 
 
The Indonesian government began its first subsidized housing programme in 
1976 in the form of reductions in mortgage interest for members of low-income 
groups. To support the programme the government established Bank Tabungan 
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Negara (BTN) as a special mortgage bank. Further, the government established 
the National Urban Development Agency, which is a state-owned developer 
known as Perumnas. Perumnas develops large-scale housing projects, the units 
of which can be bought with subsidized mortgage loans from the BTN. During 
the 1970s and 1980s Perumnas developed several large-scale housing projects, 
some in the outskirts of Jakarta and other big cities, others as smaller-scale hous-
ing projects in the inner city (The Government of the republic of Indonesia 
1974). On the whole, Perumnas built approximately 500,000 low incomes hous-
ing and apartment units in more than 300 locations spread throughout Indonesia 
(http://www.perumnas.id/perum-perumnas). At the end of the 1980s, when the 
oil bonanza   was over, Perumnas moved away from its original purpose to act as 
the National Urban Development Corporation. Further, after the monetary crisis 
of 1997-1998, Perumnas is no longer continued to carry out its particular mission 
in the housing sector. Its status  as a “special enterprise for developing social 
housing projects” disappeared as it became an ordinary state enterprise with a 
limited social mission of providing low-interest (subsidized) mortgages (Silas 
2005). In recent years there is a plan to revitalize the role of Perumnas as cham-
pion in production of low-income housing in particular in relation to provision of 
land for low income housing, but the plan is never actualized. 
The mortgage subsidy programme consists of an allowance that reduces the 
interest on housing loans for eligible members of a defined target group; here, 
the government pays the difference between the market interest rate and the 
actual interest the borrower pays. In implementing   this programme, the gov-
ernment works together with private developers. The private developer manages 
the construction and the new houses are sold at a maximum price only to those 
who are eligible for the subsidized mortgages. Since the programme began in 
1976, it has undergone many revisions, especially since 1999 when housing 
prices were repeatedly adjusted for inflation. The other problem is in providing 
financial resources. According to the new version of Decentralization Law 
No.32/2004, the authority and responsibility of housing affairs should be decen-
tralized to the local government.  But years after the first Decentralization law 
was promulgated in 1999, only a few local administration was able to initiate a 
low-income housing program (Kusno 2012).  
Experiences from implementing and operating different housing-subsidy 
programs between   2005 and 2013 offer the following conclusions: In general, 
the implementation of the different “top-down” housing programs has been inef-
fective. The main reason is that on one hand the national institutions could not 
effectively control what happened on the ground and the local governments 
cannot carry out their important role as mediator between the stakeholders at the 
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local level and the government institution at the national level. On the other 
hand, the national government’s financial support was misused as it was seen as 
an opportunity to earn short-term benefits and not as an opportunity for the de-
centralization of programme delivery. Local governments and other local players 
also failed to adjust the programme to the specific conditions of local areas.  An 
indicator for this, among others, is the need to adjust programmes to local condi-
tions such as using local building materials, adjusting housing prices to the local 
minimum salaries or the UMR (minimal monthly salary), and other considera-
tions. In Jakarta or Surabaya, for example, the actual UMR is around Rp 3.6 
million (around U$ 250), but in some areas in Eastern Indonesia the UMR is 
valued at  only 45-50% of this amount (Santoso 2018a). Further, there was insuf-
ficient effort to enable local players to participate in these projects. There was no 
significant improvement in the awareness of the involved stakeholders about the 
importance of housing programmes for low-income people living in their com-
munities. The end result of all this is that the goal of transferring housing affairs 
from the national to the local level utterly failed. 
Another important finding is that, in general, the quality of subsidized hous-
ing is far from acceptable. Poor coordination between the responsible institutions 
and the attitudes of profit-oriented contractors and housing developers created 
situations where the involved players are accusing each other and nobody was 
doing their homework. The Ministry of Home Affair has the opinion that in 
order to decentralize the housing affair, the Ministry of the Public Works and 
Housing is responsible to empower the local housing stakeholders, but the Min-
istry of Public Works and Housing has the view that the Ministry of Home Af-
fair is responsible to do the capacity building of government institutions on local 
level. The mortgage Bank of BTN has primary interest to distribute the subsi-
dized mortgage to so many clients as possible. In the end, the quality of the 
products becomes uncontrolled and no involved is willing to take the responsi-
bility that a high percentage of the houses is not full fill the minimal standard. 
Under the bottom line, the home buyers assumed all of the risks and have to 
make an extra effort to repair and maintain the condition of their houses. The 
biggest risk is that if the buyer cannot cover the high cost of depreciation in the 
early years then they will have to move to another house and will stop paying the 
mortgage instalments on the original one. The results are a large number of 
abandoned houses and the rapid increase of non-performing loans by the mort-
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The Concept of Affordable Housing  
 
The notion of housing affordability became widespread in Europe and North 
America during the 1980s. In the words of Alain Bertaud, former principal plan-
ner at the World Bank  and now of New York University, “It is time for planners 
to abandon general objectives and to focus their efforts on two measurable out-
comes that have always mattered: workers’ spatial mobility and housing afford-
ability” (Bertaud 2014). Most of the literature on affordable housing applies to 
mortgage programmes and many other programmes that exist along the same 
continuum – from emergency shelters to transitional housing to non-market 
rentals (also known as “social housing”) to formal and informal rentals, indige-
nous housing, and ending with affordable home ownership. In many countries, 
there are affordable housing committees that consist of social-housing experts 
and government representatives. The Australian National Affordable Housing 
Summit Group developed their definition of affordable housing as housing that 
is adequate in standard and location for lower or middle-income households and 
does not cost so much that a household is unlikely to be able to meet other basic 
needs on a sustainable basis (ACTU 2012).  
In the United Kingdom, affordable housing includes social rental and inter-
mediate housing provided to specified eligible households whose needs are not 
met by the market. Here, affordability is calculated based on the capacity of 
those in a specific income group to use a percentage of their disposable income 
to pay their “total housing cost”. This seems a simple solution but the actual 
calculation is rather complicated while at the same time it must include  a num-
ber of factors in the demand and supply side of the housing market, such as the 
willingness to save and spend money for housing, the number of persons in a 
particular household, the actual cost of operating/managing a house, the con-
struction cost of the house, the inflation rate, the cost of capital, the cost of utili-
ties, the cost of the depreciation of the building and the quality of the infrastruc-
ture, etc. (Gabriel et al. 2005).   
One of the greatest strengths of following the housing affordability concept 
is to develop what is called the housing affordability index (HAI). Following a 
housing affordability index developed by a team at MIT, housing affordability is 
the ability of a household group to capture the “total cost of occupying the  indi-
viduals’ housing”, which consists of the cost of rent or mortgage payments along 
with all of the everyday housing expenditures (MIT Centre for Real Estate, 
2019). With regards to affordability, this total housing cost is more relevant than 
the market price of housing. This statement means that the housing price is in-
deed a “relative cost” in relation to affordability. Therefore, understanding the 
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challenges of affordable housing requires understanding trends and disparities in 
income and wealth. The conventional approach to affordable housing is to meas-
ure the relationship between income and the market price of housing. However, 
a better method of measuring housing affordability has been to consider the 
percentage household income spent on (total) housing expenditures.  
Further, if the market-oriented way of thinking is to understand buying housing 
as an act of property investment, then its quality should be measured in the rela-
tion to the amount of the investment and the actual value of the property. The 
core idea of this approach is to define affordability in relation to the local-
specific conditions. In Indonesia, both the minimum wage (Indonesia: UMR) 
and living costs are very strong local-specific conditions where the high percent-
age of people whose incomes are less than 60% of the median income is very 
city specific (Rodda 1994).   
The other strong influencing factor is the dynamic of the world economy. 
Since 2000 the world has experienced an unprecedented boom in house prices 
not only in magnitude and duration but also in the synchronization of these fac-
tors across countries. Never before have house prices risen so fast, for so long, in 
so many countries. Prices have doubled in many countries. In Ireland housing 
prices nearly tripled as the country became a target of foreign investors. When 
the biggest financial bubble in history burst in 2008, this wreaked havoc on the 
housing market globally.  
By 2011 home prices in Ireland had plunged by 45% from their peak in 
2007. In the United States prices fell by 34% while foreclosures increased expo-
nentially. In Spain and Denmark home prices dropped by 15%. However, in 
spite of the bust, home prices continue to be overvalued by about 25% or more 
in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, New Zealand, Britain, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Sweden (Cox and Pavletich 2012). Many researchers argue that in-
come inequality is partly to blame for the shortage of affordable housing. This 
same condition can be found in globalized cities in Europe, Australia, and Asia: 
In many of these globalized metropolitan cities a new form of “illegal rental 
condition” is sprouting up and in a situation city administration have failed to 
control. Typically, only legal, permitted, and separate housing is considered 
when calculating the cost of housing. The low rental costs for a room in a family 
home or an illegal garage conversion or a college dormitory are generally ex-
cluded from the calculation, no matter how many people in an area live in such 
situations. In cities like Singapore or Hongkong, we find that home owners have 
subdivided their apartments in order to make it more affordable. In many cases 
the home owner are renting all the bed rooms and they only keep the living room 
for them.    
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Faced with few affordable options, many people attempt to find less-
expensive housing by buying or renting farther from the city centre. But long 
commutes often result in higher transportation costs which erase any savings on 
shelter. Some call this the “drive until you qualify” approach, which causes far-
flung development and forces people to drive long distances to get to work, to 
buy groceries, to take their children to school, or to engage in other activities. A 
well-located dwelling might save significant household travel costs and therefore 
improve not only family economics but also the overall quality of family life. 
The trend is going more toward sacrificing domestic life for a “better” house; but 
this is not the case of a minimum-wage worker in an industrial factory on the 
outskirts of Jakarta. These workers normally share a rental accommodation with 
friends so as to reduce theirs dwelling cost as much as possible. This is because 
migrant workers want to save money for their family who are still living in their 
home villages, so they spend as little as possible on their own housing.  
The conclusion is that the housing affordability index follows the dynamics 
of the market. In many countries, housing is becoming less affordable because 
the market economy is causing social inequality to deepen. This is causing home 
seekers to lower their expectations as much as possible; it is also the real reason 
we are seeing increasing incidences of poor squatters in high-density urban areas 
across large metropolitan areas world-wide.  All of this is the consequence of 
integrating the housing sector within the market economy.  
 
 
THE DIFFICULTIES TO IMPLEMENT NAHP IN INDONESIA 
 
The idea of housing affordability is to move away from housing programmes as 
part of a “social-corrective” programme and toward integrating a housing deliv-
ery system into the market mechanism. There is no housing policy that addresses 
the problem of the production of substandard houses; as long as there is a de-
mand, these types of housing will continue to be produced. Following the con-
cept of the neo-liberal housing concept, housing has become more unaffordable 
through a so called “market distortion”. The HOMI study (2001) had the goal of 
dealing with this distortion by enabling the Indonesian housing market to work 
properly. Here, the assumption was that the market distortion should be ad-
dressed before the housing market can work more efficiently and be able to sup-
ply more affordable housing at a reasonable standard of quality. The HOMI 
study accepted the importance of the relationship between housing and social 
disparity and also recognizes the importance of subsidized housing programmes. 
But as housing becomes more affordable, the subsidy should be reduced simul-
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taneously. Marja Hoek-Smit, the leader of the HOMI study, repeatedly under-
lined the importance of gradually reducing subsidy programmes following an 
increase in market efficiency (Hoek-Smit 2005). Alain Bartaud also noted that 
the core of the housing problem is in how to integrate the housing delivery sys-
tem into the market mechanism. The weakness of the HOMI study is that the 
study does not recognize the importance of the local characteristics of the hous-
ing problem.  
From the different concepts of affordable housing mentioned above, it can be 
concluded that housing expenditure, income and local economic conditions are 
the most critical indicators of the housing affordability index. By consequence, 
the factors that influence the HAI at the local level should be observed. That is, 
each local area or region should have its own specific HAI; otherwise, this 
measure would not give us the real picture of the housing problem.  All of the 
three above-mentioned indicators are strong, depending on the local economic 
situation. Housing is, in general, a local matter. The quality of the housing in a 
particular city is strongly determined by the willingness and ability of the local 
stakeholders involved in the housing delivery system and not by the extent of the 
financial subsidy. If the willingness to provide a housing delivery system at a 
reasonable standard does not exist at the local level, then no national government 
can change that. Even if the City Without Slums are to be successful in establish-
ing a housing management committee, if social equitability cannot be achieved 
then nobody will be able to avoid the incidence of new miserable squatters 
springing up somewhere else in the city. 
Indeed, the Indonesian national government must play several essential roles 
to support the decentralization of the housing sector.  With regards to the limited 
availability of financial resources for housing, many experts in Indonesia are of 
the opinion that this should be the core of housing policy on the national level. In 
particular, the necessary long-term financial resources cannot be transferred to 
institutions that operate at the local level (LPPPPI 2015). Although the nature of 
housing development is a long-term enterprise, with people building houses to 
last for 40 to 75 years or longer, it is not easy to mobilize funding. The availabil-
ity of a long-term housing fund can protect housing production from the ups and 
downs of national and global economic cycles. Further, government policy 
should protect investments in the housing sector from short-term speculative 
manoeuvres. 
The concept of affordable housing is seen as an individual act of buying a 
house as an investment (in property), which is a domestic affair. A person’s 
housing stock is an individual asset that can be used as a collateral guarantee to 
borrow money from a bank. Also owning a house enables a person to become 
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involved in the process of capital accumulation. Affordable housing needs can 
be addressed through public policy instruments that focus on the demand side of 
the market and programmes that help households reach the necessary financial 
benchmarks that make housing affordable. National policies define banking and 
mortgage lending practices, and taxation and regulatory measures that affect the 
cost of building materials and professional practices (i.e., real estate transac-
tions). The purchasing power of individual households can be enhanced to a 
certain degree through tax and fiscal policies that result in reducing the cost of 
mortgages and the cost of borrowing. Public policy may include the implementa-
tion of subsidy programmes and incentives for average households. The national 
government must also develop a platform for a housing information system, and 
this should be installed in every city that wants to deal with housing problems. 
The information provided should also include the socio-economic conditions of 
people who are working and living outside the market system.  
Furthermore, in relation to enabling housing stakeholders, the national gov-
ernment should help cities form housing affordability committees. Other issues 
where there still needs to be national-agency interventions regarding local stake-
holders are: the management skills needed to ensure the quality of the design and 
construction of social housing. The trend today is to sacrifice quality for lower 
cost. This has an impact on reducing the lifetime of the product. The develop-
ment of technology is also relevant as it can increase quality and avoid higher 
costs. Making use of local-specific building materials and traditional building 
cultures are possibilities that move in this direction.  
But what national government cannot do is protect the housing market and 
the quality of new construction from the negative impacts of the rise and fall of 
the global economy. In all globalized cities, the appearance of foreign workers 
with much higher incomes that sometimes allow for investments in housing has 
had an impact on the over-proportional increases in rental costs and housing 






In the mid-1970’s the Indonesian government began to establish liberal housing 
policies that privatized the national housing delivery system and prioritized 
housing ownership. In the same time, the government introduced two strategic 
programmes whose goals were to upgrade substandard housing and provide 
mortgage subsidies to members of low-income groups. Three decades later, 
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Indonesians must accept the reality that the condition of low-cost housing has 
become worse than ever. Although the Indonesian economy was continuing to 
grow, during that time, this did not automatically make housing more affordable.  
After the end of Soeharto regime, in 1998, the Indonesian government increased 
its efforts to eliminate substandard housing, especially in urban areas. At the 
same time, it also attempted to increase the efficiency of housing production and 
the number of subsidized housing programmes. But 15 years later, the Indone-
sian government should realize that the problem of housing in the cities cannot 
be solved by permanently increasing housing subsidies and upgrading substand-
ard homes. Indonesia has to learn that the problem of housing can be solved only 
if the production of new substandard housing can be stopped; this calls for a big 
effort to make housing more affordable. To achieve those goals, the Indonesian 
government introduced two new housing programmes: City Without Slums and 
The National Affordable Housing Programme, both of which have long-term 
financial backing from the World Bank. This chapter shows that these two pro-
grammes can be successfully implemented only if two main problems can be 
overcome: the first is to enable stakeholders in local housing to assume leader-
ship positions in a decentralized housing delivery system; the second is to find a 
way to control the main factor, which is to make housing more affordable in the 
present market-oriented economic system where there is a  gap between housing 
expenditure and the disposal incomes of people who need housing. This latter 
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Chapter 2: Let’s Get Down to Business – 
Private Influences in the Making  
of Affordable Housing Policies 






When thinking of housing in Brazil, the favelas no doubt first come to mind. 
This paradigmatic slum typology has become a large part of Brazil’s visual dic-
tionary because it is seen as a lasting manifestation of the country’s dysfunction-
al urban planning and housing markets. Similar to other countries in the Global 
South, informal housing solutions emerged during the course of the early 20th 
century but these approaches only proliferated during the 1980s and 1990s (in 
Brazil, the ‘lost decade’) when national governments passed neo-liberal reforms 
that were in line with the Washington consensus.1 With decreasing government 
spending on housing, infrastructure and basic services, urban growth largely 
took place in an unplanned manner and informal settlements quickly turned into 
slums. The number of people living in households situated in slums increased 
worldwide, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, to reach 921 million in 2001 
(UNCHS 2003). 
In the specific case of Brazil, the housing supply in the early 2000s showed 
signs of severe dysfunctionality: the formal market catered to only the top 20% 
 
1 This consensus between three Washington D.C. based lending institutions (the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United States Department of the 
Treasury) aligned their respective demands of institutional reforms targeted at devel-
oping countries requesting financial assistance. 
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of total demand. The remainder of the population needed government support or 
relied on informal mechanisms (Maricato 2009). This housing situation was the 
result not only of roll-backs in state expenditures but also of the institutional 
legacy a former military regime left behind (1964-1986). Brazil’s transition 
toward democracy created major institutional disruptions (In chapter 9, Kienast 
describes similar mechanisms that existed in the South African context after 
apartheid). The dissolution of The National Housing Bank of Brazil (BNH), in 
1986, in combination with a stabilization plan that was brought in to respond to 
an unfolding economic crisis, in the 1990s, led to reduced credit for housing and 
reduced government spending on urban development. As local governments 
were unable to fill the shoes of an absent national government, the question of 
housing and urban planning remained largely unsolved, at the institutional level, 
until the beginning of the 2000s when the growth of cities largely took place in 
an irregular manner. While reliable data are largely missing for that time period, 
Brazilian scholars agree that the 1980s and 1990s are marked by a decline in the 
housing situation on a national level (Cardoso and Aragão 2013). 
In early 2000s, the governments of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and, 
subsequently, President Dilma Rousseff launched several initiatives that recog-
nised the importance of cities and reaffirmed the role of government in providing 
infrastructure and basic social and economic programs. In a neo-Keynesian roll-
ing out of the state, major investment projects were launched (such as the 
Growth Acceleration Program). This culminated in Minha Casa, Minha Vida 
(MCMV), a public housing program that was launched in early 2009 in order to 
address the country’s housing backlog. The MCMV has been presented as pursu-
ing a dual goal of improving the housing situation (by reducing the existing 
backlog of 7 million units (FJP 2008)) and, at the same time, countering the 
global financial crisis by generating jobs and stimulating investment (D’Amico 
2011; Cardoso et al. 2013b). While such a dual view was reflected in the media, 
in official government communications and in academic discourse, a closer look 
at the program’s conditions, the nature of the changes it brought, and the under-
lying mechanisms of these views clearly shows the overemphasis on involving 
market actors at the expense of civil society, participation, and ultimately the 
liveability of cities. 
This chapter aims to show the close interconnections between market actors 
and public decision-making by looking at the policy-formulation process that led 
to the MCMV and the interactions between the government and large-scale de-
velopers. By doing so, it provides more academic evidence for the broadly stated 
criticism that the housing program was and continues to be too market friendly. 
A deeper analysis of the private influences on public policy-making is needed to 
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advance an understanding of the political economy of urban development and 
also to uncover the underlying forces that are shaping our built environment. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, an explanation of the characteris-
tics of the national housing programme and an outline of the research design are 
presented. Next, the Brazilian housing sector and the main institutional changes 
that led up to the MCMV are discussed. Then we take a step back and retrace the 
precise genealogy of the policy ideas and their institutionalization. The analytical 
part of this chapter discusses not only the role of the private companies that have 
been involved in shaping the idea of a national housing programme but also the 
underlying premise behind the programme’s institutionalization and the regula-
tory changes that were passed between 2009 and 2015. The conclusion stresses 
the need for further research on the role of developers in the planning and im-
plementation of urban policies. 
 
 
THE BRAZILIAN AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROGRAM 
 
Minha Casa, Minha Vida is an ambiguous program. On one hand, it represents a 
paradigmatic shift in Brazilian affordable housing strategy while at the same 
time featuring many elements that are direct continuations of the initiatives of 
former governments. Particularly influential have been the aforementioned 
Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, PAC), 
the Solidarity Credit Programme (Programa Crédito Solidário), and the Residen-
tial Leasing Programme (Programa de Arrendamento Residencial, PAR). The 
MCMV incorporated the Growth Acceleration Program’s monitoring and deci-
sion-making processes and branding effects, the institutionalization of auto-
construction under the Solidarity Credit Program, and the PAR’s insurance pur-
chase and supply incentives as well as its unified social-housing fund. From an 
institutional lens, and even to a certain extent from a programmatic angle, the 
MCMV builds upon former housing-related government programs. The major 
novelty is in its unprecedented scale of investment; in its first phase, between 
2009 and 2011 alone, R$34 billion (USD 19.5 billion)2 were allocated to finance 
a broad range of subsidies and incentives, as well as a reduction in registration 
and legal fees on both the demand and supply sides of the program. 
In order to understand how market actors influenced the way the programme 
was set up and how it changed in the course of its operations, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the nature of its initial programme. The MCMV is a national 
 
2 All values in Real are converted to US dollars, based on the 2009 exchange rate. 
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housing program that attempted to address a national housing backlog of 7 mil-
lion units (as of 2009) by offering differentiated demand targets and several sub-
programmes and by using a combination of subsidies aimed at both supply and 
demand. The programme targets households that are living under different socio-
economic realities that span from poor and low-income families up to the lower 
middle class. The programme additionally differentiates in space by acknowl-
edging housing differences between rural and urban areas.3 In urban areas, offi-
cial minimum salaries (MS) are used to determine the housing needs and de-
mand benefits. The demand benefits, output targets, and supply modalities all 
differ by income track. Track 1 is targeted at families earning up to 3 minimum 
salaries; track 2, up to 6 MS; and track 3, up to 10 MS (see Table 1).  
Two different sub-programmes were established to address Brazil’s urban 
housing deficit:4 The National Programme for Urban Housing (Programa 
Nacional de Habitação Urbana; PNHU) deals with market-oriented supply and 
Entidades is based on self-organisation. The PNHU is at the heart of the MCMV. 
At the outset, the government’s aim was to deliver 1 million housing units (14 
percent of the deficit) by allocating 14 billion Reias (8 billion USD) within the 
programme’s first phase (2009-2010). The demand benefits, which may include 
a direct subsidy, beneficial loans and repayment conditions, as well as reductions 
in registration charges are adjusted to the different tracks. The programme en-
tails the construction of new housing units in urban areas, the redevelopment of 
existing properties in consolidated areas, and the purchase of urban allotments 
(the latter two were only regulated later, see Rolnik et al. 2010). The government 
fixes the ceilings for the unit prices of the houses provided for recipients in all 
income tracks, the minimum floor plan areas (only for track 1), and the limits on 
the unit costs that are applied to the reduced unified tax rate and the registration 
charges. As can be seen in Table 1, these different limits are partially discon-




3 In rural areas, demand is categorized based on the official average yearly wage for an 
agricultural worker. Families in track 1 can earn salaries up to R$ 10,000/year; in 
track 2, up to R$ 22,000/year; and in track 3, up to R$ 55,800/year (USD 5,741; 
12,631; 32,036; respectively). 
4 Presently, there are three sub-programs and a special development modality for mu-
nicipalities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants under which projects are developed 
based on a public offering. This segment has only been included in the program since 
2010. 
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Table 1: Demand and supply benefits of MCMV per track. 
Benefits MCMV Track 1: 
MS 0-3 
Track 2: MS 
3-6 
Track 3: MS 6-10 
    
Income level USD 801 USD 1,602 USD 2,670 
Max. unit cost USD 29,280 USD 74,635 USD 74,635 
Max. unit size: 
house / apartment 
32 / 37 sqm - - 
Subsidy USD 13,205 USD 1,148 USD 0 
Interest rate 0% 5% 6% 




(min R$ 50) 
- - 










RET (unified tax 
regime supply) 
1% 1% to 34,447 USD; above 6% 
Notary reduction 
(supply side) 
90% 90% to USD 34,447, 80% to USD 
45,929; 75% to USD 74,635 
Source: Table produced by the author, based on legal documentation of the different pro-
grams. 
 
Entidades is a housing modality that is based on self-organisation for the urban 
housing demand of those in track 1 and is carried out by non-profit organisa-
tions. The work can be entirely given to a main contractor or it can be done 
through self-built/assisted construction. For the first phase, the government allo-
cated R$ 500 million (USD 287 million) to the Entidades programme. 
While the MCMV is clearly social in nature as its aim is to build housing 
units for low- and middle-income families and to reduce the national backlog, it 
can hardly be seen as the driving force behind the institutionalization of Brazil’s 
housing programme. Its priority is to create volume in the number of houses but 
not quality, in other words its intention is to use the country’s building industries 
to realise floor space and not homes that are adapted to the needs of the popula-
tion (this is further discussed below). 
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Brazil’s affordable housing programme was clearly formulated as a counter-
cyclical measure in the context of the unfolding global financial crisis. Similar to 
other governments around the world, the Brazilian government reaffirmed its 
role in the housing sector. The financial shock of 2007/08 and the consequent 
global recession had considerable impacts on global consumption, investment 
flows, affordability levels, and inadequately housed populations (homelessness, 
slum populations, etc.). Large-scale housing initiatives were seen as adequate 
socio-economic policy responses as they were viewed as stimulating both na-
tional production and consumption simultaneously. From 2007 to 2013, national 
governments in Mexico, Malaysia, India, and several other countries of the 
Global South launched housing programs aimed at assisting low-income people; 
however, these programmas almost exclusively relied on real-estate-market 
actors to construct up to 500,000 housing units yearly (Buckley et al. 2016; see 
also contributions in this book; for the example of Indonesia (Santos 2020, chap-
ter 1), for Argentina and Uruguay (Casanova 2020, chapter 3)). The market for 
low-income housing in countries in the Global South amounted to almost 200 
million units with an investment requirement of USD 9-11trillion (GIZ 2014). 
These projects were rendered financially viable through lower profit margins and 
savings in economies of scales. In view of the billions of dollars in investment 
opportunities this presented, the question arises as to whether governments actu-
ally managed to balance both the country’s social and economic needs. 
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The role of developers and the financialisation of housing 
 
Real-estate developers are central agents of change as they construct a large 
majority of the built environment. Despite the centrality of these stakeholders in 
steering urbanisation processes and their spatial manifestation, the existing body 
of literature on this topic remains thin (Adams and Tiesdell 2010; Coiacetto 
2009). One of the first books on development and developers was edited by Guy 
and Henneberry (2002); this publication shows that in the early 2000s and prior 
there was a broad range of approaches to improving our institutional understand-
ing of real-estate markets (see also Fainstein 1994). Currently, the theoretical 
and practical insights on developers remain fragmented, with little dialogue 
among their many parts. While interest is slowly developing in terms of investi-
gating this issue as it relates to the Global South (Fauveaud 2014; Rouanet and 
Halbert 2016; Sanfelici and Halbert 2015; Searle 2014), knowledge remains very 
limited on the role of real-estate developers in urban development (see Rolnik in 
the foreword of this book for an elaboration). This imbalance between the rele-
vance of this issue and currently deployed research efforts is particularly worri-
some in a period of the increasing globalisation of financial flows and the finan-





An analysis of the policy-formation process in Brazil is often carried out by 
relying on the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), which ideally requires 
unrestricted access to the actual meetings that underlie policy negotiations or at 
least the associated documentation on these meetings (Crow 2001; Sabatier and 
Weible 2007; Hersperger et al. 2013). In the case of the MCMV, this access 
could not be established because discussions on programme elements relied on 
several informal communication channels. Furthermore, the same communica-
tion channels may support corrupt practices as is suggested by the central role of 
construction companies in the corruption scandal of 2014 onwards (Cardoso and 
Jaenisch 2017). The Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) provides the 
advantage of being flexible enough to enable an indirect research workflow 
(Hufty 2007, 2011; Kübler 2012). Instead of analysing actual interactions be-
tween competing actors, the existing research is limited to the detection of com-
munication channels. However, the GAF is based on four main concepts: agents, 
nodal points, values, and norms, of which the first two are essential for this study 
as it conceptualises the policy-formation process as a series of nodal points 
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where different agents convene. In the absence of academic alternatives, an 
analysis of secondary sources and newspaper clippings is used to retrace the 
chain of nodal points. These are placed in relation to the actual policy outcomes. 
This workflow does not allow for the detection of causalities in terms of influ-
encing decision-making but it at least helps illustrate the range of communica-
tion channels available to market actors who exert pressure on government deci-
sions. These insights can help create a first step toward understanding the policy 
influences within the MCMV and the different ways developers managed to 
shape the regulatory framework that ultimately defines the possibilities and re-
strictions of their own business activities. 
 
 
THE HOUSING SECTOR IN BRAZIL AND  
ITS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES UP TO THE MCMV 
 
Traditionally, housing in Brazil was built by private individuals and, later, com-
panies that offered housing units for their own workers so they could live close 
to their factories. In the second half of the 20th century, the country’s housing 
sector was institutionalized and relied on a pension and welfare system in which 
funds were used to finance government-produced houses (such in the Casa Popu-
lar program of 1946). The idea of tapping into these financial possibilities con-
tinued throughout very different political systems, including under Brazil’s mili-
tary regime (1964-86) and after it became a democracy (1986 onwards). The 
military government recognised the economic importance of housing and created 
the first country-wide housing policy (Loureiro, Macário, and Guerra 2013, pp. 
1886-8), a national housing bank (BNH), the Workers Severance Fund (Fundo 
de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço; FGTS), which is a mandatory program that is 
still central today, and the optional Brazilian Savings and Loans System (Siste-
ma Brasileiro de Poupança e Empréstimo; SBPE). Access to both funds boosted 
the availability of housing finance and enabled the development of a large-scale 
housing supply in the country (Cardoso et al. 2013b). The system of a national 
housing bank, the SBPE and the FGTS stimulated economic growth and the 
establishment of a real-estate sector that consists of the same main actors and 
institutions as today (Cardoso and Aragão 2013). 
Brazil’s peaceful transition to democracy was less smooth in economic and 
institutional terms. The new democratic government had to find ways to respond 
to the economic crises that brought down the military regime; it also had to de-
velop a national stabilization plan. Political instability and hyperinflation cou-
pled with very limited public spending resulted in a power vacuum, where the 
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absence of state actions (the extinction of the BNH created an institutional hole 
in relation to housing) translated to the spread of slums5 and increasing signs of 
urban malfunction. The private real-estate market contented itself with catering 
to the housing demands of the country’s top 20 percent income earners (Marica-
to 2009) and the scarce available funds mainly benefitted those who earned 
higher incomes.6 Housing policy at the federal level showed institutional fragili-
ty and administrative discontinuity, with isolated programmes and planning that 
failed to take into account larger urban considerations (Cardoso et al. 2011). 
Government programmes that targeted those earning lower incomes (Habitar-
Brasil, Projeto Pro-Moradia) were characterised by discontinuity, low efficiency 
and decreasing output (Cardoso et al. 2013b). Also, the government structure 
was highly fragmented in relation to programmes for housing and urban devel-
opment. Only toward the end of the 1990s were some reforms passed to address 
urban development and the housing sector. 
The Cardoso government remodelled housing finance according to interna-
tional best practices, which included the provision of certificates of real-estate 
receivables (CRI) and mortgage-backed securities, both of which were informed 
by the American model. The idea of unifying governmental structures that were 
in charge of urban and housing issues had already emerged during this period, 
but this was only realised when the labour party came to power (Romagnoli 
2012). In 2003, the Lula government created the Ministry of Cities.7 While this 
institutionalization represented a huge step toward streamlined planning for 
urban and housing development, it fell short of uniting financial flows with its 
housing-development model. The FGTS remained under the decision-making of 
Caixa (short for Caixa Econômica Federal which reported directly to the Minis-
try of Finance); this considerably eroded the ministry’s financial emancipation 
(see Bonduki 2008). Caixa had been operating de facto as the state bank since 
the dissolution of the BNH, in 1986, in a function it was neither initially con-
ceived for nor had the legal status to carry out (Dias 2009). 
 
5 In the 1990s, the slum population outgrew the country’s normal overall demographic 
growth by close to a factor of three (Maricato 2009). 
6 Between 1995 and 2003, fully 79 % of all financial resources went to households with 
incomes in excess of 5 MS (USD 390) and only 8.5 % for families that earned less 
than 3 MS (USD 234). The indicated dollar values are based on the official MS limit 
and the dollar exchange of 2003 (Bonduki 2008, p. 80). 
7 The issue of housing was assigned to its own secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de Hab-
itação, SNH), which consisted of three departments, one for housing, another for 
technical and institutional development, and another for slum rehabilitation. 
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An important preoccupation of the Lula government was to remove major in-
stitutional bottlenecks from private-market activities. In 2004, three major re-
forms were introduced in important changes to the aforementioned CRI to fur-
ther decrease investment risk, the introduction of a special tax regime, and ac-
cess to the stock market; these profoundly restructured the functioning of Bra-
zil’s real-estate sector. In combination with more favourable macro-economic 
conditions, these new policies triggered a major economic boom in the country 
that should have lasted throughout the 2000s. The Lula government’s wage poli-
cies also increased the percentage population in the middle and upper-income 
brackets, thereby ensuring they had the financial means to access formal market-
based housing options. Construction companies that had traditionally catered to 
the demands of high-income earners now created subsidiaries in order to move 
down the income ladder (Bonduki 2009). But the favourable developments expe-
rienced by the Brazilian economy and the housing sector were suddenly threat-
ened by the unfolding global financial crisis. It is in this context that the gov-
ernment developed and launched the MCMV as a social-housing program with 
clear economic aims. 
The global financial crisis affected various sectors, including real estate 
where demand for housing (measured in sales) dropped by 90 percent at the 
individual firm level (Arantes and Fix 2009). In order to avoid entering into the 
major recession that was unfolding throughout the world, the government initiat-
ed immediate countermeasures to support national industries and consumption, 
such as expanding the credit limits of major banks and lowering tax rates for 
industrial products (D’Amico 2011). A more comprehensive stimulation package 
was launched through the MCMV in the beginning of 2009. Conceptualised as a 
neo-Keynesian initiative, this social-housing program received a budget of 34 
billion Reais (USD 19.5 billion) in order to build one million housing units with-
in 2 years. It was expected that the program would stimulate employment crea-
tion and consumption as well as alleviate the national housing deficit by 14%; 
thus, combining social and economic targets. 
 
Institutionalization of the MCMV 
 
The idea of Minha Casa, MinhaVida was directly connected to the global finan-
cial crisis. The government’s official discourse, and also that of large parts of 
academia, was that the program had been formulated as a direct response to 
changes in the global macro-economic climate. 
While from an overall view the MCMV might appear to be a novel national 
approach to housing, an investigation of the programme’s institutional frame-
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work shows a complex imbroglio of old and new ideas. The housing programme 
incorporated several institutional precedents while ignoring others. For the fol-
lowing discussion, it is essential to carefully dissect the programme’s innovative 
characteristics from its more path-dependent developments. 
 
The selective institutional influence of former housing programs 
 
The MCMV is an unprecedented initiative in Brazil in terms of budget and scale. 
However, this housing programme stands at the end of a broader and rather con-
tinuous learning curve, particularly when considering its institutional configura-
tion. The MCMV directly benefitted from the successes and failures of the pre-
vious Solidarity Credit Programme, the Residential Leasing Program, and 
Growth Acceleration Programme. 
The Solidarity Credit Programme can be seen as the direct ancestor of both 
Entidades and the MCMV. This program was created to include families that 
lacked adequate savings capacities to access the formal housing market. Families 
with incomes under MS 3 were organised into associations, cooperatives, or 
other civil-society organisations (Fernandes and de Silveira 2010). More specifi-
cally, the program assisted the construction of low-income housing and could be 
seen as a direct outcome of social movements that gained access to federal funds 
after putting pressure on the government (Cardoso and Aragão 2013). 
The Programa de Arrendamento Residencial was created by the Cardoso 
government in order to stimulate housing supply. It aimed to increase the supply 
of rental housing and represented the government’s main programme for housing 
between 1999 and 2009. In contrast to the neo-liberal agenda that pervaded the 
Brazilian economy, this housing programme reaffirmed the role of the state and 
linked public subsidies to the private housing supply (Arantes 2010). Still, PAR 
can be seen as having been another step toward the greater commercialization of 
social housing in a system that put the production of social housing in the hands 
of private enterprise and became seduced to the logic of capital accumulation. 
Construction companies were attracted by land donations and additional de-
velopment rights (Cardoso and Aragão 2013). The main housing bank’s mort-
gage-loan assurance considerably decreased investment risks. Caixa was in 
charge of project control but was limited to merely conducting techical/financial 
viability studies and was not concerned with overseeng housing’s architectural 
or locational features. The bank also filtered the demand established by the local 
government, based on risk assessments. With the help of PAR funds, rent re-
payment was subsidised over a period of 15 years. At the end of their contracts, 
beneficiaries were given the option to buy their rental unit through a system 
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whereby they received credit for the rent they had already paid (which is quite 
considerable) or by requesting a new unit and/or contract (Arantes 2010). 
The proclaimed target group included those who earned from 3 to 6 MS. In 
practice, the 200,000 realised units within the first five years went to families 
with incomes ranging between 4 to 8 MS). PAR was remodelled under the Lula 
government to better target lower-income families (MS < 4). As government 
funding was not increased, the construction of these new units was largely 
achieved by government-stipulated reductions in project and building standards 
(in particular, unit sizes), while the market reduced construction costs by choos-
ing peripheral land on which to build new housing units (Arantes 2010). 
The Growth Acceleration Program was launched at the beginning of 2007 
(January) and used the newly available financial resources that were the indirect 
result of the positive economic growth the country had been experiencing up to 
that year. This programme further promoted economic growth through an ambi-
tious initiative in infrastructure investment (Cardoso et al. 2011) and had a major 
impact on the infrastructure coverage throughout the country. In housing, in-
vestment went primarily into upgrading slums to alleviate poor living conditions 
and into improving access to civic services. Slum upgrading was also very visi-
ble and marketable as a political success. 
While the proportional share of available funds within the overall program 
budget was rather negligible, overall it led to a 20-fold increase in the budget 
allotted to slum upgrading for the period between 2002 and 2008 (Bonduki 
2009). The funds used for this initiative came directly from the Casa Civil minis-
try and were not restricted to the same social-control mechanisms other funds 
were (Cardoso et al. 2013a). Two institutional innovations of the Growth Accel-
eration Programme are relevant for a discussion of the MCMV. Under this pro-
gramme, the Brazilian government discovered the importance of discourse and 
the symbolic advantage of uniting various programmes under a single label 
(Cardoso et al. 2013a). As a consequence of these multi-ministerial under-
takings, the programme required refined institutional configurations to answer 
the challenges of project planning, approval, implementation, and control. Spe-
cial steering committees were established to streamline decision-making pro-
cesses and compliance. Situation rooms enabled the collection of sector-specific 
data, and monitoring of the physical and financial schedules and, thus, ensured 
that deadlines and targets were met. These institutional innovations managed to 
reduce the procedural friction and ministerial fragmentation of former housing 
programmes (Loureiro et al. 2013). 
The MCMV was ultimately built on the large shoulders of former pro-
gramsme. The Growth Acceleration Program has shown that a large-scale public 
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programme that relies on the construction sector to create jobs and stimulate 
economic growth can be a success. This programme’s steering and monitoring 
committees were developed to address the major challenges of national pro-
grammes that are attached to quick feedback loops and were directly translated 
into the MCMV. 
The Solidarity Credit Program fine-tuned the traditional model of auto-
construction and set up an institutional structure that was based on unified social 
funds that should have been the role model for Entidades. The learning experi-
ence from PAR has been highly influential due to its own less-controlled (and 
publicly accountable) fund for social housing as this created a gatekeeper posi-
tion for Caixa as the central control agent positioned between the government 
and the construction companies. 
 
The discontinued branches of housing programs 
 
The MCMV has partly or completely ignored several institutional innovations. 
The inclusion of insights from PAR was highly selective. Despite including large 
parts of the programme almost one for one, the idea of rental units was com-
pletely discarded despite their obvious advantage in offering geographic flexibil-
ity to the beneficiaries of these units. Programming also incurred greater discon-
tinuity and followed a similar logic in the almost complete dismissal of the new 
housing policy. 
In the second half of the 2000s, PlanHab was developed and introduced. As a 
direct result, social movements engaged in the reform of a decision-making pro-
cess in Brazilian cities that had become institutionalized under the National 
Council of Cities (October 2002). In August 2007, the National Housing Secre-
tariat initiated discussions on PlanHab in order to consolidate efforts on a na-
tional housing policy. For the next two years, housing policy was jointly devel-
oped through initiatives between representatives of civil society, states, munici-
palities, and academics (Loureiro et al. 2013). The policy document that was 
launched in January 2009 aimed to establish a long-term strategy to address the 
country’s current and future housing needs, based on the idea of decent housing 
(moradia digna, Bonduki 2009). In the end, however, PlanHab remained a pipe 
dream. While some political staff decisions undermined government support for 
the national housing plan, the unfolding of the economic crisis of 2007/08 
pushed forward quick-fix solutions that combined the desire for immediate re-
sults with the economic stimulus of a sector that is one of the country’s major 
employers. At the same time, the MCMV largely ignored the preparatory work 
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of PlanHab8 and only used its financial insights (budget allocation, tax relief, the 
guarantee fund), while adopting the most optimistic scenario proposed by the 
plan (Bonduki 2009). 
Given the level of detail and the elaboration process inherent in PlanHab, the 
MCMV can only be seen as a rather clumsy and rudimentary approach to the 
challenge of affordable housing in a framework that largely favours construction 
companies at the expense of society as a whole. In the next section, I attempt to 
provide some explanations of the instrumental influence of private-sector actors 
that may cast some light on the political economy of institutional change in Bra-
zil. Indeed, real-estate developers were behind the idea of the MCMV, its institu-




HOW TO CREATE YOUR OWN REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK: THE ROLE OF REAL-ESTATE 
DEVELOPERS IN THE MCMV 
 
Planting the idea: The policy-formation process of the MCMV 
 
The introduction of the MCMV was announced in March 2009 as a counter-
cyclical measure to the global financial crisis of 2007/08; but the idea of a large-
scale national housing programme had been planted much earlier. 
In the mid-2000s, SindusCon-SP, the country’s most influential real-estate 
umbrella organisation, began to collaborate with FGV Projetos, an important 
university-led thinktank, to publish a magazine on the construction sector (Con-
juntura da Construção). By the end of 2006, a special issue discussed the merits 
of strong government involvement in the housing sector (based on historical 
analyses). In 2007 and 2008, two out of four annual issues were dedicated to the 
idea of a national public housing programme (including a special issue that fea-
tured Mexico). These nodal points represent direct communication channels to 
influencing public opinion and using the legitimacy of (quasi) scientific research. 
Specific stories and special issues of these magazines were commonly featured 
in the country’s most important newspapers, in combination with expert inter-
views. 
 
8 The planning and land mechanism tools have largely taken over, such as prioritizing 
municipalities that make use of increased property taxes for underutilized lands or do-
nated land. In practice, however, these tools were largely non-operational. 
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In parallel to these efforts, the Rio branch of SindusCon attempted to influ-
ence public decision-makers even more directly. In 2007, the association organ-
ised a government delegation to visit Mexico. Delegates from the construction 
sector found both the Mexican and Chilean housing policy experiences to be the 
most appropriate model for housing production in Brazil (Cardoso et al. 2011). 
In both countries, the stimulus of the supply structure led to the construction of 
monotonous, large-scale, poor-quality housing projects that were situated in 
urban peripheries (see Rolnik 2012). Nevertheless, from the impressions collect-
ed abroad, a pilot project called sustainable housing was initiated under the Car-
doso government and later presented to Dilma Rousseff at the beginning of 2008 
(De Andrade 2011; Cardoso and Aragão 2013). These attempts by the real-estate 
lobby to create a positive momentum for large state-led housing programmes 
quickly yielded concrete results. 
At the end of 2008, informal meetings took place between the minister of the 
Casa Civil Dilma Rousseff (Chief of Staff Office) and several major construction 
companies. Rousseff had invited six large construction companies (Cyrela, Ros-
si, MRV, WTorre, Rodobens, and Gafisa) to discuss the feasibility of such an 
undertaking (Loureiro et al. 2013). According to the CEO of Wtorre, the private-
sector actors in this conversation proposed several measures to President Lula da 
Silva, such as the creation of a guarantee fund and reduced notary costs for land 
records, of which almost all were directly included in the government’s proposal 
which formed the basis for the later law (MP 459 2009; Blanco 2009). 
The importance of the real-estate sector received a symbolic dimension when 
the programme was introduced to the broader public. In a television broadcast 
that took place on March 25, 2008, President da Silva left the main presentation 
to the minister of the Casa Civil. Dilma Rousseff´s speech was followed by a 
discourse between the president of the Brazilian Chamber of Construction Indus-
tries and a comment by the developer Gafisa (by then the country’s largest de-
veloper). This public event can be seen as a nodal point that visually enshrined 
the different levels of importance attributed to each sector: the government and 
the private sector took centre stage, while representatives of social movements 
were present but visually marginalised (De Andrade 2011). 
 
Influencing the institutional frame of the MCMV 
 
The MCMV was institutionalized by Law No 11.977 (June 7, 2009). The first 
phase initially ran to the end of 2010, with the overall target of delivering one 
million new housing units. Phase 2 was envisioned to last from 2011 to 2014 and 
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to have a total budget of R$125 (USD 67) billion9 allocated to building a further 
two million houses (later increased by 600,000 and to take an additional year to 
complete). In both phases, those in track 1 should have received around 40% of 
all contracted units. Phase 3 began in 2016 with the allocation of R$211 (USD 
64.9) billion10 for constructing 3 million housing units (see Table 2). At this 
time, however, the program was caught up in the national government’s budget 
crises and new construction contracts basically came to a halt. 
Besides monitoring progress, the government set up regular meetings in Bra-
sília that brought together representatives from the private market, civil society, 
and academia. These round-table discussions were used on a regular basis to 
collect feedback and decide on any required changes. Due to frustrating experi-
ences that took place in other sectors,11 these discussions became de facto in-
dustry-government feedback moments. This alignment of interests in specific 
nodal points was also reflected in the changes that were made. While various 
problems emerged throughout the MCMV’s years of operations (discussed in a 
separate forthcoming paper),12 for the most part the regulatory changes followed 
the logic of improving market benefits (Loureiro et al. 2013; Dias 2015). 
Various federal government measures for the financial viability of projects 
also took place under the MCMV. For example, setting maximum permissible 
unit prices was one of the primary measures used to influence market response: 
increasing housing prices without changing other requirements (such as unit size 
and housing standards) was seen as broadening the geography in which MCMV 
 
9 Based on the 2011 exchange rate. 
10 Based on the 2016 exchange rate. 
11 Representatives of academia and social movements expressed their concerns as soon 
as the program was announced. The government largely ignored their criticisms; thus, 
generating feelings of being unheard (Loureiro et al. 2013, 1886:8). This is confirmed 
by a comparative study by Pires and Gomide (2014, p. 20), which shows that the 
MCMV relied on the “active engagement of construction firms, [but] housing 
movements and urban planning professionals never had much opportunity to influence 
the implementation of the program.” 
12 The problems that occured during the MCMV’s different phases ranged from specific 
reported shortcomings (delays, intransparent selection processes, resales, abandoned 
units, invasion by criminal groups), more systemic problems (default rates, units that 
were too small, projects that were too distant, lack of infrastructure, land speculation, 
too costly, insufficient quality, too market friendly) to institutional limitations (rushed 
process, absence of certain concerns, non-participatory, not aligned with urban plan-
ning frameworks, no consideration for rental and vacant housing, corruption). 
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projects were possible (while increasing profitability in areas where such pro-
jects were already possible). The result was a more active supply of housing 
units. 
For the urban-supply modality, the unit sizes, standards, and maximum unit 
prices were fixed. Between April 2009 and October 2015, unit prices saw partic-
ular adjustments: The maximum allowed price increased, over the years, from 
R$ 51,000 to R$ 63,000 (USD 21,817 to 30,428), or by 128%. For the track 2 
and 3 limits, the revisions were even more vivid and represented an increase of 
173%, which was much higher than the national-construction-cost inflation rate 
of 147%. 
 
Table 2: Overview of MCMV phases and their targets. 
MCMV 1 
(2009-10) Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Total 
     
Goal 400,000 400,000 200,000 1,000,000 
Contracted 482,700 375,800 146,600 1,005,100 
MCMV 2 
(2011-14/15) Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Total 










0 400,000 3,750,000 
MCMV 3 
(2016-2021) Faixa 1 Faixa 2 Faixa 3 Total 





0 400,000 3,000,000 
Source: Table by the author based on program documentation. 
 
A second domain of regulatory changes was in the level of supply incentives. 
The largest incentives were in considerable reductions in notary fees and a uni-
fied taxation regime (so-called Regime Especial de Tributação, RET) being 
applicable to project budgets. RET applicability was also regulated by maximum 
unit prices, albeit these were disconnected from the aforementioned track-1 ceil-
ings (see Table 1). This carved out a regulatory loophole where builders could 
scoop up the main benefits of highly subsidised units but sell their projects at 
82 | Anthony Boanada-Fuchs   
 
higher prices to track-2 families. As this track was less tightly controlled than 
track 1, it also opened up the possibility of imposing further payments off-the-
book so as to increase the final unit price (see Cardoso et al. 2013c, p. 146).  
A third area of policy reform concerned compliance to a minimum standard 
of building quality. The Ministry of Cities and Caixa imposed qualification 
standards for construction companies (supply procurement, administration, hu-
man resources, etc.) in order for them to participate in the subsidised housing 
programs. In practice, these qualification standards linked project size to compa-
ny size and ultimately benefitted large developers. 
In contrast to the supply-related changes, other problems that were linked to 
the MCMV did not receive the same level of attention. The inadequacy of the 
unit model applicable to an entire country, which was in disregard to the overall 
cultural, environmental and geographic differences, had been raised from the 
very beginning (Arantes and Fix 2009). The lack of solutions to account for the 
heterogeneity of demand (Cardoso and do Lago 2013) was particularly puzzling 
as the national housing policy of 2008 offered a broad range of options that were 
based on different family sizes and regional differences (Eloy and Cagnin 2012). 
Similar stagnation in the programme adjustment can be traced to the issue of 
land location (Nascimento and Tostes 2011; Maricato 2011), the location of 
projects (market-dictated peripheral developments) (Arantes and Fix 2009; Nas-





Programme Minha Casa, Minha Vida has added more evidence for an interna-
tional critical review of a large-scale national governmental housing programme 
that has over-relied on market supply and ultimately led to urban sprawl, mass 
housing of relatively poor quality and a supply that runs aside actual demand. In 
Brazil, the private sector was instrumental in planting and shaping the idea of 
this housing programme, defining its actual institutionalization, and influencing 
the way it changed over time. This was made possible by not only the sector’s 
pro-active engagement and deployment of its own resources but also the ease at 
which it was able to align its interests with those of the government. A pro-
gramme that incorporated both of private and public interests came at the ex-
pense of Brazilian society and cities. 
These private-sector lobby efforts took place largely undetected from public 
scrutiny as the purpose of this lobbying remained hidden behind a vail of legiti-
macy in the print media, in its own umbrella associations and in official round-
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table debates in Brasília. Retracing the involvement of the real-estate sector in 
shaping public opinion and influencing changes in policy provides evidence on 
the political economy of urban development and points to important yet largely 
ignored forces that underlay current urban development trajectories. The direct 
link between the MCMV and political change (the impeachment of Rousseff; the 
imprisoning of Lula), economic scandals (construction-related bribery mecha-
nisms) and ultimately re-emerging socio-spatial tensions in the country, under-
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Chapter 3: Mutual Aid, Self-Management  
and Collective Ownership 
Social Capital as a Housing-Finance Counter-Mechanism  






Cities around the world have experienced aggressive transformations mainly due 
to the speculative character of global capital. Global capital has been claiming 
urban centralities as arenas in which to place new global markets, thereby ex-
panding new urban economies that are reshaping cities in a polarizing trend that 
has created conditions that exacerbate poverty and the marginalisation of urban 
populations (Sassen, 2011). Urban land and housing have become expensive 
commodities which are denied to a large majority of people in a system domi-
nated by the politics of accumulation and the privatisation of essential aspects of 
life, including recreation, education and health care. This urban business model 
has been directed toward fostering financial profit while intensifying a process of 
the commodification of the city (see Rolnik in the foreword of this book for an 
elaboration on the commodification of land and housing). In turn, this has 
opened deep gaps in a society that constrains access to social services, infrastruc-
ture, facilities, and especially housing for the most vulnerable. 
At the same time, new models of urban development have influenced the 
way governments conceive and implement housing policies in terms of how they 
 
1   This paper is based on the dissertation “Social Strategies Building the City: A Re-
conceptualization of Social Housing in Latin America”, by Marielly Casanova pub-
lished by LIT Verlag Berlin, 2019. 
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affect affordability and accessibility to urban centralities where most social ser-
vices and infrastructure are located. In this system, state investment in housing is 
reduced and state responsibility is replaced or dominated by market logic. 
Hence, the state is no longer the provider but the facilitator that supports market 
demand and promotes private ownership under a neo-liberal dogma (UN-Habitat 
2012 – see also the elaboration on housing trends on a global scale in the first 
foreword by El Sioufi in this book). Therefore, housing and especially housing 
for the poor is built as an industrial product characterized by a mass production 
that is devoid of individual variation and social meaning as it has become com-
pletely disarticulated from its context (Ortiz 2011). These housing schemes are 
designed under principles of standardisation and mass production, emulating an 
industrial economy that has severe effects on the character of neighbourhoods 
(Calthorpe and Fulton 2001). This mass production acts against diversity and the 
human scale and denies the complexity of the community and its ties of solidari-
ty; the spatial nature of this production neglects to include opportunities for en-
counters between neighbours, limits social control of the territory and reduces 
the feeling of security and comfort (Casanova 2019). These new private agendas 
provide no room for collective solutions. Instead, these industrial models en-
courage individualization in society by restricting participation, autonomy and 
self-determination. Social actors are not at all considered in the process of the 
conception, planning and/or construction of housing. 
Additionally, the state’s withdrawal from investment in economic activities 
and infrastructure has caused a weakening of the working class, which in turn 
translates into lower wages, higher unemployment and unfulfilled citizen rights 
in a system that neglects to accumulate social capital. Along with the individual-
ization of problems, other negative outcomes result from the politics of exclu-
sion in that any collective actions to solve these problems are excluded, such as 
in cooperatives, solidarity and mutual aid. However, in the past decades this 
situation has triggered a more structured resurgence from social movements and 
workers’ unions that are active in popular urban sectors and that have been en-
gaging in resistance to the new neo-liberal model and reacting in defence of their 
salaries, access to decent housing and services, and mostly advocating for the 
recovery of democratic spaces and decision-making processes. 
In this sense, contemporary social movements have institutionalized the co-
operative as the embodiment of one of the most effective forms of resistance in 
their struggle for access to employment and a dignified standard of living. 
Adopted by the early labour movements with an important precedent dating from 
the beginning of the industrial revolution in modern times the cooperative has 
become a mechanism for the construction of social capital. The cooperative 
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movement operates mainly in spaces where the corporate system and the market 
cannot reach. Workers’ cooperatives and social enterprises provide alternatives 
to people who would otherwise be unemployed and marginalised (Curl 2010). 
Housing cooperatives are using unconventional tools to empower people to ac-
cess decent housing and also to build skills and capacities for their integration 
into their city and its systems. 
In Latin America, the cooperative has been a response of organised collec-
tives and socio-political actors whose aim is to counteract the consequences of 
neo-liberal policies. These cooperatives are based on three main pillars: self-
management, mutual aid and collective property. Cooperatives in Latin America 
understand the interconnection between these three principles as being social 
capital. The aim of this paper is to provide another perspective to the concept of 
social capital and to describe in specific cases its implementation for the produc-
tion of low-income housing. 
 
 
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM –  
NEO-LIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The end of the 1980s in Latin America was marked by a type of neo-liberalism 
that was the result of a radical transformation of the structures of capitalism; one 
that fractured the basis of the interventionist and benefactor state. This trend had 
already begun by the end of the 1970s when the global recession gradually con-
cluded a debt-financed period of “apparent development” (Walton 2001). 
The privatisation of public companies, productive areas and infrastructure in 
addition to the deregulation and cease of public subsidies for public goods and 
infrastructure were some of the rules imposed by the market. The right to the city 
was more than ever in dispute as neo-liberalism caused economic inequalities to 
increase. These were articulated within different forms of exclusion: physical, 
social and political (Samara et al. 2013; Casanova 2019). Neo-liberalism and 
globalisation encouraged the development of new centralities where corporate 
projects expanded. The consequences were new forms of city making that were 
mainly characterized by socio-spatial disintegration (Girola and Thomaz 2013), 
fragmentation and deep segregation. 
Those economic measures along with the resulting austerity had high social 
and economic costs. Cities did not only host a growing number of poor people 
but were also becoming poorer in their capacity to provide basic needs. The neo-
liberal ideas introduced in Latin America promoted and imposed the privatisa-
tion of public services and the deregulation of urban policy, which resulted in 
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deficient or non-existent education, a lack of proper health care, the privatisation 
of public space, unaffordable “public” transportation and the commodification of 
housing (see for example, Boanada (Chapter 2), on the example of Brazil). In 
sum, it created a “disarticulated ill-equipped city” (Velásquez Carrillo 2004, p. 
9) that was unfit to cope with emerging challenges and unable to provide a quali-
ty of life to its inhabitants. 
The overall result of these measures was an increase in global poverty. Re-
duced salaries and the deregulated rents denied a majority of the population the 
possibility of accessing decent housing or even housing in general. The housing 
problematic translated into two general aspects: one aspect was the construction 
of new slums on occupied land in urban peripheries or the illegal occupation of 
empty buildings in inner cities. People in need of housing took into their own 
hands the role of housing producers without financial, technical or legal support. 
The second aspect relates to the transfer of responsibilities from the state to the 
market; this encouraged the mass production of low-quality housing, which was 
mostly built on cheap land far from city centralities. This typology of housing 
has increased the social gap and caused even more social and physical segrega-
tion. Low-income housing was and still is built in areas that are disconnected 
from cities; thereby, lacking cultural or social identity to root the inhabitants to 
the territory and also distancing them from social services and employment op-
portunities. 
This neo-liberal crisis expanded throughout the territory, affecting countries 
and cities in Latin America, to different extents. Argentina was one of those 
countries where the state was severely affected; here, essential services were 
aggressively privatised while the state’s planning role in the develop of infra-
structure and social facilities was constrained. In 1998, Argentina began to ad-
vance toward a deep recession that culminated in a social crisis that exploded in 
2001. As the country’s international debt increased, social rights and social in-
vestment were reduced, especially in specific areas like public housing. These 
events together caused a national financial crisis (Fernández Wagner 2011) that 
shaped a process of social disarticulation and eroded the democratic basis of 
Argentinian society (Rodríguez 2009). 
By 2001, all socio-economic indicators were showing the critical impover-
ishment of a population that was being influenced by an enormous qualitative 
and quantitative housing deficit. Poverty increased in Argentina over the next 
two years, so that 51.7% of the population in metropolitan Buenos Aires was 
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living in poverty2 and 25.2% of that percentage was homeless (Raspall 2010). 
The quantitative aspect of the problem shows that in 2001, the ‘villas miseria’ or 
the city’s slums which were in constant and exponential growth housed 110,387 
people while 55,799 people lived in tenement housing and 37,601 in hotel-
pensions (Raspall 2010); none of those accommodations provided security of 
tenure or a minimum acceptable standard of living. 
 
Figure 1: Accentuated occupation of land in the periphery of cities building new 
slums and densifying existing slums, Caracas. 
Source: Daniel Schwartz, 2011. 
 
One of the social solutions to (informally) solving the housing shortage was the 
squatting or illegal occupation of private and public buildings in the city. It is 
estimated that by 1991 there were 150,000 people involved in the occupation of 
vacant buildings in the city of Buenos Aires. This means that roughly 5% of the 
city’s population (Rodríguez, 2009) that was living on the margins had taken this 
measure to meet their housing needs. However, the revalorization of the city’s 
 
2    Households in poverty present at least one of the following indicators of deprivation: 
Overcrowding (households with more than three people per room); poor quality of 
shelter (households that live in a dwelling of inconvenient type such as tenements, 
rooms in hotels or pensions not built for housing purposes); inadequate sanitary condi-
tions (homes that do not have any type of toilet, etc.). 
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land between the 1990s and 2003 influenced the enactment of new urban 
policies (especially during the crisis of 2001-2002) that aimed to evict residents 
from illegally occupied buildings (Rodríguez 2009). 
 
 
COUNTER-ACTION TO NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES 
 
Throughout the decade of the 1980s, and more so during the explosion of the 
crisis in 2001, social movements were already organising themselves within the 
‘villas miseria’, tenement housing, and illegally occupied buildings, so as to act 
in defence of citizen’s rights and against the housing shortage, the inaccessible 
housing rents and the evictions. The decade of the 1990s marked the beginning 
of grassroots planning in which several grassroots organisations evolved into 
socio-political actors that later influenced public policy (Zapata 2013). During 
this period, these movements were performing independent from the state in 
their decision-making processes. In other words, the sense of autonomy that 
resulted from these participatory practices began to have an effect on state 
policy; thus, influencing urban policy as their own project for an alternative 
society (García-Guadilla 2018). 
The contemporary cooperative movement is embodiment of those social 
organisations in the context of Buenos Aires. These cooperatives differ from 
traditional cooperatives due to the complexity of their fields of action, where 
they reject the traditional bureaucratic, vertical and clientelist structures (Ciolli 
2011). Instead, they function through participatory democratic processes through 
which members advocate for solutions to the different problems that deeply 
affect Argentinean society (Rodríguez 2009). Self-management is one of the 
fundamental principles that enable these cooperatives to achieve collective goals. 
The first cooperatives achieved the collective renovation of occupied buildings, 
which they later formally acquired through public funding. 
Since 2001, the cooperatives have been operating mostly with the public 
funds they have received through the Programme for Self-management Housing 
(a regulatory instrument formed under the framework of Law 341 for the alloca-
tion and monitoring of resources). Law 341 was conceived as a mechanism that 
would enable cooperatives to receive credits for the construction or purchase of 
affordable dwellings and also for the renovation of or construction work required 
on existing buildings. The main aspect of this law is the inclusion of social or-
ganisations as beneficiaries of loans or access to credit without their being sub-
jected to income restrictions (Rodríguez 2009). The city government guides the 
lending process by providing financial and technical resources and the actual 
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loans and also the later monitoring of the use of funds acquired through those 
loans. In 2003, the city created the Institute of Housing, which enabled it to sus-
tain its self-management and participatory policies (Rodríguez 2009) and to 
support the cooperatives during the process of housing production. Despite being 
dependent on public money, the cooperatives and social organisations behind the 
programme have been able to establish clear boundaries between their capacities 
and responsibilities and those of the state; thus, ensuring the effective use of 
public resources to access decent housing, employment, education and health 
care, while investing in building capacities for their members. 
‘El Movimiento de Ocupantes e Inquilinos’ (The Occupants and Tenant 
Movement (MOI)) is one of those relevant actors that emerged from the process 
of building occupations and subsequent forced evictions in Buenos Aires. This 
organisation was essential to the creation of cooperatives. It was also a major 
actor that, together with other pro-habitat organisations, achieved the enactment 
of Law 341 for housing cooperatives, in 2000, and supported numerous coopera-
tives before and after the law’s enactment. The movement’s main objective is to 
help process-oriented small-scale organisations access serviced urban land and 
gain legal tenure for housing production in the city’s centralities. The MOI is 
composed of a combination of diverse professionals and academics from the 
University of Buenos Aires and La Plata, urban social movements (from the 
occupations and cooperatives) and workers from the ‘Central de Trabajadores 
Argentinos’ CTA. 
The MOI has provided the necessary mechanisms for cooperatives’ internal 
organisation; it has also supported self-management efforts that together with the 
public sector (co-management) have been instrumental in the development of 
housing projects. The cooperatives’ affiliation to their structure is based on 
small-scale processes that build capacities for self-management and mutual aid. 
In addition, they incorporate their collective property as a powerful tool that 
contradicts the concept of a city that is structured as a speculative business; in-
stead, they promote a democratic city where everyone has the right to reside. 
The constitution of the MOI follows the values or three pillars that were 
adopted from successful experiences in Uruguay and which were institutional-
ized by the Federación Uruguaya de Cooperativas de Viviendapor Ayuda Mutua 
(FUCVAM).3 These are self-management, mutual aid and collective ownership 
 
3 The FUCVAM (Uruguayan Federation of Mutual-aid Housing Cooperatives) is an 
organization whose founding in 1970 was supported by the enactment of the National 
Housing Act 13728, in 1968. It functions as an umbrella organization in which the 
base cooperatives are federated.  
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which, along with the dimensions embedded within these pillars, constitute what 
the movement calls social capital. 
 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AS AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM  
TO FINANCE LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
 
Social organisations are constitutive producers of social capital (Kearns and 
Forrest 2000). Housing cooperatives hold a certain level of responsibility in that 
they are involved in the creation of social capital that is intrinsic in their ties to 
solidarity and their commitment to a collective effort. These organisations refer 
to social capital as the potential of human capital to encourage economic devel-
opment; thereby, establishing a direct connection between mutual aid and social 
capital. Mutual aid is, in itself, both a social and economic asset due to the fact 
that the labour or working hours performed by the cooperative member and/or 
his/her family are translated into payments that complement the financing re-
quired for the construction of the member’s house. Social capital can be trans-
formed into financial capital (Putnam 1993); however, it cannot be used as capi-
tal (for exchange) as it is understood in the market economy but rather it is a 
value that can be accumulated and used as an asset for social benefit (Coraggio 
2002); in other words, it is the constitution of a social economy. 
The social economy is directly related to the theory of social capital; it repre-
sents the aggregate value of the steps housing cooperatives follow as social en-
terprises, steps that are vital to fostering economic development (Casanova 
2019). At the same time, their organisation is shaped by self-managed practices 
and their governance system is based on direct democracy. These social enter-
prises have the capacity to manage social, economic and physical resources in 
order to produce income and social benefits for its members (Casanova 2019). 
Furthermore, self-management in combination with mutual aid are two princi-
ples that contribute to the generation of work value which is accumulated 
through individual and collective efforts. The two principles contribute to build-
ing personal capacities through the organisation and its logistics and also through 
management and construction-related activities. 
Additionally, collective ownership adds another dimension to the concept of 
social capital. It creates a series of securities that protect the cooperative member 
from land speculation and the direct threat of eviction by third parties. Different 
from individual ownership, the family is the user and not the owner of the prop-
erty they occupy. This means the cooperative members have the right to use and 
enjoy their dwellings and the cooperative’s common spaces while the deed is 
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registered under the cooperative as an organisation. This ensures both individual 
and collective tenure and benefits. Furthermore, collective ownership within this 
social-capital framework act as a financial guarantee so there is a reciprocal 
exchange between the cooperative and its members in the repayment of loans 
and debts. The collective act between these two entities is the guarantee for the 
debt incurred (Portes 1998). 
This social-capital scheme also comes with some restrictions. Members as 
users cannot sell the dwellings, they occupy nor can they use them as capital for 
mortgages. If a family decides to move out of their dwelling, then they receive 
the value defined by the initial investment in labour and hours of work provided 
during the whole process (not limited to construction but also management, etc.) 
and any additional personal contributions. Due to the social nature of this ar-
rangement, this compensation is not influenced by the market or the land value. 
To understand the context of self-management, mutual aid and collective 
ownership depicted in social capital, it is essential to provide a closer look into 
the FUCVAM and its philosophy as it has influenced the configuration and func-
tioning of the MOI in Argentina. 
 
 
EXPERIENCES BASED ON SOCIAL CAPITAL –  
MUTUAL-AID HOUSING COOPERATIVES IN URUGUAY: 
THE MODEL FOLLOWED BY THE MOI 
 
In Uruguay, participation in housing production has been institutionalized 
through the production of housing that is primarily based on the cooperative 
model. The first cooperative venture into mutual-aid housing dates back to 1966, 
with three pilot experiences supported by the Uruguayan Cooperative Centre 
(CCU) and funded through cooperation between the Uruguayan government and 
the Inter-American Development Bank. Inspired by these experiences, the Na-
tional Housing Act was passed in 1968, and in 1970 the FUCVAM was founded 
as an essential actor for the organisation and consolidation of a growing number 
of cooperatives that included members of workers’ unions and working-class 
dwellers. 
The FUCVAM functions as a guild organisation in which member coopera-
tives are federated. These cooperatives manage and administer project funds, 
while the FUCVAM assumes a political role in providing support through tech-
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nical assistance and capacity building. Furthermore, from 1984,4 Montevideo 
City Hall created a land bank that allows the cooperatives to buy serviced urban 
land within the city’s centralities. The FUCVAM is now the institution that allo-
cates land for use by the cooperatives. 
As mentioned in the previous section, social capital is defined as the combi-
nation of self-management, mutual aid and collective ownership; and the 
FUCVAM considers these factors to be a legitimate mechanism for financing 
low-income housing. This means that the government supported by the legal 
framework provides 85% of each loan and the families (or members that will 
inhabit the project) provide the remaining 15% in mutual aid along with other 
financial contributions. Before construction begins, first there is a contribution of 
two taxable units or Unidad Reajustable,5 then during construction each hour of 
labour is recorded as an economic value, and when construction is over the 
members repay the loan through social quotas while continuing to self-manage 
the maintenance of the building. This format reduces costs in several ways: first 
the cost of intermediaries is avoided (construction profit, promotion, real estate); 
and second, the maintenance cost is also reduced as it is assumed through mutual 
aid (International Co-operative Alliance ICA). Cooperative members acquire 
considerable knowledge during the construction process and can therefore organ-
ise themselves to undertake this latter task. 
After the construction is complete, the families distribute among themselves 
the responsibilities for the tasks and activities associated with self-management. 
This is a process that stimulates communication which, in addition to the con-
stant consensus and decision-making, promotes solidarity among the communi-
ty. This approach has enabled collective solutions for other social problems the 
community has faced (Rodríguez interview 2013). In the case of this project, 
those ties were behind the implementation of a series of community-oriented 
projects that have improved the quality of life for both the residents of the hous-
es and of the surrounding neighbourhoods. Some examples of community inter-
ventions are: basic services and urban infrastructure, sports and recreation, cul-
ture, health care and other community-managed programmes. 
Collective ownership in the context of the housing projects is an important 
aspect of development in that it prevents speculation since only the families 
involved in these projects have the right to use the housing units but not to sell 
them. Being a user means understanding that housing is a social asset and not an 
 
4 In 1984, with the election of the left-wing government, democracy had been restored 
from the right-wing dictatorship that had ruled the country since 1973. 
5 UR: 1021, 32, value in Uruguayan Pesos as of February 2, 2018. 
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asset for exchange or a commodity. In addition, being a user involves having two 
important characteristics: one is ideological as it ties people together in develop-
ing a sense of responsibility within the context of the project (the houses and the 
dwellings, the commons in the house, the community and the neighbourhood); 
the second factor, here, is more practical in that it has to do with the users’ rights 
and the rights of their children to grow up in a healthy and safe environment 
(Rodríguez interview 2013). When a family is not able to pay credit instalments 
on their dwelling or is only able to partially pay them, then the case is presented 
to the cooperative. In turn, the cooperative presents the case to the state, which 
can provide subsidies to the family.6 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of tasks and roles in FUCVAM cooperatives, Montevideo. 
Source: Author, 2013. 
 
Capacity building is an important principle that comes from the cooperative’s 
social capital. Several economic activities emerge during and after the construc-
tion process. First, the cooperative goes through a process of education that helps 
the families understand the dimensions and complexity behind working and 
 
6 These subsidies come from official programmes that are generally for low- and very 
low-income families; these subsidies also depend on the families’ income and compo-
sition (Nahoum 2013).  
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living in cooperatives. Second, there is a strong process of training and the build-
ing of skills and capacities during the process of housing construction. 
This model that has been working in Uruguay since the 1970s and has served 
as a solid base from which to replicate organisations such as the MOI in Argen-
tina when it stepped in with support to navigate the severe social effects of the 
economic crisis in 2001. The FUCVAM provides a clear example of how social 
capital in its interpretation of the three main pillars could be incorporated in 
public policy and the implementation of social housing projects. Social capital is 
seen as a means not only to achieve the right to adequate housing but also as a 
platform for socio-economic development. It is strongly connected to the city’s 
deployment of the right to allow vulnerable members of the population to access 
serviced urban land, social and cultural services and infrastructure, education, 
employment, and mostly to enable them to have a voice in decision-making 
processes. 
The last point was a crucial characteristic from the point of view of the MOI 
and other cooperatives in Buenos Aires. These social organisations were able to 
boost political processes that promoted and achieved the redistribution of state 
responsibilities in the drafting of social policies and the provision and manage-
ment of funds for housing. By following the FUCVAM model, the MOI was 
able to institutionalize its three main pillars: self-management, mutual aid and 
collective ownership, the bases for the functioning of mutual-aid cooperatives in 
Uruguay. Although the cooperative composition is smaller in scale in the case of 
the cooperatives associated with the MOI,7 this organisation functions under a 
very similar structure that has ensured its success in the production of social 






7 By 2007 (the period between 2002 and 2007 saw the highest number of loans under 
adjudication) the MOI had 180 housing units under construction (Rodriguez 2011) in 
a city of 2,890,151 (according to the National Census 2010; Rodriguez and Huerta 
2016). On the other hand, from 1966 the cooperative movement in Uruguay has built 
30,000 housing units in a country of 3.5 million people (Del Castillo 2015). 
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Figure 3: Housing units under construction by FUCVAM cooperatives, 
Montevideo. 
Source: Author, 2013. 
 
 
NEW VALUES – SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
From the late 1980s to today, capitalism in its most aggressive form of neo-
liberalism has negatively influenced the development of cities and society in the 
Global South (especially in Latin America). It has affected the great majority of 
the population, especially in their capacity to access decent housing. Neverthe-
less, it has also provoked the creation and consolidation of movements whose 
proposals have contributed to the transformation of their societies. These move-
ments have put forward measures that are not only pertinent to developing coun-
tries but that can also be discussed and transferred to other contexts in which 
crises are having impacts in similar ways. 
One of the most important characteristics of the social movements that are 
behind the experiences of the MOI in Argentina and the FUCVAM in Uruguay 
is their understanding of the problems and their comprehensive approach to 
looking for solutions. Normally the solutions provided by governments are uni-
dimensional. The social and urban fragmentation and segregation could not be 
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solved by only providing mass housing. For social needs to be better clarified 
and understood, this has required social movements to point out how to better 
understand the problems and how to integrate essential solutions to basic social 
needs. These solutions would not only allow the poor and marginalised to access 
adequate housing but also to access education skills and capacities, culture, em-
ployment and social inclusion. 
Using social capital as a mechanism to achieve these goals shows that hous-
ing and especially social housing cannot be seen through the logic of a market 
that expects to profit from its construction. But social capital can be conceived 
under the logic of the type of social investment that allows the population to 
have a dignified standard of living and a platform that supports social mobility 
and development. 
Although the main ideology behind self-management, mutual aid and collec-
tive ownership is one that asserts that these principles belong to a socialist view 
and their application is intended to break with capitalistic structures (Rodríguez 
2009), these elements of social capital also include the potential for society in 
general to undergo a great transformation. Beyond the present resistance to the 
dominant system, there is the possibility of incorporating this ideological ap-
proach within capitalistic systems so these two models can both coexist and 
cooperate in providing opportunities to the most vulnerable. However, the con-
servative bureaucratic models must change and acknowledge the capacities and 
responsibilities of social organisations. In this way, the democratic autonomy of 
these organisations could be ensured. 
Additionally, the principles of social capital have not yet been completely 
explored. Thus, a complete assessment of their potential has yet to be deployed. 
The failure to do so might be related to the stigma attached to collective owner-
ship and its association with socialistic stands; these are often rejected in certain 
contexts. Also, there is no official mechanisms for the regularisation and imple-
mentation of principles and policies that support social capital. 
There are many alternative ways to introduce social capital mechanisms into 
democratic processes. A closer look at the functioning of these tools, and their 
evaluation and monitoring in existing proposals and implemented projects, 
would be necessary as a step to understand how to introduce them widely into 
public policy. Two concluding remarks: first, organisations that are working 
collectively for the defence of housing as a right and a social benefit should 
receive more legal, technical and financial support from the state, and, second, 
stricter controls and regulations should be imposed over land value and private 
property so as to avoid speculation and to allow these organisations to access 
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Chapter 4: Understanding the Housing Needs 
of Low-Skilled Bangladeshi Migrants in Oman 
Case Study of a Labour Camp and Migrant-Dominant 
Neighbourhood 





The Gulf region has a long history of migration. Over the years, the patterns of 
migration and the demographics of migrants within cities in the Gulf have 
changed. Before the 20th century, the Middle Eastern countries indulged in ‘in-
tra-regional’ migration, with members of the Arab-speaking population that 
migrated in and out of the Middle East specialising in administration and educa-
tion (Choucri 1986). During the 1930s, the intra-regional migration of both 
skilled and unskilled migrants was evident within Middle Eastern countries. The 
1960s saw an upsurge in extra-regional migration, with labour moving from the 
Middle East to the West. However, with the oil boom of the 1970s, the focus of 
migration shifted back to the Middle East, namely to oil-rich Gulf countries. 
With rising oil prices, infrastructural development became economically possible 
and this increased the number of new jobs available for low-skilled workers, 
especially in the construction industry (Choucri 1986). As a theoretical concept, 
Maslow and Lewis’ (1987) needs triangle and migration theories were assessed 
in regards to the sustainable livelihood framework developed by the UK’s De-
partment for International Development (DFID) (1997), wherein each livelihood 
asset (human, financial, social and physical) was studied in depth to identify the 
basic and psychological needs that were not being provided to migrant labourers 
in Oman. Further, laws, policies and processes were assessed following DFIF 
framework so as to understand the social and spatial standpoints of these low-
skilled migrants during their temporary stays in the country and to identify the 
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possible causes of their temporary situation. Finally, this study takes into account 
Lefebvre’s (1991) concepts of both the social production and appropriation of 
space so as to understand how and why low-skilled migrants undertake the tem-
porary development of their own housing and the use of open spaces in order to 
provide for their basic needs. 
This article aims to answer two research questions: First, what is the state of 
Oman’s existing available housing provision for its migrant workers? Second, 
what are the basic spatial and social needs of low-skilled Bangladeshi migrants 
living in Oman? 
A qualitative research approach was taken, starting with 174 interviews of 
Bangladeshi professional, skilled and low-skilled migrants who were living in 
different locations across Oman during the time of the study. The aim of these 
interviews was to understand the general wellbeing or livelihood status of the 
interviewees and to understand the selection of their housing typology. An at-
tempt was made to identify the rental prices of these dwellings, but unfortunate-
ly, we were not successful. This limitation was due to the lack of trust between 
the interviewer and the interviewee, which made it impossible to obtain honest 
answers on rental agreements from among the respondents; there was also a lack 
of valid quantitative data on property/housing rents. The results of these inter-
views provided answers to the first research question and these are documented 
in this chapter under the title Housing typology of Bangladeshi migrants living 
in Oman. 
In order to answer the second research question, 20 low-skilled migrants 
were interviewed using a narrative approach to the case study. Ten interviewees, 
each either from a labour camp or a migrant-dominant inner-city neighbourhood, 
were selected and interviewed. The results were recorded in a graphical repre-
sentation that provides a life-history mapping; development of livelihood assets 
(in the form of an assets pentagon which provides information on the livelihood 
status of individuals by looking at their human, financial, spatial, and social 
situations); and the development of a livelihood strategy matrix (Annisa 2018). 
Furthermore, spatial mapping was used to understand the usage of indoor and 
outdoor spaces in labour camps and migrant neighbourhoods, respectively. This 









The Sultanate of Oman, being part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has 
followed the region’s trend of inviting temporary workers from Southeast Asian 
countries to work in low-paying jobs in the country. Oman is situated on the 
southeast coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It has a total population of approxi-
mately 4.6 million, of which 44% are expatriates and 56% are Omani nationals 
(NSCI 2018). From 1973 to the present, there has been a steady increase in the 
number of Southeast Asian migrants coming to Oman. The work of Birks and 
Sinclair (1978) (as cited by Choucri (1986)) shows that, by 1975, Oman had 
become the second highest preferred destination of Southeast Asian migrants 
(notably Indians and Pakistanis), after Dubai. According to the National Centre 
for Statistics and Information (NCSI), in 2013, fully 89% of all foreign workers 
in Oman were employed (the remaining 11% being family dependents) (NCSI, 
2014), of which 87% originated from Southeast Asian countries, such as India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri-Lanka (GLMM 2014). Furthermore, it was noted 
that, in 2014, Southeast Asians predominated blue collar jobs, with 74% having 
attained below a secondary level of education (GLMM 2014). These statistics 
also help us understand that the highest population of migrants in Oman are 
single, low-skilled Southeast Asian individuals. Until 2016, Indian workers took 
up the first rank, being the highest number of migrants in the country, with 
39.4% of the total migrant population in that country (NCSI 2018). However, by 
2018, the percentage of registered Bangladeshis in Oman had fallen to 34%, still 
surpassing the 33.6% of Indian migrant workers (NCSI 2018); this and the fact 
the Bangla language and connections within the Bangladeshi community in the 
city of Muscat are seen as a strength compelled the researcher to prioritise an 
investigation into the dominant Bangladeshi community for the selection of the 
case studies presented in this chapter. 
 
 
THEORIES OF TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION 
 
Every migrant labourer entering Oman requires an employment visa. These are 
only valid for a limited period of time wherein every visa type ties these mi-
grants to a certain employment status (ROP 2018). Furthermore, under the 
Gulf’s unique employment system (Kafala system), every employee is bound by 
law to their employer, who takes financial and legal responsibility for them 
(Longva 1999). Thus, the employee is bound to their employer and is not legally 
permitted to work for any other employer/sponsor (Oman Labour Code, Article 
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18Bis). This effectively limits the options of low-skilled migrant workers in 
terms of both work and housing. In regards to the location of work, some mi-
grants are housed in labour camps in proximity to work place. Residents of la-
bour camps face this challenge as they are provided temporary housing in labour 
camps and are thus segregated from city centres and do not have the option of 
selecting the location of their stay. 
Migrant labourers are recruited to the Gulf in a complex process that in-
volves a number of stakeholders in both the home and host countries and which 
can be explained by institutional theory (Massey et al. 1993). Further, migratory 
networks theory explains these migrants’ dependency on the social networks that 
provide them with personal connections to former migrants in the host country 
(Massey et al. 1987), where these networks prove to be “valuable adaptive re-
sources” in an alien environment (Massey et al. 1987, p. 147). With the help of 
these networks, illegal channels of migration have given rise to a type of visa 
that is locally known as a “free visa”, where the migrants are bound to an em-
ployer on paper but, in reality, have no connection to these employers (Rahman 
2011). As these visas are not recognised by law, the employer is not bound by 
law to provide these labourers with acceptable housing or safe working condi-
tions at legally established wages. Migrants that fit under this category are ac-
cepted by various employers who employ them either on contract or on hourly 
bases to perform short-term tasks. These poorly paid migrants seek out afforda-
ble housing close to city centres, where they rely on their social networks to find 
information on job opportunities. Migrant networks help migrants sustain them-
selves economically, making it viable for them to live and work in a host coun-
try, and they tend to accumulate in migrant-dominant neighbourhoods in order to 
benefit from the social capital that exists there. 
In today’s globalised world, the dual-market theory of Piore (1979) implies 
that low-skilled migrants become part of a secondary sector in the job market 
where they take up difficult, low paid, labour-intensive jobs that nationals refuse 
to do. In addition to the lack of integration schemes and nationalisation policies 
in the Gulf, this phenomenon not only creates a segmented employment sector 
but also waters down the concept of a parallel society, where residents of the 
host and home countries segregate themselves from each other by living in en-
claves within the same city with each practising their own ethnicity, culture and 
traditions. 
In his hierarchy of needs triangle, Maslow and Leiws (1987) identify three 
kinds of needs: basic, psychological and self-fulfillment needs, which contribute 
to the efficient functioning of the human mind and body; all of these aspects 
need to be touched upon. Basic needs are divided into physiological needs, such 
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as food, water, and warmth; safety needs, including security and safety; and 
psychological needs, which are categorised into the need for belongingness and 
the need for love, and these are acquired through friends and intimate relation-
ships; and esteem needs, which include prestige and feelings of accomplishment. 
It is evident that Oman’s labour camps provide low-skilled migrants with basic 
needs; however, these camps fail to provide these people with opportunities to 
fulfill their psychological and self-fulfillment needs. Evidence shows that the 
latter two needs are seen to be fulfilled through the development of livelihood 
strategies in migrant-dominant neighbourhoods by the migrants themselves (An-
nisa 2018). 
With an increase in the institutionalization processes of migration and in the 
technological advances that have taken place during our century, it has become 
easier for migrants to maintain connections between their home and host coun-
tries. Following this trend in migration, the term ‘transnationalism’ was coined 
in a new discourse in 1990 (Schiller et al. 1992). Schiller and colleagues define 
transnational migration as ‘the process by which immigrants forge and sustain 
simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of 
origin and settlement’ (Schiller et al. 1995, p. 48). Under this paradigm, ‘[f]ami-
lial, economic, social, organisational, religious and political’ connections and 
networks run effectively across physical borders (Schiller et al. 1992: ix). Trans-
national migrants have more than one location they refer to as ‘home’. Their 
necessities and constraints are no longer bound to one region and, instead, ex-
pand over home and host countries. They develop strategies of adaptation on 
both an individual and communal level (Schiller et al. 1995). Their usage of 
space is affected by and developed as a product of their transnational relation-
ships. In addition to Maslow’s definition of basic needs, this paper concludes 
with a number of added aspects that can be considered as ‘basic needs’ for low-
skilled transitory migrants living in Oman. 
When considering the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), focussing 
on Goal 11: To make cities resilient, sustainable and inclusive, the urgency of 
providing the basic, psychological and esteem needs of migrants becomes of 
high importance. Furthermore, taking into consideration Goal 3: Good health 
and wellbeing, it is essential for the Gulf countries to consider the living condi-
tions of their low-skilled labourers working under a temporary state. Given that 
the GCC’s large portion of low-skilled migrant workers continues to prove bene-
ficial to the region’s economic and infrastructural development, catering to these 
people’s needs in relation to the efficient functioning of their wellbeing becomes 
important. 
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HOUSING PROVISION FOR OMANIS, GCC NATIONALS 
AND HIGH TO MEDIUM-SKILLED MIGRANTS 
 
With the 1970s oil boom and a push to move towards Oman Vision 2020, the 
Sultanate of Oman began a period of rapid development that focused on 
infrastructure, housing, health and education. In 1980, as part of this 
development, the government of Oman initiated a land lottery system for Omani 
nationals; its aim was to provide and regulate the country’s housing stock. 
According to this policy, every Omani male citizen, from the 1980s on, and 
every Omani female citizen, from 2003, on, was eligible to enter into a draw to 
receive a plot of land in Oman (MOH 2009). This system encouraged Omani 
families to move to peripheries where larger plots were available. Furthermore, 
the social housing policy that was developed in 1973 offered three systems to aid 
low-income Omanis, who were earning less than 300 – 400 Rials (USD700 to 
1000), to obtain housing (Al Shabia Housing law 1973). Under this program, the 
government provides residential units (a built dwelling) to households; further, 
the Ministry of Housing’s housing assistance program provides 20,000 OMR 
(USD 52,000) to rebuild, construct, or restore a dwelling; and the housing loan 
programme provides loans to low-income Omanis for the construction of their 
dwelling (MOH 2009). In 2002, the government of Oman decided to permit 
GCC nationals to own real estate. In 2006, it permitted high-income expatriates 
(high-skilled migrants only) to own property in three locations within the 
Sultanate, under a programme that allowed them to own high-end dwellings in 
integrated tourism complexes (ITCs) where recreational facilities were available. 
Once this investment is made, the expatriate is eligible to apply for citizenship 
(OBG n.d.). While the news media have reported on various discussions about 
permitting long-term migrants to own property outside the ITCs, since 2016 
nothing has yet been confirmed. Therefore, migrants are not permitted to own 
property outside the ITCs in Oman. Further, as the prices of these properties are 
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Figure 1: Prominent laws and policies in Oman regarding housing 
   
Source: Author, 2018. 
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The land lottery system has been heavily criticised by authors such as Al 
Gharibi (2014) and Nebel and von Richthofen (2016), who stated that this sys-
tem has resulted in urban sprawl and has encouraged car-based mobility as the 
allocated lands are distant from economic centres. As such, the land lottery sys-
tem and social housing policy have encouraged the movement of Omani nation-
als away from crowded older city centres and into the peripheries, causing an 
impact on inner-city neighbourhoods, such as Mattrah, Ruwi and Wadi Kabir. 
These neighbourhoods now consist of low-rent properties, largely rented to mi-
grant families and individuals. 
 
Housing provision for low-skilled migrants 
 
A large number of low-skilled migrants are housed in labour camps that are 
situated in close proximity to their work sites; others live in apartment buildings 
or villas that employers rent out as shared housing to their employees (Gardner 
2010). Each type of dwelling may differ in form and appearance but what they 
have in common is segregation. Notably, the most common deficiency in these 
spaces is any mode of recreation, open spaces and possibilities for informal ac-
tivities. Being stripped away of basic necessities and living in camps that are 
located far from city centres often causes boredom, leading to mental health 
problems (Bruslé 2012). Further, these low-skilled (unmarried) migrant workers 
are perceived as a social threat to locals in terms of inappropriate social behav-
iours and are, thus, tucked away where they are not visible in what is perceived 
as the formal city (Elshashtawy 2008). Qatar, for example, goes so far as to plan 
mini “bachelor cities” for their migrant population in order to move them “out of 
public view” (Gardner 2010). Dubai’s attempt at this is to create “luxury labour 
camps”, which are strictly planned in a grid with housing and shopping facilities 
but are placed outside the city. Furthermore, Oman is currently working on plans 
for “bachelor colonies” and has delegated three plots for the development of 
large-scale housing for single migrant workers. Muscat municipality has located 
plots in Amrat, Bawshar and Mabella, which are known for being the city’s 
industrial sites (Das 2017). 
 
Housing typologies of migrants in Oman 
 
However, these types of complexes are presently in the planning process and are 
not yet available for residents. But the question remains: how effective are these 
labour camps for the low-skilled migrants’ livelihoods and wellbeing? This part 
of the paper analyses one such labour camp and documents the adaptations and 
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modifications low-skilled migrants have created so as to provide for their own 
basic social and spatial needs. 
 
Figure 2: Housing typology based on skill level and affordability.  
Source: Author, 2018. 
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A strong phenomenon was noted regarding low-skilled migrants’ housing se-
lection: Their visa type seemed to be corelated to their housing selection. The 
concept of a ‘free visa’ has given rise to illegal forms of work. On paper, mi-
grants with these types of visas had employers and therefore automatically had 
job contacts but, in reality, their visa type placed them far from their skill level 
and, therefore, they lived on short-term free-lance jobs they found for them-
selves. These free visas were commonly used by low-skilled migrants who were 
in desperate need of migrating to Oman as a livelihood strategy. Therefore, low-
skilled migrants who were on a free visa opted to live in migrant-dominant 
neighbourhoods where their social capital was high and it was easier to find 
short-term contracts for free-lance jobs. In these migrant neighbourhoods, they 
devised intensive shared housing typologies due to the lack of affordable hous-
ing. 
 
Lessons learned from the case study of the labour camps 
 
A case-study camp was selected whose name is withheld for privacy issues. 
Gaining access to labour camps is difficult; thus, for the purposes of the case 
study, the camp selection was done on the basis of successful access through the 
author’s social networks. The camp in question has characteristics of a typical 
labour camp in the Gulf region but, in addition, has adaptive spatial and social 
features that the inhabitants had developed in order to fulfill particular dire 
needs. 
The selected labour camp is situated on the periphery of the capital city, be-
tween Muscat and Barka, and it houses about 600 inhabitants. The closest town 
is 10 km away and the closest largest municipal area, Barka, is about 15 km 
away. The nearest mosque, petrol station and grocery store can be reached by car 
within approximately 30 to 40 minutes. The labour camp is situated inside a 
construction area and is closed off by a boundary wall and only accessible via its 
main gates. A typical labour camp consists of worker’s cabins, executive cabins 
for management, a kitchen, a dining area, and toilets and a washing area; thus, 
catering to some aspects of Maslow and Lewis’ (1987) basic physiological needs 
but failing to cater to psychological and esteem needs. With a combination of an 
empathetic camp manager and empowered inhabitants, the case-study labour 
camp has successfully developed adaptive features that cater to the needs of its 
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Figure 3: Case study labour camp. 
 
Source: Author, 2018. 
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Portable cabins of 40 square metres each were built with lightweight con-
crete walls, and cardboard and tin-plate roofs, mounted on concrete blocks that 
raise them half a metre off the ground. The two-by-one metre bunk beds and 
closed windows permits these cabins to accommodate the maximum number of 
inhabitants possible in such as small space (Figure 3). Small cupboards and 
spaces under the beds are used as storage for personal belongings and the struc-
ture of the beds means they can also be used for drying clothes. Thus, each cabin 
not only lacks optimum natural ventilation and daylight but also personal space. 
This increases the need for being outdoors. Mapping of the inhabitants’ daily 
routines showed that they had nothing to do after work. A lack of gathering 
points, TV areas, and recreational activities was mentioned by 89% of the inhab-
itants. From the literature review and the interviews, it is evident that internet 
and news channels on TV are the main tool for low-skilled migrants in the Gulf 
to keep their transnational connections alive. Therefore, the inhabitants were not 
only segregated from their host country but were also separated from their home 
country. The camp had no on-site grocery stores, leaving the inhabitants depend-
ent on car mobility to purchase food and other daily necessities. 
Furthermore, 83% of the inhabitants of this labour camp are Muslims with a 
need to pray five times a day, but no mosque or praying area was provided. 
These conditions led the inhabitants of this particular camp to get together to 
cater to their own needs. They built a makeshift mosque within the camp for 
their use (fig 3, bottom left). They self-funded a TV for themselves as a free-
time activity and to stay connected to the on-goings in Bangladesh. They devel-
oped informal vendors within the camp, where simple groceries and phone cards 
were sold during the evenings (Figure 3, middle left). They built makeshift game 
boards to gather around in their free time (Figure 3, top right). The informal 
vendors, makeshift game areas, and TV area are all located around one location 
which is close to the designated kitchen and dining area. ‘Almost no one eats 
inside the dining area, they line up to get their food and walk outside to crowd 
around the TV or game area’ (Interview: Manager). The need to be outside in the 
fresh air surfaced in many interviews. Vegetables and meat are part of a daily 
diet for Bangladeshis. In order to cater to this need, some inhabitants brought 
special seeds from Bangladesh and grow them inside the camp. Breeding chick-
ens is also noted. For some of the camp dwellers, this and growing vegetables 
are also considered free-time activities as they were accustomed to doing these 
back “home” (Figure 3, bottom left). ‘I am from a farmer’s family. We live in 
the village. It is impossible for me not to grow my own vegetables. I do it for 
fun. I also like running behind the chickens. They remind me of home.’ (Inter-
Understanding Housing Needs of Low-Skilled Immigrants in Oman | 121 
 
view: Inhabitant). Thus, by catering to their own needs, these camp dwellers 
were able to increase their human, financial and social capital. 
 
Lessons learned from migrant neighbourhood: Al-Hamriya 
 
After careful analysis of different areas in the capital city Muscat, Al-Hamriya 
was chosen for this case study. This is because Bangladeshi migrants dominate 
its demography and it is also relatively easy to access. 
 
Figure 4: Four different housing typologies found in Al-Hamriya show that the 
typology of the compound dominates the area. 
  
Source: Author, 2018. 
 
Al-Hamriya is located in Ruwi, which is one of the oldest neighbourhoods in 
Muscat. During the 1980s, Ruwi’s development focused on commercial, indus-
trial and residential construction. Three types of residential categories were 
planned for: a high-rent area in the north, medium-rent districts located behind 
major commercial strips, and low-rent districts in the south. Development in Al-
Hamriya fell under the last category (Scholz 1990), thus having a history of 
being inhabited by a low-income population. This area is homogenous in terms 
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of the height of its buildings and the fact it mainly functions as a residential area 
with a strip of mixed-use buildings along one street. There were no planned 
recreational spaces owing to the fact that it was developed to house temporary 
residents. Today, Al-Hamriya is a preferred destination of absconders (Safar and 
Levelland 2015), free visa holders and runaways. This neighbourhood consists 
of a large number of financially vulnerable inhabitants who live and work there 
illegally. During our interviews, we found that these people selected Al-Hamriya 
because of the strong social networks within its Bangladeshi community; its 
proximity to the city centre; the availability of short-term contract jobs; and the 
ability to rent affordable rooms semi-legally (Annisa 2018). 
Land and housing in Al-Hamriya can only be owned by an Omani national. 
Migrants are not legally allowed to do so. Omanis rent a large number of resi-
dential buildings to migrants (commonly referred to as migrant owners) and 
these migrant owners further sub-rent units in these building to other migrants 
(Tenant B, C, D…) without checking the legal residence or work status of these 
sub-tenants. These migrant owners’ aim to make an optimum profit by renting 
units out to a large number of tenants. At the same time, the migrant tenants’ aim 
is to minimise their living costs by minimising their rental space. These intensive 
shared-housing units in Al-Hamriya are commonly referred to as ‘compounds’. 
The internal spatial organisation of a compound is very similar to that of the 
portable cabins in the labour camps. However, unlike in a labour camp, the mi-
grants themselves opt for this spatial organisation, owing to their livelihood 
strategy of ‘minimising living costs and self-developing shared housing’ (Annisa 
2018, p. 98). 
A compound is a typology of housing where single rooms or units of rooms 
are clustered around a courtyard (Figure 5). Spaces within these compounds are 
used to the maximum possible efficiency and to accommodate basic needs. Each 
room contains from 6 to 18 single beds, depending on the size (Figure 5). On 
average, a person gets about 2.3sqm of personal space in a compound. Each 
compound contains a kitchen, a bathroom, a washing area and toilets, which all 
the inhabitants share. Internal walls are added to ease the flow and division of 
space between individuals. Often, additional holes are cut into the walls in order 
to install air-conditioning. Extra plumbing is added to create washing areas or 
toilets, and staircases are added to gain access to the roof. Additional floors are 
also added, depending on the need. Due to the shortage of space inside these 
rooms, residents often put a couch or a chair in the courtyard or store other 
things there. Within the courtyards of these compounds, migrants were noted to 
plant vegetables and fruits that are specific to Bangladesh and to take care of 
them. According to one interviewee, ‘In my free time, I take care of my vegeta-
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bles, it reminds me of Bangladesh. Not only me, there are other friends of mine 
who does the same. It’s fun. (Interviewee, Inhabitant of a compound in Al-
Hamriya). So often the courtyard substitutes as a living space, whereas the roof-
tops, streets and thresholds are often used as refuges from these people’s crowd-
ed rooms (Figure 5). Even during warm evenings in the peak of summer, resi-
dents in need of personal space will climb to the roof. Owing to these migrants’ 
livelihood strategy of maximising their modes of income (Annisa 2018), a large 
part of their daily life depends on networking and job-searching. Being visible in 
public gathering points is essential. These are primarily spaces that are situated 
between mixed-use buildings that provide higher chances of socialisation and 
thus are the main areas migrants are attracted to for such activities. A larger 
cluster of shops, restaurants and coffee shops provides seating opportunities in 
outdoor spaces. During the interviews, the inhabitants noted that, over time, 
these places have developed into hotspots, which recruiters and job-hunters refer 
to as “manpower supply points” or temporary informal markets where individual 
vendors sell vegetables, fruits and fish. Occasionally, fruit trucks enter these 
areas, also contributing to the informal activities that take place there (Figure 5). 
Conducting an economic activity without a valid permit is illegal in Muscat. 
Therefore, vendors do not use furniture or stalls but sell their products out of 
trucks or cars; thus, they have developed quick ways to display their goods and 
to clear out on short notice. Intense social and informal economic interactions 
were documented within these spaces, such as conversations between multiple 
people, temporarily playing on makeshift game boards that are popular in Bang-
ladesh, selling phone cards, drinking tea and enjoying snacks. The lack of parks 
and recreational spaces in Al-Hamriya has also encouraged residents to take over 
the larger spaces between buildings and parking lots for recreational activities, 
such as cricket and football (Figure 5). Makeshift game boards are developed 
(Figure 5). Drinking tea and chatting with friends are the most common activities 
noted. Conclusively, these communal spots are noted as the busiest locations, 
within Al-Hamriya, that are temporarily appropriated by the inhabitants them-
selves in response to their need to increase their financial and social capital, to 
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Figure 5: The housing typology of the compound dominates the area in Al-
Hamriya. 
 
Source: Author, 2018. 




The temporary appropriation of indoor and outdoor spaces in both case studies 
can be taken as an indication of city management failing to provide basic social 
and spatial needs to low-skilled migrant workers in a system where members of 
this population are considered temporary and hosted in Oman for only short 
periods of time. However, this temporary situation has been reoccurring, most 
notably, since the oil boom of the 1970s. Therefore, more permanent infrastruc-
ture is called for, such as housing, mobility options and recreational spaces. 
Further, the development of compounds is illegal and must be enforced by law. 
If no other affordable housing options are legally available, then low-skilled and 
low-paid migrants will automatically be left to provide for their own needs. 
Thus, the need to provide legal affordable housing options should be a high pri-
ority. 
Migrants who wish to maximise their incomes (Annisa 2018) need to be 
close to city centres or at least have adequate access to mobility options to travel 
to city centres. Policies that focus on these factors, in relation to migrant work-
ers, tap into psychological and esteem needs in addition to respecting the SDGs 
Goal 11 of developing inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities. 
Both case studies show that migrants workers in Oman depend, live and 
function with the support of social capital, such as personal interactions, ties and 
trust. Communal gathering points, be they within labour camps or neighbour-
hoods, must be considered. The careful study of informal vendors in the labour 
camps and informal markets in neighbourhoods show the need for providing 
options for ethnic food and drink. Such activities should not be discouraged. It 
was also noted that transnational connections (economic or social) are estab-
lished through access to television and telephones. Talking to their loved ones is 
an essential part of every interviewee’s daily routine, and options for such activi-
ties are recommended regardless of whether these people live in a camp or a 
neighbourhood. Both of the case studies also show that recreational spaces are 
non-existent and temporary appropriation is strongly visible. Therefore, recrea-
tional spaces for playing sports or providing other options where migrants can 
spend time together, for growing vegetables and breeding chickens, for example, 
should be taken into consideration. The same goes for areas for praying and 
access to mosques. Religious rituals provide migrants with a strong connection 
to their roots, connections they value most when situated in foreign lands. There-
fore, providing religious spaces is also recommended. A lack of indoor spaces 
has triggered the use of outdoor space, even during times of the day when it is 
extremely hot and humid. However, being present in outdoor spaces and increas-
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ing their social capital by interacting with others develops into a norm for this 
group of migrants; thus, outdoor sitting/gathering options are encouraged. 
It is important to recognise that, while discussing the housing needs of a low-
skilled migrant, the word ‘house’ for them does not necessarily mean a private 
space with four walls and a key to the front door but a place they willingly share 
and that is open to others. In a foreign land, these individuals are alone. And as 
they come from a family-oriented society, these individuals find family in the 
others around them and therefore prioritise social interaction. Thus, in addition 
to providing basic needs for sleeping, personal washing and cooking, the devel-
opment of housing that includes spaces that encourage social interaction is high-
ly necessary. The rooms can be small: the kitchen and bathrooms can be shared, 
but large living rooms, areas with TV or WiFi, areas for praying, courtyards and 
areas for planting are highly recommended. It is important to understand that 
housing should also incorporate the social and spatial needs of this group. Not 
everything can be planned. This group should take charge of their informal 
needs, themselves. Small informal vendors that undertake small economic activi-
ties seem to be highly successful in attracting a crowd. People gather near these 
vendors in search of something familiar, be it a product from Bangladesh or a 
chance to speak in Bangla. It is recommended that such spaces not be termed 
illegal; rather, they should be encouraged as they provide low-skilled migrants 
with opportunities to increase their financial and, more importantly, their social 
capital. 
Finally, with the global agenda of working towards safe, resilient and inclu-
sive cities, the status of low-skilled migrants within Gulf cities needs to be ad-
dressed (see also Mukaddim et al. in Chapter 7 for a discussion on addressing the 
status of migrants). While the countries of the Gulf region are assessing their 
sustainable development goals, policy-makers should not forget to include the 
high percentage of the low-skilled migrant population that lives and works there, 
paying special attention to Goal 3: Good health and wellbeing and Goal 11: 
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Chapter 5: Between Need for Housing  
and Speculation 






By 2050, around two thirds of the global population will be living in an urban 
environment. Therefore, recent international agreements on the issue of sustain-
able development have centred the debate around urbanisation and the consider-
able challenges cities face (UN-Habitat 2017; WBGU 2016). Seventy per cent of 
the world´s economic activity takes places within cities; moreover, cities are 
responsible for 70% of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, 70% of global 
waste, and over 60% of global energy consumption (UN-Habitat 2017). Fur-
thermore, growing cities also consume large pieces of land as they continue to 
expand through rural-urban migration, migration between cities, and displace-
ments through political conflicts or natural disasters, among other factors. 
In recent years, the rate of urbanisation has become more critical in develop-
ing countries; in particular, Latin American trends in urbanisation are among the 
highest in the world and it is expected that the region’s cities will continue to 
grow (UN-WUP 2018). In this context, informality is seen as a generalised mode 
of urbanisation (Roy 2005). The challenges posed by a development that often 
results in increasing social inequality and environmental damage have been 
widely discussed (Angotti 1995; Butterworth 1981; Rodgers et al. 2012). What 
comes to mind, here, is the often-used picture of a São Paolo favela that is segre-
gated from the city’s wealthier neighbourhoods. New approaches and agenda(s) 
where especially discussed in 2016, during UN-Habitat III (UN-Habitat 2017). 
Moreover, McGuirk`s (2014) comprehensive research around housing and set-
tlement development in various cities in Latin America has shown the failure of 
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politics, planning, and architecture to address this complicated issue, mainly due 
to the lack of success in linking formal and informal modes of urban develop-
ment. 
Not all cities have the same dynamic as mega cities such as São Paolo or 
Mexico City. Bolivia, for instance, has developed three metropolitan regions and 
34 medium-sized cities; approximately five million people live in the metropoli-
tan regions, which makes for almost half of the Bolivian population (PNUD 
2015). And as research has mainly focused on the larger cities, dramatic changes 
in small- to medium-sized cities may have been overlooked. As mentioned be-
fore, cities are expected to grow due to migration. But is this the case for all 
cities? And what dynamic does their expansion follow? Furthermore, it is well-
known that land markets will continue to play an important role in the future 
development of cities. But does a profit-oriented land market always act in the 
interest of the common good? How are planning institutions avoiding the nega-
tive side-effects of a speculative land market that benefits from a need-for-
housing discourse? These initial reflexions address the issue of land speculation 
and challenge the common notion of the impact of an ever-increasing demand 
for housing; however, they can only be answered on a specific case-study basis. 
Therefore, building on the premise that densification in existing structures is a 
more economic and sustainable way of addressing the need for housing, this 
chapter analyses urban expansion in the city of Tarija, raising the question of 
whether urban expansion is triggered by migration and a demand in housing or 
whether it was promoted by land speculation. 
 
 
BETWEEN NEED FOR HOUSING AND SPECULATION 
 
Drawing from practical experience and various visits to the medium-sized city of 
Tarija, in Bolivia, this paper identifies a critical scenario: how a speculative land 
market, with few restrictions and constraints from the government, has dramati-
cally expanded the city in terms of the surface area covered in recent years; large 
and fragmented settlements where produced on the periphery of the city, where 
basic infrastructure and services are lacking and the living conditions are not 
optimal. Figure 1 shows the gravity of this scenario, where the actual extent of 
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the urban land the city occupies is around four times larger than its actual con-
solidated area1. 
 
Figure 1: The growing city of Tarija. The consolidated city in 1989, based on 
GAMT (2008) in relation to the consolidated city and the expanded surface in 
2018. 
Source: Images Digital Globe, Google Earth (edited by author). 
 
In this context, two realities clash: the formal part of the city, which is within the 
urban radius, and the informal section, which continues to emerge outside of the 
urban radius. Moreover, dwellers who settle on the periphery lack property titles 
as they are occupying an area that is not properly defined and are, therefore, in a 
permanent legal argument with the municipal government. They remain in the 
hope of one day becoming the rightful owners of the pieces of land that were 
sold to them in an illegitimate market; at the time, they find themselves situated 
somewhere between the formal and the informal urban land (Vargas Gamboa 
2014). 
The process of the regularisation of property titles is not transparent and also 
extremely time-consuming. People are lost in a never-ending list of requirements 
and fees, while there exists a speculative land market nation-wide where actors 
continue to sell pieces of land, that lack basic services, at ridiculous prices 
(ibid.). Further, selling land situated in rural areas for urban uses is a lucrative 
business that has dramatic effects on the environment as it destroys the natural 
 
1 Due to the informal nature of the urban periphery and the lack of official plans, this 
polygon was broadly defined, based on the authors’ analysis and maps that have not 
yet been published. 
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landscape and valuable water bodies (Figure 2). Therefore, this chapter raises 
questions about the role of land speculation in the city of Tarija and reflects on 
the severe consequences of neglecting this issue. This research question is ad-
dressed by searching secondary sources that describe the city’s urban expansion 
from a historical perspective and link it to the drivers of urbanisation and popula-
tion density. Furthermore, through a literature review on local, departmental and 
national development plans, and through semi-structured interviews and discus-
sions with local actors, this research reflects on the city of Tarija and Bolivia’s 
urbanisation and housing strategies and makes the case for changes in policies 
and regulations related to land acquisition and development. 
Five semi-structured interviews where held in Tarija in September 2018; 
they ranged from 30 minutes to 3 hours in length. Among the interviewees were 
representatives from the municipal secretaries of development, culture, and land-
use planning and the environment; the departmental neighbourhood committee; 
and the departmental farmers’ federation. Moreover, in the framework of a 
transdisciplinary approach a real-world laboratory two workshops where held to 
tackle the issue of land speculation and the consequent environmental damage: 
one in January 2018, and the other in September 2018. During both events, in-
formal discussions took place with a wider range of actors, practitioners and 
scholars as well as peri-urban and rural dwellers. Above all, during these work-
shops, a conceptual framework was conceived for future development2; it was 
then presented to different residents of the various neighbourhoods so as to gain 
valuable feedback on the concepts of the framework. In particular, this approach 
served to fill gaps in the research due to the lack of official documents and plans 
on the topic of the impact of urbanisation and land speculation on the city of 
Tarija. 
 
2 The framework focuses on three aspects of land development in the context of the 
case study: first, on reclaiming ravines vital water bodies and securing them legally 
through zoning plans in a regional open-space network; second, small-scale interven-
tions on the main roads should secure risk-free transit for pedestrians. And later, this 
transdisciplinary approach should be institutionalized, in time, and thereby serve as a 
mediator between the municipal planning authorities and the National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform for the development of policies and regulations related to land 
development.  
Between Need for Housing and Speculation | 133 
 
Figure 2: Left-over and degraded rural spaces waiting to increase in value. 
Land speculation has been the primary factor in the degradation of the natural 
environment in the city of Tarija. 
Source: Author, 2018. 
 
Urban expansion in the city of Tarija 
 
The city of Tarija is located in a valley in the South of Bolivia, about 1850 me-
tres above sea level, in an area that is defined by the South American Andes 
mountains. Founded in the year 1574 as a strategic city to support the expansion 
of the Spanish Empire towards the South, the city emerged next to the Guadal-
quivir River. It followed a traditional chequered urbanism, with a north-south 
and east-west orientation of its streets in the city centre. It is characterised by its 
traditional vineyards, its warm, charismatic and friendly people, and its rich 
folkloric culture.3 From 1574 onward, the city expanded from its core towards 
the surrounding mountains, reaching its peak population density in 1977, as is 
shown in Figure 3. A description of the city’s urban expansion can be divided 
into three historic time periods: the colonial period, from 1574 to 1825; the re-
publican period, from 1825 to 1952; and the modern period, from 1952 onwards 
 
3 For more information on the city’s character, see Lea Plaza Dorado et al. (2003) and 
Trigo O’Connord’Arlach (2017). 
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(Lea Plaza Dorado et al. 2003; Trigo O’Connord’Arlach 2017; de Mesa 
Figueroa et al. 1998). In colonial and republican times the city grew in terms of 
population, increasing its density in the now historical city centre. Moreover, 
land tenure was not possible for the indigenous and farmers’ community; thus, 
settlement development outside the city was constrained. In modern times, agrar-
ian reform was introduced, making it possible to divide up the land in individual 
lots of property; thus, the development of settlements and the establishment of a 
land market (Urioste 2012). Moreover, regional economic development triggered 
migration towards the city, which led to its expansion from its core towards the 
surrounding mountains. New neighbourhoods and city districts were created by 
annexing existing villages into the city’s structure (GAMT 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Urban expansion of the city of Tarija, 1967-2006. An increase in 
surface area and a decrease in population and built density. 
 
Source: Author’s representation based on (GAMT 2008).  
 
During colonial and republican times, city development was framed by the Span-
ish semi-feudal regime. Goods were produced in rural areas and traded in the 
city, and housing and political participation in the city was mainly reserved for 
aristocrats and wealthy members of society. In 1825, Bolivia proclaimed its 
independence from Spain and became a republic; however, its semi-feudal re-
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gime continued to define society (Trigo O’Connord’Arlach 2017). In rural areas, 
the form of land tenure was as in colonial times the hacienda, which is Spanish 
for a large productive estate. Natives lived on large estates owned by nobles; at 
the same time, they were exploited by these landlords and did not have the right 
to own property (Larson 2017). Urban expansion in terms of the surface area it 
covered continued to be extremely low as the boundary between urban and rural 
areas was protected through social exclusion. However, the city centre became 
slightly denser in terms of population as the casonas, Spanish for a big house 
with several inner courtyards, were subdivided primarily among growing fami-
lies and through inheritance (Lea Plaza Dorado et al. 2003). In the early 1930s, 
this dynamic was slightly disrupted through migration, due to the Chaco War 
between Bolivia and Paraguay. The Gran Chaco region was thought to be rich in 
oil and, after the war, Bolivia lost a great part of the Chaco region to Paraguay. 
Since then, new neighbourhoods with lower population densities started to 
emerge around the centre of Tarija (GAMT 2008). 
The revolution of 1952 marks a point of inflexion in Bolivia’s history, its so-
cial structures and the subsequent urban development. This period of modernity 
accounts for one of the greatest transformations in citizenship, political participa-
tion, land distribution and state control of the national economy and the coun-
try’s natural resources (Vargas Gamboa 2014; Urioste 2012). Moreover, the 
right to vote was universalised, which gave women, the country’s indigenous 
population and farmers a new role in society. In 1953, the state promulgated 
agrarian reform through the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto 
Nacional de Reforma Agraria, INRA). This reform regulated land tenure and 
land uses in rural areas and protected indigenous and farming communities from 
being subjected to the earlier semi-feudal regime. Since the 1960s, the state, 
through the National Institute for Colonisation (Instituto Nacional de Colo-
nización, INC), supplied on request between 20 and 50 hectares of physical land 
per family as non-transferable and indivisible private property. However, over 
time, these large properties where either sold to developers at low prices or di-
vided up by the families, themselves. During the dictatorial military regimes of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, in particular, and the democratic neo-liberal govern-
ments of the early 1990s, land with no arable value was freely distributed to 
political supporters. This led to the establishment of a land market that freely 
operated on rural territory. (Urioste 2012, pp.61–64) 
From 1996 to 2006, the main goal of the INRA was to regularise property ti-
tles for land that had been freely distributed since 1952. This was quite challeng-
ing as the INRA only provided titles to productive estates and many families had 
already transferred (or divided up) their lands to third parties that exclusively 
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used it for housing. The process of regularising property titles was not transpar-
ent, extremely time-consuming and plagued by corruption as there were no rec-
ords of previous transactions (Urioste 2012, p. 64). Since 2006 and the election 
of government of Evo Morales, Bolivia has seen profound socio-political chang-
es (Lazar 2013). A new law of agrarian reform was promulgated to tackle the 
mistakes and corruption of the previous period; now the state had the ability to 
secure land for indigenous communities and to expropriate unproductive lands 
so as to avoid land speculation (ibid.). A government slogan is ‘la tierra es de 
quien la trabaja’, which is Spanish for ‘the land is for those who work it’. How-
ever, corruption and the lack of transparency remain, thus making it difficult to 
address these issues. The distributed rural land is still being subdivided and 
speculation continues in a market for private land (as Figure 1 shows for the city 
of Tarija). 
Moreover, in the mid-1990s, the election of a neo-liberal government led to 
the closure of state-owned mines in the city of Potosí. This, combined with the 
discovery of natural gas reserves in the Department of Tarija, led to a pattern of 
heavy migration throughout the country and especially into the Department of 
Tarija and its capital, Tarija (Vargas Gamboa 2014). People in search of em-
ployment migrated to Tarija from different cities and rural areas around the 
country. The existing regulatory frameworks and municipal capacities where 
overwhelmed by the influx and the compact structure of Tarija collapsed (PNUD 
2015; GAMT 2016; GAMT 2008; GADT 2015; Vargas Gamboa 2014). Land 
speculators soon took advantage of the situation as, at this point, the pace of 
growth of Tarija became critical. However, the city did not grow as much in 
terms of population as the surface area covered, as is shown in Figure 3.  
Furthermore, with the government of Evo Morales, the construction of social 
housing intensified and many informal settlements where formalised through 
Article 247, which was promulgated in order to address the demand for housing 
that resulted from strong migration. It was during this period that Tarija grew the 
most in terms of the surface area covered; however, as there are no official plans 
to measure the actual urban surface area developed, this remains the task of the 
author, based on an analysis of Figure 3. 
 
 
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND POLICIES ADDRESSING 
URBANISATION IN BOLIVIA 
 
The year 2025 will mark the 200th anniversary of Bolivia’s founding. In prepa-
ration for this occasion, and based on international agreements, the Ministry of 
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Autonomy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia proposes an agenda that includes 
thirteen pillars for development; it also identifies the role each level of govern-
ment will play in the implementation of this agenda (Ministerio de Autonomías 
2014, p. 13–14). At its centre is the promotion of an inclusive, participative and 
democratic society and nation; one that is without discrimination, racism, hatred 
or internal strife. Furthermore, the agenda proposes an inclusive and strategic 
collaboration between the country’s four levels of government: central, depart-
mental, municipal, and native indigenous farmers. The pillars of the 2025 agenda 
range from the eradication of extreme poverty through to securing basic infra-
structure, the right to adequate housing and protecting the natural environment. 
The role each level of government will play in the operationalisation of the 
above stated goals will then be quantified as a participatory percentage; that is, 
for each pillar and specific goal there is a clear statement of how responsible 
each level of government will be for the operationalisation of their part of the 
agenda. For instance, for pillar two, ‘the socialisation and universalisation of 
basic services and infrastructure with sovereignty to live well’,4 the central gov-
ernment will have 31% responsibility, 25% will be carried out in collaboration 
between the central government and the autonomous territorial entity (ETA) (the 
remaining three levels of government), and 44% will be the exclusive responsi-
bility of the ETAs (Ministerio de Autonomías 2014, p. 39). Overall, the ETAs 
will have 45% of responsibility for carrying out the agenda under pillar two and 
the central government, 33%, and the remainder will be carried out through col-
laboration. The main point of the document is for the ETAs to be the key to the 
future development of Bolivia (Ministerio de Autonomías, p. 65). 
Pillar number two addresses urbanisation, and ambitiously aims to achieve 
100% coverage of basic infrastructure and services, such as water, electricity, 
mobility and communication. Moreover, it particularly focuses on securing ac-
cess to adequate housing that comes with basic infrastructure and services. A 
review of the participatory percentage responsibility for carrying out Bolivia’s 
2025 agenda shows that the roles and tasks of the various levels of government 
are distributed as follows: The central government is mainly in charge of policy 
development regarding human settlements in rural areas (through the National 
Institute of Agrarian Reform), planning and housing. The central government 
 
4    To live well, in Spanish ‘vivir bien’, was formulated in the national law N°300, Art.1 
and stressed by Bolivian foreign affairs minister David Choquehuanca. It describes a 
model for development in harmony with the natural environment based on traditional 
customs and believes of the indigenous communities. See: https://www.economia 
solidaria.org/noticias/vivir-bien-propuesta-de-modelo-de-gobierno-en-bolivia. 
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will work in combination with the ETAs in the planning and implementation of 
social housing projects. And the municipal governments will be mainly in charge 
of the development of land-use plans (framed by central policies), building 
codes, providing basic infrastructure, land for social housing, and property regu-
lation in urban environments (MAEPB 2014, p. 40). 
The issue of housing was also addressed through the (new) constitution of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia (2009). Article 19 and Supreme Decree 
N°0986 state that everyone has the right to adequate housing and the state 
(through all levels of government) should promote adequate plans and financing 
for social housing, especially for the urban poor, the vulnerable and the inhabit-
ants of rural areas. Moreover, Article 299 states that the central government in 
collaboration with the ETAs is responsible for housing and social housing, 
which is carried out through the National Housing Agency. Under Supreme 
Decree No. 0986, the National Housing Agency has been assigned the task of 
designing and implementing housing programs and/or projects. And although the 
ETAs are represented in this agency, the key decisions are made centrally. The 
municipal report for the city of Tarija, from 2017 and the departmental report for 
the Department of Tarija,5 from 2015, point out this decision-making hierarchy 
(GAMT 2017; GADT 2015). The municipal government is not involved in hous-
ing projects as it is mainly in charge of basic services, infrastructure and proper-
ty regulation in urban areas and for imposing building codes (GAMT 2015). 
Furthermore, in the departmental government report of 2015, addressing the 
issue of housing is not listed among the city’s strategies for overcoming the 
economic crisis the department presently faces due to the dramatic drop in the 
price of oil in 2015 (GADT 2015). 
In the 2016 HABITAT III report of the Bolivian Ministry for Public Works, 
Services and Housing (Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Servicios y Vivienda 2016 
(MOPSV)), urbanisation is seen as an opportunity. Thus, the report proposed a 
definition of an urban area as being an urban environment that is quantitively 
defined as a human settlement of 2000 inhabitants or more, with buildings and 
spaces structured by a road system that is destined for housing development, and 
where economic activities are primarily those in the second, third and fourth 
sector (MOPSV 2016, p. 13–14). Furthermore, an urban environment must have 
access to basic services and infrastructure, such as water, electricity, sewage 
systems, schools, hospitals and areas for recreation and leisure. Urban environ-
ments can be sub-categorised according to their uses as intensive areas, exten-
 
5 Bolivia has nine departments, each with a capital city. The city of Tarija is the capital 
of the Department of Tarija. 
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sive areas and protected areas. Intensive urban areas can span from extensive 
high-density areas to areas of low density that include productive activities and 
serve as a belt to keep the city from expanding. Protected areas are meant to 
secure vital ecosystems. Furthermore, the document recommends that if there is 
a demand for housing then this should be accommodated in an intensive area 
(MOPSV 2016, p. 22). Regarding social housing, the government develops the 
policies and provides for the economic resources, and the municipal govern-
ments provide the land and basic infrastructure (MOPSV 2016, p. 30). In this 
positive vision of urbanisation, however, the issue of land speculation and its 
dramatic effects on the environment is presently being neglected. Although the 
purpose of agrarian reform is to avoid land speculation, the lack of a dialogue 
about and collaboration between this central government institution and the 
ETAs has hindered any progress in this regard. 
 
The challenges for urbanisation in the city of Tarija 
 
In recent decades, Bolivia has become predominately urban and almost half of 
its population is concentrated within the three metropolitan regions of La Paz, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. The remaining population lives in small- to medi-
um-sized cities, such as Tarija. Compared to the major Bolivian metropolitan 
regions, as of 2016 Tarija was relatively small with an estimated 247,000 inhab-
itants (INE 2017). Nonetheless, its spatial expansion and the dynamics along its 
periphery follow the same patterns as Bolivia’s major cities. Firstly, as Figures 3 
and 4 show, the city has expanded from its core, with few topographical con-
straints, as it has annexed villages and informal settlements in the process. Sec-
ond, as was noted on the topic of agrarian reform, the lucrative business of sell-
ing rural land promotes the creation of settlements of an urban nature on rural 
land. This, combined with social pressure and corruption, promotes the expan-
sion of formal urban areas, all to the benefit of land speculators who dramatical-
ly increase the prices of their land holdings, almost overnight. The actual urbani-
sation process occurs on a self-organised and incremental basis, as shown on 
Figure 4. 
Nowadays, around 67.5% of Bolivia’s population lives in an urban environ-
ment; the region with the highest urban population is Santa Cruz, where the 
urban proportion is an estimated 80% (PNUD 2015). It is estimated that Boliv-
ia’s urban population will continue to grow to 72% by 2025 and 53% of Bolivi-
ans will live in the three biggest cities. However, the censuses take from 2001 to 
2012 show that small- and medium-sized cities have the highest urbanisation 
rates, making them also a force to reckon with in terms of the development and 
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integration of the country’s regions (MOPSV 2016, p. 34; PNUD 2015). So far, 
34 intermediate cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants each have consolidated 
and their populations continue to maintain their agricultural customs and links to 
the rural hinterland. Consequently, the central government has proposed a multi-
locality strategy for the 21st century (MOPSV 2016, p. 24). From 2006 to 2013, 
Tarija’s urbanised area increased from 8,186 ha to 11,846 ha or by 45% 
(MOPSV 2016, p. 24). Over the same period, the population grew from 171,489 
(GAMT 2008) to 212,856 inhabitants (INE 2012), and to an estimated 247,000 
in 2017 (INE 2017), the latest year for which this data is available (INE 2017). 
This shows that the pattern of Tarija’s development has been one of low-density 
in recent years because the population increase has not been as dramatic as the 
expansion that has occurred in urbanised areas. 
Moreover, the urban expansion that has taken place has been informal, with 
inadequate municipal control and/or regulation. Land acquisition and housing 
construction took place without the approval of municipal planning institutions 
and urbanisation has mainly taken place on an incremental, self-organised basis 
(Figure 4). In this context, speculation accelerated and plots of land became 
over-priced. In response to this spontaneous growth and pressure from land 
speculators and social organisations, municipal governments expanded their 
cities’ urban radiuses several times. This led to the creation of new settlements 
and neighbourhoods. These emerging neighbourhoods are not yet fully inhabited 
(Figure 2). However, they are self-organised and represented on local, depart-
mental and national neighbourhood committees. According to the president of 
one departmental neighbourhood committees, since 2008, the neighbourhoods 
have increased in number from 60 to 170, nowadays. However, the exact number 
cannot be determined as not all of the neighbourhoods have been formally 
acknowledged by the municipality; doing so would imply the proper registration 
of land tenure, but this legal argument has not yet been settled. Therefore, the 
municipality refers to them as groups, and the number of existing neighbour-
hoods cannot be determined. Moreover, through an analysis of urban expansion, 
it also became clear that the new neighbourhoods are larger than the older ones 
in terms of the surface area they occupy; however, they also house significantly 
fewer people. 
Addressing of the needs of Tarija’s 170 neighbourhoods has proven to be a 
heavy burden for Tarija’s municipal and departmental governments as more than 
half lack basic infrastructure. For many, expanding the urban radius may have 
solved the issue of property; however, it has yet to solve the issues of social 
disparities, lack of basic infrastructure and environmental damage. Land specula-
tion has particularly benefitted from the expanding urban radius as the price of 
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rural land has increased by merely being listed on paper as being urban land. 
This gave rise to a lucrative business where speculation and corruption steered 
development (Vargas Gamboa 2014). This has resulted in the growth in the 
number of vulnerable dwellers with no basic infrastructure, who then organise 
themselves through neighbourhoods committees that then put pressure on the 
government to appropriately develop their habitats (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 4: Sequence of urban development. From the core towards the periphery, 
different stages of self-organised and incremental development can be observed. 
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Figure 5: Vulnerable housing on a ravine. Migrants from the rural area who 
were deceived by land speculators. 





In recent years, the city of Tarija has seen a large expansion in terms of the sur-
face area it occupies. This expansion has mainly occurred informally. However, 
there are questions as to whether this expansion was triggered by migration and 
the consequent demand for housing or by land speculation. An analysis of the 
city’s urban expansion, from an historical perspective, in terms of surface area 
and population growth, has shown a dramatic decrease in both the built and pop-
ulation density in recent years. A review of policy and development agendas 
shows that efforts have been made to secure adequate housing for everyone in 
the city; however, those interviewed during the study noted the urgency of tack-
ling land speculation and also voiced concerns over the lack of strategies to ad-
dress this problem. Furthermore, the general public sees informal urbanisation as 
harmful for the consolidated city of Tarija; therefore, the general discourse 
around city development does not include these areas in their plans. Rather, legal 
efforts have been intensified to protect existing structures against encroachment 
from emerging informal surroundings. 
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I would argue that an informal mode of urbanisation does not harm the de-
velopment of a city. Further, this type of development provides opportunities to 
develop cities in new and more inclusive ways, as informal urbanisation is more 
capable of adapting to new socio-economic circumstances than the generalised 
formal bureaucratic mode of urbanisation. Different innovative approaches 
throughout Latin America offer examples of successful informal modes of de-
velopment (McGuirk 2014). Moreover, discussions on this topic have raised a 
whole new set of questions that will challenge planning institutions in the future. 
But what will happen to the lands that are not yet inhabited? Which constellation 
of actors is needed to oversee the development of these areas? And what strate-
gies are needed to accomplish development here? Reforestation and agricultural 
land use were also discussed in the study interviews; however, densification 
through social housing or privately developed forms of housing could also be 
topics of discussion. For these types of initiatives, it is crucial to understand site-
specific circumstances, discuss them in a transdisciplinary manner, and integrate 
them into development plans that recognise the need to find a median between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
Addressing the overall question of land speculation in the city of Tarija is 
quite challenging. First impressions argue that the expansion that took place due 
to speculation was out of proportion in relation to the influx of migrants, as the 
city’s low population density has shown. Further, the question of whether migra-
tion will increase or decrease remains an open one. Moreover, there is a clear 
consensus between those interviewed for the study and the discussions around 
land use that assert that land speculation has deprived the city of valuable natural 
land, has destroyed important water bodies, and has been the main driver behind 
urban expansion in terms of the amount of surface area used. This was, thus, a 
highly inefficient way of achieving urbanisation, the severe consequences of 
which are shown in Figures 2 and 5. Therefore, it is crucial to prioritise this issue 
in local development plans and to tackle it with the same intensity as the issue of 
land ownership is currently addressed. To continue neglecting this critical issue 
would only promote even more uncontrolled and unjustified expansion, where 
the main victims are those who dwell on the periphery of the city. 
To conclude, three important points can be raised that are relevant to a gen-
eral understanding of the issue of land speculation. First, the centralised housing 
policy and programmes in Bolivia makes it difficult to put development agen-
da(s) into operation, as centralised programmes cannot respond to site-specific 
circumstances and, in a way, disagree with the key role of the ETAs. This high-
lights the importance of establishing a median between top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. Second, there is the issue of land ownership. In the context of the 
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case study, land for social housing must be provided by the municipal govern-
ment; however, the municipalities often do not own land in housing-intensive 
areas as this land is mainly privately owned. Thus, the land provided is mainly in 
extensive areas, thereby promoting the type of low-density urban expansion 
identified in Figure 3. Last, the State of Bolivia has made great progress in de-
veloping financing systems for housing and social housing at very low interest, 
making housing available to an increasing number of people every year 
(AEVIVIENDA 2018). However, this serves and promotes the land market as 
people who previously did not have the resources are now are able to buy land 
for housing. Land speculators then take advantage of this situation (Vargas 
Gamboa 2014). The need for housing and low-density development creates con-
ditions for a profitable land market; therefore, different actors involved in land 
speculation and development have promoted this type of model. However, from 
a planning and environmental perspective, the densification of existing structures 
is a more economical and sustainable way of urbanisation. It is, therefore, crucial 
to challenge the existing discourse around the demand for housing and to pro-
pose urbanisation strategies and policies that are based on site-specific circum-
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Chapter 6: Influence of Migrants’  
Two-Directional Rural-Urban Linkages  
in Urban Villages in China 






China’s urbanisation can be understood as an in-situ process where rural areas 
gradually become urban (Zhu 1999). This process is characterised by the infor-
mal growth of urban villages situated on the periphery of large cities and the 
huge inflow of rural migrant workers into these cities due to the better chances 
of finding employment (Hao et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2010; Zheng et al. 2009). 
Under the dual urban-rural land system, indigenous villagers are allowed to ex-
tend the houses that have been built on their own plots and rent out rooms to the 
migrant population. Because of the low living costs and prime location, migrants 
prefer to settle down in urban villages in their destination cities. In certain urban 
villages in metropolitan cities like Beijing, the number of migrants can be more 
than ten times that of indigenous villagers (Feng 2010). As such, urban villages 
have been identified as migrant enclaves (Friedmann 2005; He et al. 2010; Lin et 
al. 2011; Liu et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2013; Wu 2016). Much liter-
ature has described urban villages as settlements that are ‘chaotic’, ‘unplanned’, 
‘congested’ and ‘substandard’ (Chung 2010; Tian 2008), arguing that this situa-
tion is attributed to the informal mechanisms of land development and the ra-
tional rent-seeking decisions of (urban) villagers who wish to maximise profits 
from their assigned housing plots (Ma 2006; Wu et al. 2013). In the development 
and redevelopment process of urban villages, villagers, governments and devel-
opers are identified as key stakeholders and the negotiations that take place 
148 | Shiyu Yang 
 
among them have been investigated and analysed (Herrle et al. 2014). Neverthe-
less, even though migrants are the largest group living in these locations, their 
interests are often neglected in these negotiations (Liu et al. 2018). Although 
there is some literature that focuses on migrants’ housing conditions and the 
inequalities that exist in the housing market (He et al. 2010; Zheng et al. 2009), 
it mainly observes the issue from a top-down, institutional interpretation. Given 
the fact that migrants have no property rights and tenancy security (Liu et al. 
2018), they are seen as only passively adopting the space they inhabit. The im-
pacts of migrants’ decision-making and daily activities on housing conditions in 
urban villages remain unclear. 
Many studies have proved that in traditional Chinese society blood bonds 
(xueyuan) and place bonds (diyuan) play a central role in people’s decision-
making, and migrants coming from the same rural origin (tongxiang) tend to 
agglomerate so as to be spatially close within their new urban destinations (Fei 
1985; Zhang 2001). Researchers have examined the socio-spatial pattern of mi-
grants’ networks and their attachment to and engagement with both their rural 
places of origin and their urban destinations (Fan 2002; Fan et al. 2011; Liu et 
al. 2012; Liu et al. 2018; Saunders 2011). Therefore, this paper conceptualises 
migrants’ two-directional linkages as being invisible ties between their rural 
hometowns and their arrival cities, in terms of personal, economic and social 
perspectives. The research question in this enquiry focuses on how this two-
directional linkage influences migrants’ decision-making processes and activities 
upon their arrival in urban villages. The primary aim of this paper is to contrib-
ute to a better understanding of housing conditions for migrants in urban villages 
by highlighting their bipolar relationship with both their rural places of origin 
and their urban destinations. It also seeks to shed insight on the conceptualisation 
of temporary migrants by examining the relevant factors, including migration 
time and family size. Moreover, it critically analyses the effects of social net-
works and neighbourhood attachments among migrants who come from the 
same place of origin. Due to the informal status of the migrant population in 
China and the lack of quantitative data on their everyday activities, this research 
uses qualitative analysis that is mainly based on interviews and investigates the 
village of Shigezhuang, in Beijing, as a case study. 
This chapter is presented in five sections. The following section gives a brief 
overview of the literature on China’s internal rural-urban migration and mi-
grants’ perceptions and activities concerning their rural origins. It also provides a 
conceptual framework for the empirical research. In section three, the research 
method is explained and the village of Shigezhuang is introduced as the case 
study. The fourth section provides insight into the migrants’ current housing 
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conditions and backgrounds and the factors they take into consideration when 
decision-making; it does so by analysing their demographic profiles and by re-
viewing and analysing the interview transcripts. Discussions are interwoven into 
the data analysis. Concluding remarks are drawn in the final section. 
 
 
MIGRANTS’ LINKAGE TO THEIR RURAL ORIGINS  
 
Since the late 1980s, China has witnessed a surge in the rate of internal rural-
urban migration (Hao et al. 2011) and those workers coming from rural areas or 
small cities to large cities are referred to as the migrant population. These mi-
grants maintain constant links to their rural origins, both as individuals and as 
members of families. Splitting up households is identified as a strategy migrant 
workers use to benefit the most from working in cities (Fan et al. 2011). A split-
household family refers to a situation ‘where family members who under normal 
circumstances would be living in the same place are in actuality living in sepa-
rate places’ (Fan et al. 2011, p. 2166). Migrant workers straddle the city and the 
countryside as they circulate between the two locations and send money back to 
their hometowns as a major source of income and savings for the family mem-
bers who are left behind (Fan 2002; Fan et al. 2011; Yang 2000). However, the 
study is limited as it categorises split households into forms of sole migration, 
couple migration and family migration, thereby overlooking the traditional Chi-
nese culture of including three generations in this culture’s conceptualisation of a 
family. 
There has also been a debate on migrants’ perceptions of urban villages and 
their intention of settling down in the established city. Some scholars have ar-
gued that most migrants consider urban villages as temporary places of arrival 
and are eager to transit into the nearby urban area and become a permanent resi-
dents there (Saunders 2011). In contrast, other findings indicate that migrants are 
unlikely to have long-term plans to settle down in the city (Fan 2002; Yang 
2000). However, migrants merely view the destination city as a place of work 
instead of a place in which to live, and they have no intention of staying. Deter-
minants that include the period of time spent working in a certain city and family 
size have been examined and proven to have little influence on migrants’ inter-
pretations and decision-making. Another argument is that it is better to focus on 
migrants’ ‘attachment to and engagement with the origin and destination’ rather 
than interpreting these factors according to a ‘go or no-go’ dichotomy (Kauf-
mann 2007). The system of classifying ‘temporary migrants’ and ‘permanent 
migrants’ was adopted when differentiating migrant workers from those who 
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attain a relatively high educational level and benefit from institutional welfare 
(Fan 2002). Two explanations account for this unsettled situation. The first and 
most widely discussed reason concerns China’s hukou system, which prevents 
migrants from accessing many public services in destination cities, including 
health care, education, housing and other social benefits (Lin et al. 2011). An-
other reason is that migrants are more likely to invest money in their rural 
hometowns out of a sense of social and economic security and also of belonging 
(Fan et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2018). 
Besides the fact that migrants or migrant families’ decision-making is influ-
enced by their two-directional linkage between their rural origins and their urban 
destinations, certain communities are informally set up in the established city 
because of the migrant inhabitants’ linkages to their hometowns. Research shows 
that there is a long history of migrants who come from the same origins, settling 
in the same urban villages. Extreme cases are those urban villages where the 
majority of migrants come from the same province and where that village has 
been given the name of that province, such as Zhejiang Village and Xinjiang 
Village (Chung 2010; Friedmann 2005; Zhang 2001). However, there are many 
urban villages that accommodate heterogeneous migrants and where there are 
not necessarily strong community ties among these residents (Chung 2010). A 
shared finding is that migrants tend to cluster in particular locations within a 
city, based on their shared sense of identity (Ma and Xiang 1998). This sense of 
identity is based on kinship and geographic relations to their place of origin 
rather than to their place of arrival. Those migrants having the same place bonds 
(diyuan) call each other tongxiang and their place of origin can be flexibly and 
differently defined according to contexts, which vary between village, township, 
city and province (Zhang 2001). For migrant workers, tongxiang is the main 
source of labour market information (Fan 2002). Although new-generation mi-
grants probably rely more on ‘non-territorial’ networks, ‘hometown-based 
bonds’ still play a key role in their social networks (Liu et al. 2012, p.192). 
The fact that migrants rely on social networks and have uncertain feelings 
about their arrival cities can be understood best when reviewing the recent mas-
sive demolition of urban villages and the evictions of migrant workers. For city 
governments, urban villages are blamed for the inefficient and chaotic land use 
that hampers the process of ‘modernisation’ (Wu 2009). This negative character-
isation of urban villages is used to justify large-scale demolitions under the aus-
pices of urban development. A growing body of literature argues that migrant 
workers, as the tenant class in urban villages, have an inferior status and are 
often neglected by municipalities and academia (Liu et al. 2018; Wang et al. 
2009). Migrant workers are treated as a ‘means of production’ rather than a ‘so-
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cial asset which contributes to the identity and culture of the city’ (Hao et al. 
2011, p.223). With no property rights or legal protection, migrants have no dis-
course in bargaining over rental prices and are not compensated when faced with 
displacement. When they are evicted from their original enclaves, migrants tend 
to make short-distance moves that are dependent on their social ties because of 
the lack of information on and access to other neighbourhoods. In addition to 
investigating these migrants’ physical evictions, researchers have also looked 
into their economic displacement (Liu et al. 2018). Whereas direct economic 
displacement means migrant renters are priced out by rising housing costs and 
are forced to relocate to other urban villages, indirectly, one can understand how 
they become displaced in situ where they tend to remain in the same neighbour-
hood and must accept unreasonable rental increases because of the other poten-
tial loss, which is in their social ties. 
The above literature review provides the study with a conceptual framework 
that guides its empirical analysis. To identify the impacts of Chinese migrants’ 
two-directional linkages on their living conditions in urban villages, this research 
was approached from three perspectives: the case of a migrant or a migrant fami-
ly, migrants as members of the migrant community, and the migrant community 
as a whole. First, migrants’ individual linkages to their rural origins influence 
their activities in their urban destinations and their decisions as circulators be-
tween these destinations is a superficial reflection of this linkage. In this case, a 
migrant or a migrant family is analysed as an individual subject. Second, mi-
grants gather in urban villages, based on their bonds of place, and form a 
tongxiang community, which is a collective reflection of their two-directional 
linkages. As such, two more types of subjects are identified a migrant or a mi-
grant family as a member of the community and the migrant community as a 
whole. Therefore, the specific research question is how the two-directional link-
age acts on these three subjects and also on migrants’ overall housing conditions 
in urban villages. Based on this conceptual framework, the case of the village of 
Shigezhuang was selected and examined in the research. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA 
 
Historically, Beijing’s periphery has been dotted with hundreds of village com-
munities (Jeong 2011), but there are almost no urban villages left within the 
city’s fourth ring road because of the large-scale urban redevelopment of recent 
years. The village of Shigezhuang is located to the east of the central business 
district and just beyond the fifth ring road. Shigezhuang is one of the most cen-
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trally located villages among those that remain in Beijing, which means it has 
existed for a long time in the form of an urban village.1 Further, it has a high 
migrant-to-native ratio of around eight-to-one and a large percentage of these 
migrants come from the province of Sichuan. Therefore, Shigezhuang was cho-
sen as the case village for this field research, based on the need to investigate 
migrants’ activities and decision-making processes as they relate to their rural 
origins. 
 
Figure 1: Location of Shigezhuang village in Beijing. 
Source: drawn by author based on Google map. 
The data were collected from various sources during the field research, including 
from interviews, a questionnaire survey, field observations, photographs and 
 
1 The statement in this paragraph is based on an early round of overall field research on 
urban villages in Beijing. In addition, the research of Fan et al. (2011) is also an im-
portant reference. 
Migrants’ Two-Directional Rural-Urban Linkages in Urban Villages | 153 
 
 
mapping. The period of the study was from September to October 2017. Due to 
the fact that urban villages are considered informal settlements and migrants are 
usually not formally included in the urban economy, information about migrants’ 
demographics is not officially publicly available. Therefore, the aim of this re-
search was not to enrol a representative sample of migrants but to examine the 
individualized experiences and choices of housing that are linked to these mi-
grants’ two-directional linkages. 
First, a face-to-face survey was conducted with 58 residents who were ran-
domly selected from different parts of the village so that they were relatively 
evenly distributed, spatially. The subjects were asked to provide information on 
their demographics (including gender, age, hukou province and occupation2), as 
well as to give profiles of their dwellings (including the size of their rental 
rooms, the number of dwellers per room and whether there was an in-room toi-
let). Subsequent to the survey, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
some respondents. Respondents were each assigned a number, which was used 
for anonymity in the following discussion. A number with a suffix means that 
these people were interviewed together as one household. Although the sample 
is not big enough for a reliable quantitative research, the appropriate saturation 
was achieved after 58 surveys and the subsequent interviews; that is, no new 
information concerning the main aspects of the migrants’ activities and decision-




MIGRANTS IN THE CASE OF SHIGEZHUANG VILLAGE 
 
In this section, detailed interview content and data analyses are presented in 
combination with discussions. Based on the aforementioned conceptual frame-
work, the research findings concerning the two-directional linkages were struc-
tured from three perspectives: migrants as individuals, migrants as tongxiang, 
and a migrant community as a whole. 
 
 
2 In the surveys, each person was asked about the details of the tasks they performed at 
their work. Occupations such as construction worker, electrician and decorator were 
mentioned as different categories of jobs in the construction industry. Men who 
worked as hourly laborers are often referred to as those workers who do not specialize 
in a certain type of work but mainly work on a construction site. Women who work as 
hourly laborers often work in different occupations, such as in cleaning. 
154 | Shiyu Yang 
 
As an individual migrant perceiving the arrival city as a place 
for work 
 
Among all of the respondents, five were residents with Beijing hukou and 53 
were migrants. All the Beijing residents were over 60 years of age. A majority of 
the migrants were in their 30s (25%) or 40s (36%), while only 13% were young-
er than 30 and 13% were in their 50s. As for dwelling profiles, for the Beijing 
residents the average living space per person was 21.8 square metres, while that 
for the migrants was 5.1 square metres. One family of three migrants did not 
travel to Beijing for work. When they were excluded, the average living space 
per person for the migrant workers was 3.6 square metres and only three of these 
50 migrants had an in-room toilet. The majority of these migrants had to use 
public toilets, which were substandard, and they had to bath in an outdoor shelter 
by temporarily setting up plastic tents. The rent for these rooms without toilets 
was around 80 yuan (11.4 USD) per square metre per month. For example, for 
the family of Interviewee 10, their 9-square-metre room costs around 750 yuan 
(107.0 USD), and the 4-square-metre room of Interviewee 4 cost 300 yuan per 
month (42.8 USD). 
During the interviews, some interviewees were invited to answer a hypothet-
ical question: 
 
‘I know there is a room, in the nearby urban village, that is the same size as the one you 
live in now but that has a toilet, but the rent is 200 yuan higher. Would you be willing to 
move to that room’ (Author, September 2017). 
 
Interviewee 5’s answer represents most respondents: 
 
‘There is already enough space within our room for my family to live. Why would I pay 
extra money for the rent? We don’t need an in-room toilet’ (Interviewee 5, September 
2017). 
 
This is a surprising answer because these migrants earned a fairly high salary 
compared to the rent they paid. Taking Interviewee 5 as an example, he and his 
wife had worked in Beijing for more than 15 years and had lived in Shigezhuang 
for more than 10 years, until 2017. He worked as a construction worker and his 
salary was 500 yuan per day. When he worked for 22 days per month, on aver-
age, his monthly income was 11,000 yuan. His wife worked as a cleaner and her 
salary per month was around 4,000 yuan. In this case, if this family worked for 
11 months a year in Beijing, their yearly income would have been 165,000 yuan, 
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which is higher than the 2017 annual income per capital of the residents in Bei-
jing, which was 57,230 yuan (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics 2018). In 
this case, their 8.5-square-metre room, with a monthly rent of 750 yuan, only 
took up 5% of their combined income. 
Figure 2: 2(a) Street in Shigezhuang village; 2(b) A 9-square-metre room of 
Interviewee 48. 
Source: Author, 2017. 
Besides expressing an unwillingness to spend money on rent, more evidence can 
be seen that these migrants considered the city of Beijing only as a place for 
work: 
 
‘The shopping mall within ten minutes’ walk and I have never been there. That is not for 
us. Why would we go there?’ (Interviewee 5, September 2017). 
 
‘I drive my car from Sichuan to here for more convenient transportation to my work place. 
I know that cars without a Beijing licence are not allowed inside the 5th ring road. But 
most of the construction sites are in the outskirts. Sometimes, I need to drive even 1 hour 
to a more peri-urban area for work. I don’t need to drive my car to the city centre’ 
(Interviewee 1, September 2017). 
 
‘I will go back home when I can’t work anymore. We peasants don’t have rent insurance. 
The living cost here in a city is much higher than that of our countryside. I don’t think we 
can afford this when we are old’ (Interviewee 48, September 2017). 
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‘My son is a young soldier in the army now. I don’t need to give him money every month 
like in his university times, but we need to save money from now on to help him buy an 
apartment when he gets married in the future’ (Interviewee 5, September 2017). 
 
This indicates that for these migrants the destination city only means better op-
portunities for finding a well-paid job; they are not interested in the city life. 
These migrants seldom consider the established city as their home nor do they 
intend to permanently settle down there. The term ‘temporary migrants’ men-
tioned in the literature review does not refer to the time period but rather to their 
‘floating’ situation and intention of moving back to the rural countryside. For 
example, interviewees 5 and 48 are in their 50s and are certain about their inten-
tion to return to their rural hometowns when they are no longer able to work. 
The fact they have been working in the city for more than 10 years has not influ-
enced their plans. Besides, the idea of saving money in case of an emergency or 
to provide a better future for their children is also a traditional idea that is deeply 
rooted in the minds of Chinese rural peasants. 
Prior studies have categorised forms of migration into sole migration, couple 
migration and family migration (Fan et al. 2011). Compared to these stereotypes, 
this field research has identified another type of migration, that of three genera-
tions migrating together. Over 90% of the migrants that come to Beijing travel 
with other family members with whom they share one or two rooms when set-
tling in Shigezhuang. As interviewees 9, 24, 25, 26 and 45 reported, each of their 
families had five or six members living in Shigezhuang; these might have in-
cluded a couple of older migrants, their son or daughter along with his or her 
spouse and one or two small children. In this case, the family rented two rooms 
that were situated close to each other. The young couple worked during the day-
time, while at least one of the elderly migrants stayed home to care for the chil-
dren. So instead of leaving their children behind in the rural place of origin, 
parents and children could see each other daily and the young couple could take 
care of the elderly couple when needed. Therefore, when economic conditions 
allowed, this was the preferred mode of temporary migration for most families 
with children younger than 6 years of age. However, no significant differences 
were found between these migrants and those who came to the city alone or only 
with their spouses. Having more family members in the destination village did 
not mean a willingness to invest more to obtain better living conditions. The 
average living space per person of the aforementioned four families was only 2.5 
square metres. The choice of this type of family migration can be seen as a com-
promise between saving the most from working in an urban area and enjoying 
the best of family life. 
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When the children reached school age (6 years old), most parents sent them 
back to their rural origins because the city did not provide migrant children with 
access to public education. In most cases, both the mother and the father contin-
ued working in the city and let the grandparents take care of their children in 
their hometowns, in a situation the interviewees described as being an annual bi-
directional circuit. Here, parents visited their children in the winter time when 
celebrating the spring festival in the countryside, while the children visited their 
parents during summer vacations in Beijing. As some respondents reported, the 
average living space per person was even less when taking the temporary visit-
ing children into account. 
To summarise, most migrants were reluctant to invest in rental housing. In 
the case of these migrants, indigenous villagers preferred to build rooms that 
only satisfied basic sheltering needs when they developed their housing for rent-
al purposes. In this specific rental market, rooms with more decent conditions, 
like those that included a toilet, did not receive more attention from migrants. 
 
As tongxiang: Relying on social networks for survival 
 
Among the 53 migrants who responded to the survey, 58% were from the prov-
ince of Sichuan, 15% from Henan, 7% from Shandong, 6% from Hubei, 6% 
from Hebei, and 8% from other provinces, including Shanxi, Gansu and Jiangsu. 
Of these migrants, 53% were female and 47% were male. Excluding the 11 mi-
grants who did not work (including two housewives, three students, two unem-
ployed people, and four people who were visiting), all of the men from Sichuan 
worked as labourers in the construction industry, while all but one woman (from 
Sichuan) were cleaners. Interestingly, when it came to migrants from provinces 
other than Sichuan, only one man worked as a decorator and two women were 
cleaners. Others worked as salespersons, company staff and cooks, or were self-
employed. According to the interviews that went further in-depth, this interesting 
phenomenon that migrants from the same province tended to take on the same 
occupations can be attributed to their informal access to employment infor-
mation. 
During their interviews, the 31 of the migrants from Sichuan introduced 
more information to this research about the lives of other tongxiang. Some of 
them had been invited by an acquaintance who had already been a migrant 
worker living in Beijing, while some had moved to Shigezhuang by chance after 
coming to Beijing. These tongxiang did not necessarily have blood bonds or 
know each other before coming to Beijing but they tended to form a strong 
community once they settled down in Shigezhuang because of their similar dia-
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lects and life styles. These Sichuan tongxiang were mostly low-skilled migrants 
who had not been trained for any specific occupation. Therefore, their occupa-
tions were not decided by their ability but by their access to information on op-
portunities for work. 
As the majority of these migrants did not have steady jobs, they needed to 
keep searching for new job opportunities. In such fields as construction or 
cleaning, little information was available online or via a formal platform and 
migrants needed to rely on their relatives and social networks in their job-search 
processes. 
 
‘When a familiar construction team leader calls me and tells me that they need four or five 
construction workers on their sites for a week, I will say I can help him to find all these 
people. Then I often call my relatives or go to knock at the doors of my neighbours and 
ask if they have time for that one-week work. We will also drive a car together to the 
construction site. This is very common and other people will also do so. The man with 
much job information is highly respected’ (Interviewee 5, September 2017). 
 
‘Sometimes I am busy when the household that I often work for asks me to do the cleaning. 
I will recommend my friends from the villages and guarantee the household that they can 
do the cleaning as well as I do’ (Interviewee 11.1, September 2017). 
 
In this case, migrants tended to remain in Shigezhuang even when the housing 
prices were steadily increasing and the conditions were not ideal, as they took 
into account the possible loss of working opportunities should they opt for 
resettlement. Some scholars refer to this as economic displacement, as 
mentioned in the literature review. Dependence on a social network that was 
attached to their bonds of place indirectly led to these migrants’ economic 
displacement. 
 
As a community: Negotiating with other stakeholder groups 
 
Although there was an observed strong neighbourhood attachment in sharing 
information and undertaking everyday activities, such as cooking, playing cards 
and taking care of each other, it is important to point out that this established 
social network among the tongxiang did not help the migrants in their negotia-
tions with indigenous villagers. 
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Figure 3: Tongxiang playing cards after work. 
Source: Author, 2017. 
 
During the field research, several interviewees reported that conflicts took place 
between migrants and indigenous villagers and the main concern was rent: 
 
‘You want to interview my landlord (the villager who rents a room to the interviewee)? I 
know his family lives in that courtyard house, but I have never been inside. They keep a 
fierce guard dog and it will bite us. You could go for a try. Maybe the landlord will be 
more friendly to a university student’ (Interviewee 47, October 2017). 
 
‘They (indigenous villagers) are all very bad. They keep raising our rent unreasonably, 
especially after the government’s demolishing of the nearby villages. If we don’t agree to 
the high rent, they will force us to move out. There are plenty of people waiting to rent 
their house’ (Interviewee 1, September 2017). 
 
Despite being dominant in number, these migrants were still in vulnerable 
positions when agreements needed to be reached with indigenous villagers. This 
was not only because of the informality of the rental market but also because 
these migrants lacked the necessary resources for undertaking these negotiations. 
Although some scholars, such as Zhang (2003), suggest that in some urban 
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villages there are leaders, among these migrants, who can gain the right to enter 
into a discourse because of their wealth and thus are able to represent other 
tongxiang who are fighting for their rights in the negotiation process, what 
happens in Shigezhuang is common in most urban villages. A migrant group, 
which typically consists of those with low social status and education levels, has 
few back-up resources with which to fight for the right to discuss their issues. 
Further, members in the established tongxiang community support each other in 
everyday life but few people are willing to represent their common interests: 
 
‘Last month the villagers decided collectively to raise our rent by an average of 200 yuan. 
We are so angry because they just raised the rent once at the beginning of this year. We 
had a big fight with them. However, the village committee leaders who were supposed to 
administer justice always stood by the villagers’ side. The rent still rose despite the fight’ 
(Interviewee 48, September 2017). 
 
‘Of course, there is no leader for our tongxiang community. Nobody dares to be the 
leader. Leaders are always the first to suffer. Those villagers can at any time kick us out of 
their room’ (Interviewee 5, September 2017). 
 
All of the migrants knew that their primary reason for staying in the city was to 
earn money and few people wanted to bear a possible loss by taking 
responsibility for this ‘temporary’ community. Therefore, as long as these people 
remained migrant workers with few resources in such an informal setting, their 
inferior statuses would not have changed with the addition of more tongxiang in 
one urban village. Indigenous villagers always dominated the negotiations as 
they had resources in their own legal tenancy and the village agency would 





Urban villages have been identified as migrant enclaves of which migrant work-
ers make up the largest but most inferior group. This study examined the impacts 
of these migrants’ two-directional linkages between their urban destinations and 
rural origins on their housing conditions in urban villages. The village of Shi-
gezhuang was chosen as a case study and surveys and interviews with 58 resi-
dents were conducted during the field research. There are three major findings 
related to the conceptual framework of investigating the influence of this two-
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directional linkage from the perspectives of migrants as individuals, migrants as 
members of a tongxiang community, and the migrant community as a whole. 
First, temporary migrants as circulators between their rural origins and urban 
destinations consider the city as a place for work rather than a place to live and, 
thus, are reluctant to invest money to live in the city and only seek out substand-
ard housing. Migrants have these attitudes regardless of the period of time spent 
working in the city or the number of family members living there. Migrants’ 
decision-making on their choice of housing and indigenous villagers’ decision-
making on developing housing for the rental market have mutual impacts on 
each other. Second, migrants’ limited access to job information in the city makes 
them rely on social networks that are based on their bonds of place. Besides the 
physical or direct economic displacements evictions cause, migrants’ depend-
ence on having informal access to employment information may lead to indirect 
economic displacement, which means they may have to endure high prices and 
inequality in the rental market. Third, although the neighbourhood attachment 
among the tongxiang is strong in the sense of sharing information or taking care 
of each other, without strong community leadership, being a member of the 
tongxiang is of little help when entering into a negotiation process with other 
stakeholder groups in the city. To conclude, this study argues that migrant work-
ers’ constant linkages to their rural origins and the social networks based on 
bonds of place may contribute to more employment opportunities, a better sense 
of belongingness and strong neighbourhood attachments; however, at the same 
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Chapter 7: Urban Environmental Migrants 
Demands for a Unique Category of Refugees  
to Ensure their Right to Land and Resettlement 





Environmentally induced migration is quite an old phenomenon, yet its recogni-
tion as a distinct category remains a topic of debate (Myers 2005). Along with it, 
persons displaced chiefly due to the consequences of climate change do not hold 
an important place on the agendas of the relevant international organisations 
(e.g. International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)) so as to be treated with the attention they 
need. In his publication ‘Environmental refugees: myth or reality’, Black (2001) 
argues that the phenomenon of such migration is evident and supported by 
scholarly literature yet, unfortunately, the concerned organisations do not ad-
dress this issue with the gravity that it merits. Lambert (2002) argues that even 
though the problem of environmentally induced migration exists, its lack of 
recognition among political organisations makes it more troublesome to address. 
The lack of political will to acknowledge this problem is the root cause of the 
failure to create any framework to assist environmental migrants or displaced 
persons. Furthermore, the literature on environmental risk management (e.g., 
Mallick and Akter 2013; Etzold and Mallick 2016; Roy et al. 2017) reports the 
increased risk among socially and economically vulnerable communities located 
in tropical coastal belts, due to the adverse effects of environmental disruptions. 
Very few steps have been taken to bring these people into an institutional 
framework. Some studies, for example, Kolmannskog (2008), point to the fact 
that applying the term ‘refugee’ to such displaced groups is inaccurate and thus 
needs to be addressed separately. This author suggests that closer consideration 
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should be made for the prevailing policies of prevention and protections before 
bringing in new measures to deal with this issue. Further, various scholars and 
authorities have offered draft conventions to address people who have been dis-
placed by climate change, in an effort to enclose them within an international 
regime of status and treatment in accordance with the challenges these people 
face due to the climate effects of rising global temperatures (Aylett 2014). Final-
ly, the literature shows that a significant number of people are in need of protec-
tion and thus deserve attention at both national and international political levels. 
Even though the number of such displaced persons is not yet known, Myers 
(2005) suggests that by 2050 an estimated 200 million people will fall under this 
category. Hence the time has certainly arrived for all actors to take necessary 
action on this critical issue. 
Keeping all of these issues at the forefront, the main focus of this research is 
to address the problem of recognising that environmental migrants should have a 
separate identity. In addition, when the typology of such migrants gains consid-
erable ground in the arena of policy support, it will then become necessary to 
prepare a policy framework for their protection and, more so, for their right to 
land that has not incurred environmental degradation, which appears to be the 
most significant and troublesome issue for these migrants. Therefore, the main 
problem this research focuses on and is about identifying ‘environmental refu-
gees’ with a clear understanding of what this term actually refers to (Black 
2001). Preferably, this would be treated as a separate category of migrants rather 
than adding them to the long list of political or economic refugees or the like. 
Along with this, another issue that has been largely ignored is the lack of a clear-
ly acknowledged identification for these people and this has led to the problem 
of how to provide this migrant group with adequate structural support and assis-
tance. The remainder of this chapter provides a literature review, the research 
strategy, some discussion, the findings and some conclusions. 
 
 
“ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS”: AN IDENTITY  
IN THE MAKING? 
 
The hurdle in linking environmental degradation to human migration is that the 
victims of such consequences are nowhere when it comes to the devising of 
policies and initiatives that would ensure they are accorded the basic rights they 
are supposed to be entitled to. However, scholars have acknowledged that the 
terminologies used to indicate this group are not only confusing but also insuffi-
cient to incorporate the totality of such migrants. Thus, a distinctive categorisa-
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tion of this population bears utter significance, both in terms of recognising them 
as the most vulnerable group when environmental calamities strike and in formu-
lating policies to integrate them into a support-and-assistance framework. 
It is undeniable that population displacement mainly caused by environmen-
tal changes (that eventually trigger other driving factors behind migration and 
displacement) must be recognised as a distinctive identifiable category beyond 
those identified under risk management strategies (Dun and Gemenne 2008; 
Etzold and Mallick 2016). With this recognition comes the necessity of estab-
lishing an identity base for those who are the victims of such displacements. 
Therefore, a definition that separates this particular group from other types of 
migrants is of utter importance. Very little space in the contemporary literature 
has been assigned to defining those forced to migrate due to environmental dis-
asters. Most of this literature focuses on policy gaps and how to mitigate this 
deficit. The urgency of a clear definition and, hence, a particular identity for 
these migrants has attracted even less attention from policy makers and academ-
ics, mainly because there are already quite a few terms one can refer to when it 
comes to writing about this population; for example, ‘environmental migrants’ 
(Boano et al. 2008); ‘climate refugees’ (Berchin et al. 2017); ‘people displaced 
by climate change’ (Hodgkinson et al. 2009). Nonetheless, attempts have been 
made to find a concise definition for this group of migrants. Dun and Gemenne 
(2008, p.10) clearly state that ‘without a precise definition, practitioners and 
policy-makers are not easily able to establish plans and make targeted progress’. 
They also indicate that the current definition of refugee set out in the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention has helpful elements with which to create an identity for these 
migrants. The literature also brings forward the fact that even though the defini-
tion might have some elements of creating an identity, the migrants or displaced 
people who fall under this definition remain unrecognised and, thus, non-
recipients of proper assistance. 
In an attempt to define ‘environmental migrants’ Kolmannskog (2008) men-
tions two well-known definitions, one of which is that of El-Hinnawi (1985) and 
another of Myers (2002). El-Hinnawi (1985) clearly stated that people who are 
forced to migrate due to environmental factors, be it permanent or temporary, are 
to be labelled as such, given that their natural habitats have been seriously com-
promised to such an extent where the normal possibility of a livelihood is next to 
impossible. Even though El-Hinnawi’s definition gives some clarity to a separate 
group of people who are suffering from environmental disruptions (Kol-
mannskog 2008), it still is not inclusive of all of the situations under which peo-
ple are forced to relocate. Myers and Kent (1995) offered yet another definition, 
when they stated that, when people are faced with being forced from their tradi-
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tional habitats, due to various environmental changes, notably, soil erosion, wa-
ter shortages, deforestation and the like, and the challenge of securing a liveli-
hood whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis, inland or out, this group 
of people falls under the definition of ‘environmental refugee’. Furthermore, 
these authors considered the fact that people living under such conditions have 
no other alternatives but to migrate within or outside the country and that envi-
ronmental disasters eliminate the chances of their returning home when things 
got back to normal, if ever. Thus, the crucial question is one of status and wheth-
er these people should be recognised as environmental/climate migrants and be 
granted proper treatment. 
Boano et al. (2008) argued that the existing terminologies used to identify 
environmental forced migrations are problematic as these terminologies often 
represent a more subjective classification and the decision to migrate is being 
made mostly by the refugees themselves (El-Hinnawi 1985; Berchin et al. 2017). 
Taking a look at Zetter (2017), however, terms like ‘environmental refugees’, 
‘tsunami refugees’, ‘development refugees’ and so on, offer an initial identifica-
tion of a group of people who have been forcefully displaced from their habitats; 
further, these terms provide insights into and interpretations of the actual causes 
and consequences of the real situation this group finds itself in. Keane (2004) 
suggested that these terms do not fall under the definition of refugees as set out 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention. On one hand, the absence of a proper definition 
makes the term unsuitable and hence unacceptable by most. On the other hand, 
there is a consensus, in the literature, that not all people who are displaced by 
environmental degradation, such as climate change, which can be caused by 
either rapid- and slow-onset events, will migrate or relocate outside their nation-
al borders; hence, it is crucial to avoid referring to them as refugees (Boano et al. 
2008). Yet from another definitional perspective, since the status of refuge as-
sumes a ‘persecutor’ whom people fear, unless the ‘environment’ or ‘nature’ is 
seen as such, it is not authentic to label as ‘refugees’ people who are forced to 
migrate due to environmental causes (Keane 2004). 
All of this literary evidence hints at the two-fold aspect of a need for an iden-
tity for this population and the inadequacy of the existing terminologies and also 
the real need for a distinctive identity base for this migration type and popula-
tion. Amidst the discussion about whether the term ‘climate refugees or ‘forced 
climate migrants’ (Berchin et al. 2017, p. 148) should be used, the former has 
gained popularity over the latter. This label provides the public with an emotion-
ally sensitive and open approach to the issue (Brown 2007); it also helps differ-
entiate environmentally induced migrants from the other types of migrants. Due 
to severe climatic events, people continue to leave their homes or countries and 
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seek asylum in other regions or countries. As such, they are left in situations of 
insecurity and hopelessness (Berchin et al. 2017). However, the general category 
of ‘migrant’ has an adverse implication, since these people had decided to move 





This chapter aims to focus on people who are forced to relocate to new places 
due to environmental events and it also addresses their sense of being around 
new localities, which is a consquence of their having to relocate due to environ-
mental impacts. This relocation or displacement takes place mainly due to severe 
environmental events that seriously disrupt their everyday lives and damage their 
livelihoods; in most cases, these former lives and livelihoods are not repairable. 
Therefore, these people are either forced to change their usual earning strategies 
or their place of living or both. Making the decision to migrate does not rely only 
on the event that forced people to move; rather, it triggers other hurdles that in 
themselves are difficult enough to overcome. Hence, the construction of the 
conceptual framework for this research is based on perceptions gathered from 
the preliminary or initial fieldwork and literature reviews. This investigation 
took place in three interconnected phases. Figure 1 (below) shows the relational 
diagram of the phases that served as a conceptual framework for this research. 
All three phases were intertwined and played crucial roles both during the migra-
tion decision and in the post-migration identity-making process. 
The effects of upcoming climate-change events on livelihood strategies are 
expected to be significant (Black et al. 2013). Phase one describes the principal 
drivers for migration. Being one such driver, environmental events contribute to 
people making migratory decisions either directly or indirectly due to other ag-
gregating factors (Sikder et al. 2015). This phase shows the initial thrust envi-
ronmental factors and other drivers provide. This thrust also serves to agitate the 
existing environmental degradation and helps accelerate the process of dis-
placement. For example, during the fieldwork, one of the interviewees described 
how her family survived Sidr, one of the deadliest cyclones on record, and 
avoided migration. Two years later, she was forced to migrate to her current 
location due to being a victim of an even deadlier cyclone, Aila. The latter event 
intensified the gravity of the catastrophic situation cyclone Sidr had created. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework for identity making of the ‘environment 
migrants’.  
Source: Authors’ own draft, based on secondary literature survey. 
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The number of displaced persons due to environmental disasters is not insig-
nificant. The United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP) Human Devel-
opment Report suggests that, as of 2009, there were approximately 740 million 
internal migrants due to circumstances related to climate change (UNDP 2009). 
The process of migration takes place in two phases. The decision-making pro-
cess begins during phase one and can speed up, depending on the context and 
severity of the events. Phase two describes the actual migration decision-making 
stage; this migration decision could be to migrate internally, externally (trans-
boundary) or to not migrate at all. It also shows the relationship between the 
decisions taken in favour of or against migration. In this phase, migration may or 
may not take place, depending on the success of finding a suitable location in 
which to live and in securing another means of livelihood around the location 
where these people had lived prior to the event. If the latter occurs, then migra-
tion is unlikely to take place. Phase three shows the building of a sense of self 
among the people who took the necessary steps to move away from their original 
living place of habitation. Once the displacement is completed over time, these 
people become aware of the fact that their livelihood pattern and the meaning of 
their lives have both changed in relation to the place in which they currently 
reside. This building of sense also gives them an understanding of how and why 
they are different than those who are native to the place. This phase is where the 





This research adopted the case study method, through fieldwork and analysing 
secondary literature. Being inductive in nature, it focused on understanding how 
environmentally displaced people gain a distinct sense of identity. This study 
aimed to find the probable link between environmentally induced migration and 
identity. Simply put, it argues for the need of an identity base for those who are 
displaced internally or internationally due to environmental events. In so doing, 
it is important to consider whether there is a connection between the two pro-
cesses through which the displacement decision must be made in the first place. 
For this study, three slums were selected, namely Khora Bastee1, Labanchara 
Bastee and Rupsha Bastee located in Khulna city in Bangladesh. A high percent-
age concentration of internal migrants due to climatic events was a priority when 
selecting these slums. 
 
1 Bastee is a local term for slum. 
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Data collection methods for this research included in-depth interviews; non-
participant observations, followed by informal discussions; and an analysis of 
secondary literature. As the migrant households were dispersed throughout the 
slums and sometimes were found in some pockets of these slums, this research 
first identified the pockets and locations of these migrants. Then, households 
were randomly selected from the listed locations, using an unbiased view of the 
perceptions that people held about these slums. A total of 20 households were 
considered for the in-depth interviews. Interviewees were selected regardless of 
gender, age, educational qualifications or professional standings. For this study, 
unstructured interviews (Bryman 2008) were used so as to keep the data-
extraction process close to a regular conversation. Respondents talked freely and 
in an informal tone, since the focus was to grasp the perceptions and understand-
ing of the people being interviewed. 
This study also heavily depended on an analysis of the literature on identity 
and migration as they related to environmental factors. Both phenomena are 
complex and are driven by multiple factors. The aim was to find a functional link 
between the two so as to provide a basis for the groups that were displaced and 
hence bound to migrate due to environmental degradation (Warner 2010). There-
fore, the literature was reviewed from both arenas to find similarities and differ-
ences. Investigating the literature also provided an understanding of people’s 
perceptions regarding both the causes of their migration and the subsequent 
identity-making processes. Moreover, the literature review helped reveal the 
existing bridges and gaps between the two phenomena under discussion. One 
form of observation is a non-participant one that permits the researcher to ob-
serve while remaining aloof. Here, the aim was to grasp an understanding of 
what people from and around a particular age group thought about themselves 
and how they perceived their existence. Thematic analysis was adopted as a data 
analysis method; here, themes were validated by evidence found in scholarly 
literature. The next section reports the results of a case study of Khulna. The 
empirical study was conducted in three distinct large slums/informal settlements 
in Khulna city. The discussion on the key findings include a review of the con-
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This section addresses why and under what contexts people migrate once an 
event takes place. Migration decisions are based on multiple concerns that each 
act in conjunction within a particular situation. After a climatic incident, people 
may decide to either migrate immediately or gradually, depending on the type 
and intensity of the incident, the extent of the damage it caused and the sources 
available to restore these people’s livelihoods within the shortest time possible. 
A climatic event has impacts on both social and economic factors. The extent to 
which these factors are affected determines the decision to migrate. Figure 2 
shows the relational links among the various factors that influence the migration 
decision. 
Depending on the situation, migrants vary by type, and this is mainly a re-
flection of their pre-migration condition and how this had been altered during or 
after an event or calamity. The three slums selected for the fieldwork are settle-
ments of migrants who had moved mainly due to environmental events. Among 
the three slums, Labanchara had the largest population of these types of migrants 
and Rupsha slum had the least number of environmental migrants. Findings from 
these three slums are not exactly the same; while some of the data and infor-
mation obtained were identical in relation to migration and identity-making, 
other data on these migrants differed. When struck by a climatic shock, the peo-
ple in the affected areas tended to relocate to ensure they could continue to carry 
out their primary livelihoods. This tendency was found throughout these three 
slum areas. 
In most cases, it was found that cyclones Sidr and Ailahad caused the envi-
ronmental degradations that had resulted in migrations. Jahanara Begum, a mi-
grant living in Labanchara slum (interviewed on 8th April, 2016), described why 
she had to migrate after cyclone Aila. She had lost her source of income due to 
the damage caused by this cyclone. She expressed her helplessness and inability 
to support her family after the event, when she said, ‘sob jhoree nei gaeilo’, 
which literally means that everything was destroyed during Aila. She noted that 
she had run out of options to care for her family. Better employment opportuni-
ties influenced her to make the decision to migrate to the nearest city. In their 
theoretical model on migration patterns, Maurel and Tuccio (2016) provide simi-
lar perspectives on the impact of environmental events on migration decisions. 
The aforementioned model highlights climate shocks, such as floods, cyclones 
and so on, that push the transition of labour from agriculture to modern manufac-
174 | S. Mukaddim, M.Z. Hossain, S.K. Sikder 
 
turing and the service sector, causing the migration of rural people to urban-
centres. 
 
Figure 2: Links among various factors that influence the migration decision. 
Source: Authors own draft based on findings from field survey and secondary literature. 
 
People also make migratory decisions for socio-economic reasons. But then 
again, an area’s socio-economic conditions often worsen due to climatic shocks, 
whether sudden or gradual. For example, interviewees found in the slums 
Labanchara and Sonadanga expressed how they had been forced to migrate to 
their current location due to cyclone Aila and the consequent irrecoverable losses 
in economic activities. They noted how they had taken out loans from local 
money lenders so as to establish and carry on their main sources of income. 
Borrowing from local moneylenders is quite a normal scenario in rural areas of 
Bangladesh, due to the availability of this type of financing and the fact there is 
less paper work than there is in banks and other financial institutions. However, 
when Aila caused irreparable damage to their primary sources of income, these 
people were no longer able to repay the moneylenders and had no choice but to 
‘escape’. In the words of the interviewees, ‘ki koire mukh dekhabo, taka diti 
parini’, which means that they were ashamed of being a loan defaulter. When 
people become loan defaulters, this adds social pressure to the economic ones, 
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since their status quos have been interrupted. Both factors contributed equally to 
making the decision to migrate, to escape both social and economic pressures, 
and these factors were largely influenced by Aila a climatic event. 
In addition to socio-economic conditions being intensified by environmental 
ones, many other factors also heavily influence the migration decision. For ex-
ample, the demographic pressure exerted on people who are victims of a climatic 
event pushes them out of their places of origin. At the same time, they are main-
ly pulled by the availability of work and support from relatives who live in near-
by cities. Both of these factors work in conjunction to influence the migration 
decisions of populations affected by environmental events. While migration may 
be ‘one of the fundamental choices to be made’ (Collins 2013, p. 113), the rea-
sons for so doing are complex and interconnected. Thus, the decision to migrate 




Identity is an abstract reality; the concept of ‘the self’ is the generic definition of 
the term. Identity evolves and takes on various roles in people’s lives, in relation 
to particular points of reference. Being a perceived sense of existence, identity is 
fluid in nature and thus changes in form. The displacements that take place 
chiefly because of environmental shocks can create a unique base of identity for 
a migrant population, and this is the main premise of this study. 
 
The need for a distinctive identity 
Environmental events can trigger displacements, either internally or across bor-
ders. Fieldwork shows similar traits of human mobility, as discussed earlier. 
While scholars, such as Myers (2002), emphasise that there is growing concern 
for a group of people around the world who face forced displacements due to 
environmental problems, findings from fieldwork suggest that environmentally 
induced migrants identify themselves as being different from the slums’ non-
migrants, who are mostly land owners. When asked if he felt any different here, 
one of the respondents replied, 
 
‘Where will we go? We have lost everything there [previous living place]. Now this has 
become our home. They [the land owners] help us more or less, we survive this way’ 
(Interview with Abdul Momin, Rupsha slum, 30 October, 2016). 
 
In another interview, one of the interviewees, Shefali, expressed how she felt 
different from the native dwellers. She also expressed how she felt ‘connected’ 
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to those who migrated from Koyra (a sub-district of Bangladesh), her native 
land, due to cyclone Aila. She said, 
 
‘We are all the same. Most of us [tenants] have come here after the ‘big storm’ [cyclones 
like Aila, Sidr etc.]. They [native dwellers] helped us live here, but we have to pay them. 
We live here but they own it’ (Interview with Shefali, Rupsha slum, 30 October, 2016).  
 
Such case studies show how people develop an understanding of their existence 
in relation to those who are not subject to the same challenges, in these cases 
being forced to migrate due to environmental events. Climatic events are by no 
means the sole drivers of displacement, be it internal or external; rather, these 
events work as catalysts that aggravate existing problems and, hence, cause 
mobility (Kartiki 2011). Likewise, in Bangladesh, people who are internally 
displaced, due to various environmental catastrophes, are a cause for concern. 
 
Table 1: Sense of the self: present and level of concentration. 
Slums Sense Type: Strong » Less Concentration of Migrants 
   
Rupsha Individual Least 
Labanchara Group » Individual High 
Sonadanga Individual » Group 
 
Moderate 
Source: Authors, 2016. 
 
Table 1 shows that in, Rupsha slum, migrants were inclined toward feeling a 
sense of the individual. In Labanchara slum, interviewees noted a strong prevail-
ing sense of feeling togetherness as a group and a weaker sense of the individual. 
Migrants in Sonadanga slum felt more individualistic in type and had a more 
moderate awareness of sameness, but their group feeling was still somewhat 
prevalent. One of the reasons for the interviewees expressing such a differentia-
tion of senses was the concentration of migrant groups in those slums. Whereas 
in Labanchara slum, there was a high concentration of homes of such groups, it 
was obvious that the sense of being the same as a group was stronger than for 
being part of another type. The opposite was true for Rupsha slum, while re-
spondents in Sonadanga slum showed a varied view of leaning toward both de-
scriptions. These findings also suggest the growing need to recognise the move-
ments of these migrants so it becomes easier and less confusing to conceptualise 
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and identify them. In a personal communication, Mitu Akter, a 19-year-old girl 
living in Sonadanga slum, expressed her feelings toward people her same age 
and explained why she liked to spend more time with those who had migrated 
from the same place of origin as she had. Here, she showed a feeling of same-
ness that was based on the migration context and the similar locality of origin. 
She termed these migrants as ‘nijer lowk’ to point out the type of connection she 
felt toward them. This is a unique finding that shows why identity creation for 
such groups is significant. 
Table 2 presents an overall picture of migrant’s understanding of the type of 
senses people hold in terms of whether they are the same or different in relation 
to their different contexts. This is a manifestation of the types of identity group 
or individual found among the migrants in the study. The relational references 
here play a role in the elements of identity that are described in the study’s con-
ceptual framework. 
 
Table 2: Differences in perceptions and related cause, according to age group. 
Age groups Perception type In relation to 
   
> 20  Mostly collective Same age group 
20-30 Individual, if not 
undecided 




Social networking, relatives  
40<  Mostly individual, 
overlaps 
Sources of income, assets, social 
strata 
Source: Field Survey, 2016. 
 
Sense of place and the self 
The empirical findings from the three slums within the city area of Khulna sug-
gest that Khulna is the first choice among coastal residents because it is the near-
est urban area in the event of a climatic disaster, such as cyclones Aila and Sidr. 
While conducting the fieldwork, these particular city slums were chosen based 
on the concentration of migrants who had faced such displacements. The field-
work findings show that most of the migrants who had to relocate to these slums, 
due to environmental catastrophes such as a cyclone, flood, excessive salinity 
and such, wished to remain in their current dwelling locality and had developed 
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a ‘sense of place’ (Relph 1976). One of the interviewees showed his sense of 
connectedness when he said: 
 
‘We have lost everything there. This place has become our home now’ (interview with 
Abdul Momin, Rupsha slum, 30th October, 2016). 
 
In terms of the findings in the literature, similar observations were also made 
during this study’s fieldwork. The sense of place grows over time. Abdul Momin 
referred to himself in relation to his current locality. His social identity became 
centred around that place of living. At the same time, when asked, he noted that 
the place provided him with a point of recognition. Thus, in nature, the interac-
tions are two way. Similarly, scholars such as Hauge (2007) emphasised that the 
interdependent relationship between the place and the people narrates as a unit 
that centres the reciprocal influence between the people and the place. Place is 
also seen as a product of its physical attributes, human conceptions, and the 
activities that take place there, as termed by Canter (1997). The migrants’ feel-
ings of being at home, otherwise known as rootedness (Hauge 2007), which they 
had developed over time in relation to their current dwelling places and the local 
environment indicated that their had taken on a sense of place a positive feeling 
for the locality they were currently in. Scholars have termed this positive psyche 
as having a place identity (Proshansky et al. 1983). When people show signs of 
recognising themselves in relation to the physical place they are located in, they 
are in fact manifesting one of five central functions of place identity (Hauge 
2007). Thus, they attach a socio-cultural meaning to their physical environment. 
Figure 3 shows that after migration, interactions between the people and the 
place become significant to the process of identity-making. Over time, these 
interactions help migrants grow attachments and assign significance to the places 
to which they have migrated. The place refers to the socio-cultural meanings 
people attach to it in relation to the physical environment and then there emerges 
the identity people attach to the place or the place identity they establish 
(Proshansky et al. 1983). 
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Figure 3: Identity-making process through interactions between place and 
people over time. 
Source: Authors own draft, based on findings from a field survey and secondary literature, 
2016.  
 
Migrants also develop a sense of sameness that is based on various criteria. 
These criteria include similar migratory conditions, places of origin, the similari-
ty of events for which they had chosen to migrate, and so on. During informal 
conversations in the fieldwork, informants noted how their relocation had 
changed their lifestyles and livelihoods, along with how they had been treated 
once they had migrated after the two climatic events. One such respondent, 
Motahar, age 33, had owned land and run a business back ‘home’ (he referred to 
his original location as the home from where he had to migrate to the current 
location). After Aila which was a devastating cyclone he and his family were 
forced to relocate because of decreasing business conditions and being trapped 
by loans. In the slum where he was residing, he had relatives who had been liv-
ing there for a long time prior to his and his family’s relocation. After the envi-
ronmental event, he got in touch with these relatives and made the decision to 
relocate to secure his family’s livelihood and children’s education and, thus, 
their future. He felt at home there, at the time of the study, after having lived 
there ‘all these years’. He also felt a connectedness to those who had also mi-
grated under similar conditions to his. In his words, his relatives made it feel 
more like home for him, since he mentioned them as ‘nijer jon’. 
Migration experts, such as Massey et al. (1993), point out that social network 
theory is one of the prime theories of migration used to describe different aspects 
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of migration. In the cases discussed in this study, this theory seems to have 
served more significantly over the other theories presented in the literature. In 
the above case, the family had sought social networks in an urban area, with a 
view to migrating from the affected zone. Once they were settled, they began the 
process of blending in with the original non-migrant slum dwellers. Yet, there 
remained a clear distinction between these two groups migrants and non-migrant 
slum dwellers. When asked, a non-migrant household could easily pinpoint a 
migrant household by referring to the event that had forced them to migrate. 
Even though the two groups did not hold to any noticeable identity crisis, during 
the informal interviews it would be interesting to know whether this came from 
the migrants themselves or whether the original community members sensed this 
need. In addition, the forced migrants also recognised themselves as a unit 
against the ‘other’ and had developed a sense of being a group-self, which indi-




‘PEOPLE OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT ’ 
 
During the fieldwork, it was evident that the migrants that had been displaced 
mainly due to environmental factors were in a disadvantageous position relative 
to the local (non-migrant) inhabitants. This does not mean that there were no 
interventions in local and international forms of assistance; rather, the issue for 
these migrants was the insufficiency in the lack of a proper and distinctive iden-
tity. Dim and Gemenne (2008) urged for a need for a definition of a term that 
could be used to conceptualise the issue of identity in an effective way. Another 
insufficiency was housing and land or homeownership. For such migrants, hous-
ing is particularly challenging. In informal discussions with the slum dwellers, it 
was made clear that their right to land had been degraded due to being treated as 
‘homeless’, as being seen as such by the land and homeowners of the localities 
they had migrated to. In general, this homelessness status may be implicit in 
nature but it becomes evident when it comes to receiving any aid, especially 
from non-governmental organisations. This also creates a sphere of political 
power where the landowners play the deciding role in determining who gets 
what type of facility. The senses of insideness and outsideness (Relph 1976) are 
simultaneously functional in the psyche of both groups of inhabitants. Landown-
ers generally have an influential presence over those to whom they rent their 
houses but more so if the tenant is a migrant. Regarding tenants, even though 
they are seen as being in the same group, they heavily differ in relation to their 
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stay time and migratory status. Therefore, tenants who are not migrants seem to 
enjoy greater status in the social hierarchy. In any case, the findings of this study 
note that migrants were the least-preferred group to be sanctioned assistance. For 
example, some of the migrants (who wished to remain unnamed) stated that they 
were not accepted for reasonably sized loans because they did not own any land 
or a house. ‘Bariwalarai sob pabi. Amager to bari nei, tai hreen daei na’, which 
translates to ‘people of such forced displacement within or across a boundary, 
are mostly left with the fewest number of opportunities to return to their original 
homes’ (Myers and Kent 1995). Hence, they encounter higher degrees of social 
discrimination, which in the case of housing and land-owning, becomes more 
visibly noticeable. They seem to belong to no eligible group (Keane 2004) of 
migrants that can receive specialised assistance after being forcefully displaced 
and have no clear identifiable term with which to be labelled. 
Migration scholars heavily contest environmentalists’ use of the term ‘envi-
ronmental refugees’ for dislocated groups of people; they argue that in interna-
tional law the term ‘refugee’ is specifically defined to include a group that does 
not fit the group under discussion (Martin 2013). Dun and Gemenne (2008) 
argue that this recognition is an unavoidable fact in the case of providing such 
migrants with appropriate assistance. The conceptualisation of such migrants 
also requires that a crucial step be taken to establish a precise identity (Dun and 
Gemenne 2008). This study finds likewise: there is a need for a distinctive cate-
gorisation for people who are displaced due to environmental events. The litera-
ture indicates the necessity of expanding the existing definitions (Dun and Ge-
menne 2008; Kartiki 2011; Martin 2013) and of incorporating these terminolo-
gies into a policy framework that prioritises and identifies those in need of ade-
quate and appropriate assistance. To effectively address the future flow of such 
migrants, scholarly works should also signify the need for a distinctive identifi-
cation both for migration and for policy-making. Despite the absence of a full-
scale manifestation of the impact of climate events on migration, many argue for 
the prediction of migratory behaviour, to some degree, by analysing the impact 
of the effects of past environmental events on human migration (Reuveny 2007). 
Drawing on instances of mobility cases in Bangladesh, Joardar and Miller (2013) 
show that the type of migration, whether permanent or temporary, depends on 
many factors, such as migrants receiving appropriate assistance immediately 
after an environmental event as these migrants are more likely to be permanent 
in nature. McMillan (2015) argues that as climate change is thought to have 
substantially contributed to increasing human mobility, it will influence the scale 
and nature of future human displacements. Fieldwork findings suggest similar 
traits. 




This research has contributed to a deeper understanding of how environmentally 
induced migration takes place and how the people who migrate perceive the 
process in line with where they stand in the conceptual framework of environ-
mental migration. Two principal factors are the key points of focus here: the 
migration decision and the identity of an environmental migrant. On one front, 
the migration decision that is due to environmental shocks or hazards is hardly a 
separate event; rather, it is a complex mixture of interrelated variables that are 
socio-economic, demographic, political and environmental. On another front, 
once the migration decision is taken and the movement has been completed, the 
new place and people act as points of comparison and recognition for these mi-
grants. These points give them a meaning that is one of both outsideness and 
insideness (Relph 1976). Eventually their interactions with the entire environ-
ment define what they understand about themselves and help them form new 
identities. Experts are concerned that the environment and its changes are play-
ing significant roles in creating a type of human mobility that will become more 
complex than it already is. Findings from the study’s fieldwork, though limited 
in context, also show this fact. People who face this type of mobility must un-
dergo numerous changes and adjustments on various levels, starting from socio-
cultural to individual ones. Nevertheless, until policy-makers properly recognise 
and acknowledge this group (Arnall and Kothari 2015), these migrants will al-
ways be in a constant situation of deterioration, given the catastrophes that are 
expected to be brought about by future environmental events. This study 
acknowledges the fact that the spatial scope for this study makes it difficult to 
get an overall idea on the questions being searched for, since the fieldwork was 
conducted locally. Despite the limitations, scholars have agreed on and note that 
the number people affected by climatic events is big enough to count as a sepa-
rate migratory process, though it is not yet being added. Therefore, this study 
could also be conducted in some other countries so as to cross-check and vali-
date the responses and overall scenarios pertaining to the research questions. 
Moreover, a transboundary research may reveal even more interesting aspects of 
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Chapter 8: Heat-Stress-Related  
Climate-Change Adaptation  
in Informal Urban Communities 






Climate change is affecting human settlements, worldwide, to different degrees 
of severity. The mutual relationship between climate change and urban forms 
and urban development are subject to scholarly and applied discourse. Heat 
stress, in particular, is understood to be aggravated by non-climatic stresses that 
are linked to urbanisation and those that make cities hotspots of risks and disas-
ter (Wamsler 2008), thereby intensifying the existing vulnerabilities of urban 
populations. Hence, this chapter’s main question: What are the connections be-
tween adapting to climate change and housing and community involvement, 
particularly in informal urban areas? 
This chapter aims to shed some understanding on how knowledge adds up 
and becomes beneficial for co-beneficial interventions. To achieve this objective, 
the chapter focuses on a recent theoretical discourse on the type of heat stress 
that is linked to housing and informal settlements. The chapter1 opens with a 
section dedicated to the impacts of climate change that are linked to housing, 
 
1 This chapter draws its initial motivation and ideas from the author’s master’s thesis 
research from 2013, which is linked to the discourse on community-level climate-
change adaptation in urban areas, particularly in informal settlements in arid regions 
(Laue 2013). The discussion builds on selected reflections from the author’s disserta-
tion and an additional literature review. 
190 | Franziska Laue 
 
including some findings and conclusions of the Working Group II (WGII) of the 
IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (AR5) 2014, on risk and adaptation in urban 
areas. 
Recent conclusions on an ongoing Egyptian discourse on climate adaptation 
and housing are referred to, followed by reflections on climate risks within the 
GCR. Here, the phenomenon of urban informality in Egypt is discussed along-
side how an increase in knowledge has linked climate-change adaptation in the 
context of housing to the possibilities for dealing with heat as one climate-
related stress. More precisely, a case study of the settlement of Ezzbet El-Nasr 
will illustrate efforts to introduce adaptation measures into an informal urban 
community, based on descriptions of a project undertaken by the German devel-
opment agency GIZ’s2 participatory development programme (PDP 2017). Then 
the chapter will present complementary findings from the author’s semi-
structured interviews, mappings and observations in the community as part of 
the post-graduate findings from a 2013 case study of Ezzbet El-Nasr. The final 




CLIMATE-CHANGE ADAPTATION AND HOUSING 
 
Climate adaptation is identified as one response to the impacts of climate change 
and is complementary to mitigation3 (IPCC 2007; WBGU 2016). The Interna-
tional Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate adaptations as a ‘process 
of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects’ (IPCC 2014, p.1758). 
In order to pinpoint adaptive options and capacities, vulnerabilities are identified 
via three factors: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity to a climatic stress 
(Dreyfus 2015; IPCC 2014). The German Advisory Council on Global Change 
(WBGU) notes that adaptation to climate change is one of the five fields with the 
‘biggest potential leverage effects for urban transformation toward sustainabil-
ity’ (WBGU 2016, p.11). 
Adaptation is achievable across scales and through varying strategies that 
can contribute to resilience. However, one strand of scholars regard adaptation as 
‘intensely local’ (Huq et al. 2007, p.1), thus potentially playing a crucial role 
along with national and regional strategies. The scope and extent of climate-
 
2 GIZ refers to the German development cooperation entity, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, which is active in Egypt. 
3 Mitigation refers to reducing harmful anthropogenic emissions (IPCC 2014, p.1769). 
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adaptation measures depend on their size and focus. Moreover, the ability to 
adapt is highly dependent on financial and administrative capacities, which vary 
significantly (Moser and Satterthwaite 2008). 
Intensive research on climate-change adaptation evolved between the 1980s 
and the 2000s. Before the Brundtland Report (1987) was released, adaptation 
was a secondary subject on the international climate-change agenda (Ayers and 
Forsyth 2009; Klein 2002; Smit et al. 2000), yet it gained “standing within the 
international climate change arena” (Ayers and Forsyth 2009, p.25) with each 
subsequent assessment report the IPCC released. The IPCC’s 2007 Working 
Group II report (WGII) intensively reviewed the subject of adaptation and its 
interrelations with mitigation (IPCC 2007; Klein 2002). With regards to cities 
and urbanisation, strategic and scholarly discourse on adaptation has become 
increasingly relevant (Dreyfus 2018), yet the authors of WGII for the AR5 syn-
thesis report on climate change stress the persistent lack of attention being paid 
to urban adaptation (in contrast to mitigation) by national governments (IPCC 
2014). Moreover, for some cities, adaptation seemingly remains an unclear mod-
el and the knowledge gap between decision-makers and scientists is notable 
(IPCC 2014). 
Housing and climate-change adaptation are increasingly relevant, crosscut-
ting topics within academic (Dodman 2009; Hunt and Watkiss 2010; Huqet et al. 
2007) and strategic discourse. Concerning the latter, the authors of WGII on 
‘Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ within the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Re-
port (AR5), dedicated chapter eight in particular to urban areas (IPCC 2014, pp. 
535-612). This chapter compiles analyses, case studies, and definitions of proba-
bilities of benefitting from a more nuanced understanding of these linkages, 
based on the increased availability and diversity of the relevant literature (Drey-
fus 2015; IPCC 2014). A large scientific community has validated the report’s 
conclusions (e.g., Beattie and McGuire 2019). Chapter eight not only comprises 
subsections on urban risks associated with housing but it also mentions extreme 
heat as a particular challenge for housing (IPCC 2014, p. 569). Hence, housing is 
referred to as being ‘often the major part of the infrastructure affected by disas-
ters’ (IPCC 2014, p. 559). Yet, simultaneously, housing is mentioned as a key 
sector for adaptation (IPCC 2014, p. 568). 
When looking at case studies on adaptations to extreme heat, however, the 
report acknowledges that the literature and examples still predominantly refer to 
high-income nations and consequently calls for more discourse and practice in 
low- and middle-income nations (IPCC 2014). Furthermore, urban settlements in 
low- and middle-income countries, especially those facing a combination of 
rapid urbanisation and migration (Dreyfus 2015), are expected to face climate-
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change impacts more immediately and severely (Moser and Satterthwaite 2008). 
Housing’s exposure to climatic stresses, whether rapid or slow onset, creates 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities at the local level (Figure 1), yet differ across 
communities as the impact of climate change on housing is tendentially linked to 
socio-economic constraints (Bazrkar et al. 2015). Particularly neglected or con-
tested are historical areas, informal settlements, and low-income communities, 
which may face higher vulnerabilities (Dreyfus 2015). Accordingly, more atten-
tion is given to evidence-based research, vulnerability studies and the identifica-
tion of adaptation measures as the topic of discourse moves toward identifying 
adaptive capacities and adaptation measures (IPCC 2014) on social, physical and 
urban scales. 
 
Climate change and urban informality 
 
The intersection between climate change and informally developed urban areas 
over the past decade is becoming the subject of research, development coopera-
tion and local initiatives. Moreover, two global agendas, the 2015 ‘Paris Climate 
Agreement’ and the 2016 ’New Urban Agenda’ recently and explicitly intersect-
ed with regard to climate action. In its chapter entitled ‘Urban Areas’, the 
IPCC’s AR5 WGII refers to informal settlements as being particularly vulnera-
ble to amplified climate risks (IPCC 2014, p. 538; Moser and Satterthwaite 
2009) and as having some or ‘very little adaptive capacity or resilience/ “bounce 
back” capacity’ (IPCC 2014, p. 546). Climate issues related to informal settle-
ments are also mentioned within the key risk matrix for urban settlements, under 
‘livelihoods’ and ‘poverty and access to basic services’ (IPCC 2014, p. 562). 
The increased vulnerability that is linked to the causes and effects of rapid 
urbanisation (Bazrkar et al. 2015) is also correlated with the ‘changing dimen-
sions of migration’ (IPCC 2014, p.552). For instance, increasing temperatures 
are discussed in relation to the changing availability of local resources and eco-
nomic (agricultural) activities; i.e., in rural areas, temperature increases result in 
migration (Raleigh et al. 2008) toward more economically advantageous loca-
tions, typically toward cities (see also Mukaddim et al. in this book on climate-
related migration). This forces individuals to permanently relocate, thereby gain-
ing access to affordable housing mainly in underserviced and informal neigh-
bourhoods and communities. This is communicated by the IPCC’s AR5 as part 
of a discussion on ‘spatiality and temporal dimensions’ (IPCC 2014, p.551), 
creating a ‘dynamic quality of risk’ (IPCC 2014, p.552) for housing and urban 
informality. As recommended by the IPCC (2014) and Magali Dreyfus (2015), 
adaptation strategies will need to consider the impact of climate on migration 
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and the consequent stress on housing. Consequently, AR5 continues to refer to 
informal settlements being locations where adaptive strategies and measures can 
be linked to the above-mentioned key risks, with the help of community-based 
case studies (Pelling in IPCC 2014, p.566); the IPCC also suggests stakeholders 
in informal areas engage in risk assessment and in fostering adaptive action 




Community-based adaptation (CBA) refers to a localised and people-centred 
approaches to adaptation (Dreyfus 2015) in responses to climate risks that capi-
talise on local and social capital so as to build adaptive capacities (IPCC 2014). 
Moreover, the CBA approach is considered the ‘only means of responding to 
risk’ for a significant part of households living in informal urban areas (IPCC 
2014, p.563). The IPCC AR5 WGII elaborates on CBA, recommending that a 
broad range of community actors and planners engage in the planning and im-
plementation process for adaptation (IPCC 2014, p.580). Here, the IPCC is refer-
ring to experience gained in previous practice and also to scholarly work 
throughout the past decade, for instance by Satterthwaite, Dodman, Pelling, 
Mitlin, and Jabareen (IPCC 2014, p.581). References were made to successful 
CBA cases in Africa and Asia (see for example IPCC 2014, p.566). The case 
study in this chapter will illustrate the initiation and work of the CBA inside an 
informal urban community in the Greater Cairo Region. 
 
 
CLIMATE-CHANGE ADAPTATION IN URBAN EGYPT  
AND THE GREATER CAIRO REGION 
 
Egypt’s decision-makers have acknowledged climate change on both national 
and regional levels (EEAA 2016) and within development cooperation agencies 
and local communities (PDP 2018). Climatic stresses and sensitivities affecting 
the country are complex and linked to the following particular geographical 
settings. Egypt’s most fertile areas stretch along the Nile and its tributaries, 
which cover 45 (OECD 2004, p.14) to 56% of the total land mass, mainly 
Egypt’s desert land area. Yet, this land provides about 95% of the country’s 
entire water needs and most of its agricultural production (EEAA 2016, p.112). 
All of Egypt’s major urban centres, with their industries and commercial activi-
ties, are located along a narrow strip of land that runs along the banks of the 
Nile, thus, putting stress on the country’s water resources and its coastal zones 
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(Agravala et al. in OECD 2004, p.14; OECD 2010). The IPCC’s AR5 states that 
Egypt will face further reductions in rainfall amounts (IPCC 2014, p.1210).  
 
Figure 1: Sensitivities and vulnerabilities on the city and community levels – the 
example of Cairo. 
Source: Author, 2019, based on Author, 2013, p.46. 
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To deal with climatic stresses in Egypt, identifying the country’s vulnerabili-
ties to climate change and the need for adaptation has been part of the national 
policy agenda since the early 1990s. With its national communications that com-
prise both mitigation and adaptation (EEAA 2010a, 2016; IDSC 2011, Egypt 
acknowledges that the urban sector is among an increasing number of sectors4 
that are vulnerable to climate change (EEAA 2016). 
On the topic of housing and human settlements, the Egyptian Information 
and Support Centre (IDSC) acknowledges that Egyptian cities are affected by 
extreme heat that is linked to climate change; moreover, this is intensified 
through hot air that is being emitted by buildings that use energy inefficiently 
(IDSC/UNDP 2011, p.92). In Egypt’s Third National Communication, it was 
noted that heat in urban settings is associated with the phenomenon of urban heat 
island (UHI) effects or to a slow-onset heat threat. Particularly concerning is the 
projection of a temperature increase of an average of 3°C by the year 2100 
(EEAA 2016, p.156). This will become a growing burden, particularly in dense 
neighbourhoods (CSC 2013; UNDP 2013); and these will contribute to increased 
energy demands and deteriorating air quality all of which can be exacerbated by 
environmental challenges (Dreyfus 2015).  
This combination will continue to directly affect not only the functioning of 
urban areas but also their residents. Consequently, besides erratic winds and rain 
occurrences (EEAA 2016), (extreme) heat (IPCC 2007) that is linked to impacts 
on human health5 (Chapman et al., in and Strengers 2011, p.493) requires adap-
tation. However, differing prioritisations may occur, based on a settlement’s 
geographical location. For instance, while Egypt’ surban coastline (including 
Alexandria, Port Said) is considered the most vulnerable to climate-change im-
pacts (EEAA 2016; IPCC 2014),6 climate exposure in the GCR, which is located 
along the Nile Delta, is considered to be ‘less dramatic, but nonetheless serious’ 
(Huq et al. 2007, p.1), with its equally complex combination of slow- and rapid-
onset effects and direct and indirect risks, all of which are centred around heat 
(Figure 1). summarizes the various sensitivities (affectedness and responsive-
ness) to heat in the GCR, the specific vulnerabilities city-wide and in neighbour-
hoods and communities (susceptibility to harm), and some existing adaptive 
 
4 Sectors include water resources, tourism, health, bio-diversity (EEAA 2016, p.150 et 
sqq.). 
5 Hotter periods contribute to heat-related mortality (IPCC 2014; Maller and Strengers 
2011; McMichael and Githeko 2001, in McCarthy et al 2001). 
6 Climate change impacts refer to sea-level rise and flooding as a result of erratic 
weather events.  
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capacities (Laue 2013). Combined analyses of climatic and non-climatic stresses 
in cities like the GCR are essential to comprehending the burden on infrastruc-
ture, services, quality of life, and how to contain the potential for increased pov-
erty.7 
 
Housing and climate adaptation in urban Egypt and the Greater 
Cairo Region 
 
In the context of Egypt, housing and climate change are closely interconnected. 
In contrast to previous National Communication Reports8 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Egyptian Environ-
mental Affairs Agency (EEAA), in its Third National Communication (2016), 
elaborated on housing and took a broader perspective, first, with housing being a 
basic human right (EEAA 2016) and, second, by acknowledging the gap be-
tween housing demand and delivery for low- and middle-income groups, which 
has resulted in an informal housing market. In the adaptation section of the 
EEAA’s updated report,9 housing is associated with both housing policies and 
formal and informal urban development (EEAA 2016, p.150). By adding the link 
between housing and climate-change-related exposures (ibid., p.171), it has 
become recognised that low-income and informal communities of the GCR are 
especially affected (CSC 2013). 
 
 
URBAN INFORMALITY IN GREATER CAIRO:  
CATERING TO A MAJORITY 
 
This section looks at informal housing in urban areas in Egypt, particularly in the 
GCR, which developed alongside policy shifts and transformation dynamics 
throughout the 20th century (Wodon et al. 2014). The GCR grapples with com-
plex realities. Historically, it has been an attractive destination for both workers 
and residents, over decades (Madbouly 2009; Batran 1998). It has also experi-
 
7 Non-climatic pressures are administrative centralization, rural-urban migration, high 
natural population growth, changing housing policies, and particularly the liberaliza-
tion of the housing market. 
8 The Second National Communication Report (2010) links housing and climate change 
with increasing temperatures exacerbated by energy emissions, spatial orientation, and 
façade design (EEAA 2010, p.91). 
9 Mitigation measures also refer to housing (EEAA, 2010, p.107 et sqq.). 
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enced natural population growth, declining mortality rates, and increasing pres-
sure on the local housing market, land availability, and natural resources. With 
continuous migration toward urban centres (World Bank 2014), urban and rural 
settings have been dramatically transformed since the 1950s (UNDP 2004). 
Ever-growing urbanisation rates have materialised mostly in the formation of 
informal settlements (Madbouly 2009), such that the formal housing market has 
struggled to meet the demand for affordable housing.10 Madbouly (2009) de-
scribes how housing in Egypt, in particular, has been a dichotomic topic for 
decades. 
The gradual formation of Cairo’s informal urban areas, predominantly 
termed as ‘ashwa’iyat’ in the Arabic language, can be traced back to at least the 
1960s (UN-Habitat 2003, p.206). Their development is a result of complex and 
historic policy decisions, a dynamic housing market and population growth over 
decades, and economic and regional pressures. Whereas new cities were built 
within Cairo’s greater metropolitan region, informal settlements significantly 
extended the existing urban fabric to accommodate the city’s growing population 
and to contribute to an anticipated stable economic situation or to improve in-
comes. In 2000, informal urban settlements in and around Cairo covered over 94 
square kilometres (UN-Habitat 2013, p.3) of the GCR’s approximately 600-700 
square kilometres (UN-Habitat 2011, p.xix ff.), or 13.4 % of the city’s land 
mass. 
These informal urban areas constitute a considerable and undeniable part of 
the GCR’s11 urban reality, both economically and spatially. The first recognition 
of informal communities and the initial reactive measures took place from 1974 
to 1985 (UN-Habitat 2003), mainly through policies aimed to prevent encroach-
ment on and the urbanisation of agricultural land. Since then, Egypt’s informal 
settlements were the subject of various reports, action guides and international 
exposure (UN-Habitat 2003, 2015; PDP 2011; Davis 2006). The UN-Habitat 
report ‘The Challenge of Slums’ includes Cairo as a case study (UN-Habitat 
2003). Furthermore, the Egyptian uprising of January 25, 2011, augmented in-
habitants’ call for improved quality of life “for deprived people who were suffer-
 
10 Egypt continuously suffers less from an overall undersupply of affordable housing but 
more from a mismatch between the demand and supply of affordable housing and 
locations, thereby resulting in inhabitants missing out on the security of property 
rights (EEAA 2016). 
11 About 65% (Al-Gohari 2010, p.5; UN-Habitat 2011, p.xx] to 70% (GTZ 2009, p.15) 
or around 18 million (GIZ 2018) of Cairo’s inhabitants lived in informal settlements 
in 2006. 
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ing from bad living conditions” (Hassan 2012, p.9). Some communities, such as 
Miit ‘Uqba (2011), developed initiatives to improve their communities, based on 
self-mobilisation and creating networks to external non-governmental actors. 
Informal areas12 progressively became subject to rights advocacy and support 
from urban activists and organisations, which contributed to adjusted responses 
in policy revisions and administration, resulting in the creation of urban upgrad-
ing units within the Cairo government and a shift from ‘prevention’ to ‘upgrad-
ing’ (Abouelmagd 2014). With their great socio-economic and morphological 
complexity, these informal areas continue to be the subjects of researching grad-
uate and post-graduate work and in design projects across a number of disci-
plines (e.g. Khalifa 2011; Kipper and Fischer 2009; Shehayeb 2009). Conse-
quently, these areas provide illustrations of increased knowledge, changing prac-
tices and ongoing, decades-long exchanges on topics related to housing and 
climate change (Cluster 2018a; Kipper and Fischer 2009; Singerman 2006). The 
related contemporary housing and planning discourse (Madbouly 2009) remains 
a topic of interest to scholars in the Global North and South, urban practitioners, 
advocates, and artists throughout the past decade.13 
The research on environmental and climate action gained momentum during 
the 2000s and 2010s, becoming linked with informal urban settlements and, 
particularly, with community mobilisation (Miit ‘Uqba, Tadamun – Cairo Urban 
Solidarity Initiative 2013) and cultural exchange (i.e., newly created art space 
like El-Lewa community). Around 2012, the particular connection between heat 
(including urban heat islands, UHI) and informal urban development became not 
only the subject to research (German Egyptian Research Fund / Science and 
Technology Development Fund – GERF/STDF)14 but was also assessed to be-
come subject to an innovative approach within development cooperation, with 
GIZ dedicating a strand of its local PDP programme in the GCR portfolio (PDP 
2018; Verner 2012). After an extensive vulnerability study and participatory 
needs assessment, a number of affiliated consultants (Plan + Risk Consult) de-
veloped an initial catalogue of suggested interventions (Lückenkötter et al. 2016) 
– these are illustrated below. Subsequently, a number of projects were commis-
 
12 Along with deteriorated central urban areas. 
13 This includes the continuous work throughout the decade by Manal Batran, Yehya 
Shawkat, Marwa Khalifa, and Nezar Al Sayyad. 
14 In the context of dry urban areas, three to nine areas became the subjects of research 
(German Egyptian Research Fund / Science and Technology Development Fund –
GERF/STDF) and the locations of projects for adaptation (UNDP, GIZ PDP). 
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sioned for up to six informal urban communities, some of which were imple-
mented between 2016 and 2018.15 
 
 
FROM ADAPTIVE CAPACITIES TO ADEQUATE MEASURES  
IN EZZBET EL-NASR, GREATER CAIRO REGION  
 
This case study briefly illustrates efforts that were linked to identifying adaptive 
capacities and community adaptation measures in an informal community, 
namely Ezzbet El-Nasr, which is located in the GCR. GIZ and its partners from 
the EEAA, and the Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities (GIZ 
2017) selected this urban community to be one of the first to implement commu-
nity-based adaptation measures under the PDP programme’s sub-component 
‘Climate-Change Adaptation in Informal Settlements Physical Change (retrofit-
ting) for Adaptation to Heat Stress’ (PDP 2017). 
Ezzbet El-Nasr evolved in 1977 and consolidated as a community with a 
population of approximately 60,000 inhabitants (UMP 2010, p.31) through peo-
ple continuously squatting on state-owned land and the increasing influx of resi-
dents throughout the subsequent decades (Figure 2). Since then, the legal status 
of the land has been pending, leaving the area underserviced. Being located in no 
particular disaster-prone area, the community struggles particularly with heat 
stress and the UHI effect. Ezzbet El-Nasr faces non-climate-related pressures 
within its built environments as it lacks basic urban services and faces ecological 
challenges due to nearby tanneries and a waste disposal site. Along with eco-
nomic and social challenges, these contribute to the lack of adaptive capacities 
and, hence, the community’s potential overall vulnerability toward the impacts 
of climate change. During the initial assessment, in 2012, the community’s lim-
ited awareness of any climate-change impacts was reported in the Participatory 
needs Assessment (PNA) by CDS, consultants commissioned by GIZ. In inter-
views with some of the inhabitants, no specific associations were made with the 
term “climate change”, yet those interviewed16 referred to the increasing heat 
 
15 The Egyptian platform ‘Cluster’, commissioned by GIZ in partnership with 
RISE/AUC, implements urban interventions, including urban shading, façade paint-
ing, and green roofs in Saqiyat Mikki, MasakenJazirat al-Dahab and Giza (Cluster 
2018b). 
16 About 62% of respondents in the baseline study (2013: 146) and all interviewed 
households. 
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and the sun’s intensity as the strongest overall weather-related pressures on the 
area (CDS 2013, p.48). 
An initial assessment of Ezzbet El-Nasr identified the community’s susceptibili-
ties and adaptive capacities. Following this, vulnerability studies, (on-site and 
desktop) baseline studies, and a participatory needs assessment were conducted 
so as to formulate community-based interventions. 
In 2013, the author of this chapter complemented these findings with semi-
structured interviews, visits to the interviewees’ dwellings and conversations 
with household members about the level of thermal comfort inside different 
rooms of their homes. Accordingly, household members had previously altered 
parts of their houses to improve the microclimate (see Figure 3), taking various 
forms of pragmatic action on a smaller scale. 
 
Figure 2: Location of Ezzbet El-Nasr inside the Greater Cairo Region. 
Source: Author, 2013. 
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Figure 3: Pre-project coping and adaptation measures in Ezzbet El-Nasr inside 
the Greater Cairo Region. 
Source: Author, 2013. 
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For example, to relieve households from heat, the majority of those inter-
viewed mentioned wearing lighter coloured clothing and using fans (CDS 2013), 
which can be described as autonomous coping measures. Other households ad-
justed the size and locations of windows (CDS 2013), which could be described 
as low level ‘autonomous adaptation’ as coined by Malik et al. (2010). Yet, fi-
nancial constraints were common challenges for most households, and this pre-
vented investments in physical and spatial adjustments to deal with heat (CDS 
2013). Subsequent to this, the author developed a catalogue of adaptation 
measures (Figure 4) that could potentially support the community’ spatial, phys-
ical and social organisation. The catalogue lists ten ‘soft’ (behavioural and or-
ganisational) and 32 ‘hard’ (urban and physical) measures (Laue 2013). Most of 
these measures correspond to recommendations compiled in the IPCC’s AR5 
section of the WGII, including architectural and urban options for passive cool-
ing, creating thermal mass, shading, green and white roofs, and green infrastruc-
tures, (IPCC 2014, pp.566-575). 
From the above-mentioned catalogue, the PDP project consultants 
(Plan+Risk Consult) selected 15 measures to consider in a further feasibility 
study, with each measure being assessed for its co-beneficial qualities (Lücken-
kötter et al. 2016)17 and the potential prevention of an overall maladaptation 
(IPCC 2014). This corresponds to the IPCC’s WGII, within its AR5 recommen-
dations on creating co-benefits in urban adaptation, particularly when selecting 
options that foster incremental change and sustainable transformation (IPCC 
2014). With regards to prioritising and implementing co-beneficial measures, the 
PDP project in Ezzbet El-Nasr illustrates that process. Since then, the PDP pro-
ject has grown and continues to conduct its activities on-site and other communi-
ties.18 
As of 2017, nine small-scale development measures (pilot-measures) have 
been selected for implementation. In 2018, four architectural measures were 
realised in partnership with NGOs and private local businesses (PDP 2017). 
Three physical measures included street shading, wall greening and rooftop 
farming; others included capacity development and awareness-raising pro-
grammes on both the community and local administrative levels (PDP 2017). 
 
 
17 Measures can be affiliated to four adaptation options or policies. These include ‘no-
regret options’, ‘low-regret-options’, ‘win-win options’ and ‘flexible management op-
tions’, as coined by UKCIP (2007, p. 15). 
18 This includes Masaken Geziret El-Dahab. 
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Figure 4: Suggested measures listed in the catalogue for Ezzbet El-Nasr. 
Source: Author, 2013. 
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Community-based solutions – The role of participation 
 
As described above, in the initial phase of the PDP project extensive studies and 
interviews were conducted inside the community. It was thought that this pro-
gramme could build on the previous experience of other community initiatives19 
that were already active in Ezzbet El-Nasr yet were not explicitly linked to cli-
mate-change adaptation. Hence, the community already knew about the external 
actors’ involvement. In this case, intermediate and external local actors or cham-
pions helped to build a bridge between the community, the external partners and 
the assistance. 
To initiate and, more importantly, maintain successful community-based soft 
and hard measures, the process, scope and success of the PDP seemed to be 
highly dependent on involving the local community in all of its segments. This 
included building trust and involving individuals who could potentially act as 
champions or drivers to mobilise various groups to join in on the inclusive par-
ticipatory processes. 
 
From within – The aspect of community 
As was suggested above, when speaking of interventions on the local level, 
community involvement plays a crucial role. The success of these types of initia-
tives inherently requires active contributions from community members, particu-
larly when identifying actors (internally or with input from outside), discussing 
issues, ideas and processes, and making decisions on needed measures. 
The term ‘participation’ carries with it various interpretations and types 
(Arnstein 1969; Piffero 2009), yet commonalities include the indisputable aim 
(from within or without a community) to create knowledge, engage and empow-
er community members, and ensure their commitment (Piffero in GTZ 2009) to 
influencing processes that are designed for their benefit (Piffero 1995). Referring 
to Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ concept (1969), community participation 
is preferably beyond technocratic measures and administrative dominance. Arn-
stein (1969) also argues for involving the local community in a genuine process 
of improvement, thereby creating a sense of ownership, in a process that empha-
sises the ladder’s upper rungs (avoiding the lower rungs, such as manipulation) 
and creating a gradual process from developing ‘partnerships’ to ‘delegated 
powers’ and ‘citizen control’. Hence, linking Arnstein’s reflections on the pro-
cess of community involvement to identifying co-beneficial adaptation measures 
and capacities in Ezzbet El-Nasr, it is evident that the early and close involve-
 
19   For instance, NGOs like ‘Plan International’ and local initiatives. 
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ment of various representatives in the process seems essential. Figure 5 illus-
trates a theoretical reflection on community-driven involvement within a spec-
trum that ranges from a household scale to a district scale, based on the author’s 
observations in Ezzbet El-Nasr. 
 
Figure 5: Levels and degrees of community involvement in Ezzbet El-Nasr. 
Source: Author, 2013. 
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Figure 6: Scenarios for internal and external involvement of the community. 
level. The example of Ezzbet El-Nasr. 
Source: Auhtor, 2019, adjusted from Author, 2013. 
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Community-based efforts to deal with climate change should pay special at-
tention to involving vulnerable or marginalised community members, as this is 
heavily linked to health-related vulnerabilities. Hence, Verner (2013) and the 
UNFCCC (2018) suggest considering gender-specific and value-based ap-
proaches. In the surveys and interviews conducted in Ezzbet El-Nasr (2013), 
female ‘agents’ in particular were identified for becoming active participants in 
the community’s social networks (Laue 2013); that is, to other female communi-
ty members of different ages. Furthermore, children and youth were identified to 
play a crucial role in disseminating practices and awareness into families and 
households. 
This is relevant as each adaptation measure and strategy might require a 
range of actors, depending on how and with whom and in which scope the actor 
is introduced. For example, planting a tree or making interventions at the build-
ing level can be both an individual or collective effort, varying according to 
whom benefits and in what context (see Figure 5 – levels D-J). However, other 
measures, including shared open spaces or soft measures, such as organising 
patrols, require a more complex set of actors. In some regards, this requires input 
and mobilisation from non-community members (i.e., NGOs, academia, value-
based social movements). 
 
In Between – Benefitting from local societal engagement  
and movements 
In addition to increased research interest, there has been a continuous interaction 
and mobilisation between community members’ housing realities, in informal 
urban areas and on community actors, that have resulted in interventions or so-
cial movements. Vincenti (2016, p.135) examined the role of new social forces 
in so-called ‘value-based social movements’ (VSMs) as playing an active role in 
the sustainable transition of post-revolutionary Egypt. Accordingly, these VSMs 
can and do result in collective action in social, political and spatial fields and 
represent the people’s “readiness to individually and collectively construct lived 
alternatives in order to improve their respective communities” (Vincenti 2016, p. 
136); hence, improved livelihoods and housing. In the context of the GCR, ac-
tors that have fostered such movements, so far, have been advocates like the 
‘Shadow Ministry of Housing’ (n.d.), community architects and proponents of 
urban initiatives platforms, such as Urbanics since 2010 (Urbanics 2018), Tada-
mun (Froehlich 2017), and ‘Takween Integrated Community Development’. 
Cooperation and collaboration among non-governmental actors have continued, 
to the date of this publication, and is documented on platforms such as the Cairo 
Urban Initiatives Platform (Cluster 2018a). 
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Moreover, academia also began offering channels for empowering, mobilis-
ing and encouraging local citizens in informal settlements to become involved in 
small- and medium-scale interventions that aim to improve livelihoods and liv-
ing conditions in and around their immediate residential units. One example is 
the ‘Ezbet Project’, which was initiated by an academic staff member at the 
University of Stuttgart20 and mobilises local students and community members. 
 
From without – The role of external support 
With a view to the above-mentioned reflections, interventions linked to housing 
on the community level seem to require significant overlaps not only with the 
real concerns of the residents within the respective community but also with the 
concerns of the city as a whole and, if needed, with impulses from outside. 
Local knowledge about weather conditions and vulnerabilities that are thor-
oughly and jointly reflected by all involved actors is as essential as any statisti-
cal, meteorological and simulated data on a local urban community. Climate-
change adaptation, on the city or community level, aims to ensure the prevention 
of any further damage and then to achieve resilience through growing 
knowledge. Hence, along with ensuring an awareness of climatic and non-
climatic stressors, the recognition of interconnections may help identify and 
mobilise adequate responses. This could take place on different tiers; i.e., top-
down adaptations through developing policies, regulations and investments for 
the benefit of the GCR in its entirety. This, however, as the WGII of IPCC’S AR 
5 noted, may exacerbate inequalities among communities (IPCC 2014) due to 
differing amounts of social and financial capital on the local level. Therefore, 
bottom-up adaptation (community-based) efforts need to complement this and 
may require coordination and communication with authorities at the city level. 
Consequently, the IPCC sees a role for international partners in providing sup-
port (IPCC 2014) and in extending inclusive planning efforts (UNFCCC 2018) 
to (urban) communities with low capacities. 
Referring back to the PDP programme in the GCR, as of the component’s 
start in 2012, this has been undergoing current-practice testing for adaptation in 
informal settlements, adjusting to communities’ actual conditions. As Figure 6 
illustrates, there are several scenarios and corresponding degrees of external 
stakeholder involvement in the process of identifying and strengthening adaptive 
capacities at the community level. In all scenarios, social capital is being created, 
 
20 Dr. Manal El Shahat, senior researcher at the University of Stuttgart, initiated the 
‘Ezbet Project’ as a design competition in 2011, which evolved a project comprising 
interdisciplinary teamwork and projects. 
Climate Change Adaptation in Informal Communities | 209 
 
 
yet with differing degrees of community involvement; hence, indicating different 
degrees of sustainable adaptation. The PDP project of GIZ and its local partners 
corresponds to the scenario at the bottom (illustrating a large share of mobilisa-
tion from external actors), which represents a donor-driven model that aims to 
support the local community to ‘bounce forward’ (IPCC 2014, p.549) within a 
limited time frame, whereas the scenarios that take place at the upper levels 
describe a stronger initiation that comes from the community side. Moreover, 
international philanthropic networks, foundations, and academia can play a role 
in facilitating and providing cross-references at both grassroots and community 
levels, focussing on vulnerable and marginalised segments of (urban) society 
(IPCC 2014). 
 
Transferability OR Mutual exchange 
 
Based on the above descriptions, one part of the initial question remains open: 
whether applying adaptive measures at the community level is transferable to 
other contexts that come with differing local and climatic specifics. A World 
Bank report entitled ‘Clean Energy and Development: Towards an Investment 
Framework’ (2006) states that, despite the global agreement that ‘all countries 
are vulnerable to climate change’ (World Bank 2006, p.9), the actual vulnerabil-
ity levels and adaptive capacities may differ significantly among nations. Histor-
ically, low- and middle-income countries have remained unaccountable for cli-
mate impacts (Stern 2006, p.28), yet they incur the largest burdens from anthro-
pogenic CO2 emissions. Being among the most vulnerable (IPCC 2007, 2014; 
Satterthwaite et al. 2007; Stern 2006; World Bank 2006) these countries “can 
even less afford not to adapt” (Stern 2006, p. 443). This calls for cooperation 
among local and international stakeholders, while also acknowledging local 
circumstances.21 Consequently, before and after the Paris Agreement, in 2015, 
the spectrum of official and non-governmental stakeholders, in particular, has 
been increasing knowledge transfer and experience across tiers, scales, and ac-
tors (IPCC 2014). For instance, the 2018 UNFCCC report on adaptation in hu-
man settlements mentions ‘city-to-city partnerships on adaptation’ as one aspect 
of peer learning to increase knowledge and the pace of applying adequate adap-
tive measures (UNFCCC 2018). 
On the local level, with increasing knowledge and lessons learned in prac-
tice, strategies that include community-based efforts (i.e., the PDP project in the 
 
21 Lessons learnt from previous community-based projects within arid urban contexts 
may be important references for strategic concepts. 
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GCR) feed into the transfer of knowledge. For instance, initially implemented in 
the context of rural communities, community-based adaptation principles were 
transferred to urban communities. This new knowledge can now serve as a refer-
ence to foster regional and international dialogues. Moreover, knowledge ex-
change and discourse can support the application of non-climatic developmental 
interventions and strategic considerations to create co-benefits in the context of 
housing in low-income communities. For instance, exchange in knowledge on 
urban upgrading measures and retrofitting for improved local microclimates can 
feed into a catalogue of climate responses and adaptation measures. As the IPCC 
recommends, civil-society partnerships on an eye-to-eye level, such as 
‘Shack/Slum Dwellers International’ can contribute to sustainable community-
based exchanges and monitoring (IPCC 2014, p.584). 
Whereas, in the future Greater Cairo can share its experiences and lessons 
learned in the field of climate adaptation on the local level, it may well find con-
structive input from other cities within the region and worldwide that have 
struggled with similar issues of scale, socio-economic realities, or the intercon-
nection of non-climatic and climatic factors. There is, however, still limited 
practice-oriented reference to climate-change adaptation to extreme heat in urban 
areas and in comparable socio-economic settings worldwide. Nevertheless, sev-
eral African cities such as Johannesburg, eThekwini, and Cape Town (ICLEI 
2019) have begun applying community-based approaches in their urban settings. 
For instance, in Soweto (Phalatse 2008, 2011), an intensive dialogue with and 
within local communities identified constraints and capacities and, hence, built 
the requisite community trust (Phalatse 2008) that allowed initiatives to become 
embedded in community-based processes for adaptation. Such promising stories 
(along with experiences that failed) will help adjust and develop community-
based processes for adaptation in the case of Cairo and elsewhere. This mutual 
(constructive) exchange between cities and actors on lessons learned will be of 
essence when further developing approaches to foster the resilience of human 





This chapter looked into how the connection between climate-change adaptation 
and community involvement was reinforced through increasing knowledge and 
information exchange, particularly those linked to housing in informal urban 
areas. It illustrated how the Greater Cairo Region deals with the impacts and 
stresses of extreme heat and erratic weather events whose combination reduces 
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the capacities of low-income households and communities to adapt, consequent-
ly resulting in the increased vulnerability of the region’s population (Plan+Risk 
Consult 2013). A vast urban metropolitan region like the GCR requires holistic, 
long-term, comprehensive strategies that include adaptation on all levels for the 
sake of providing a ‘collective good’ (Pelling 2011, p.48) that does not exclude 
the most vulnerable segments of society. Currently, urban heat stress in the GCR 
and, in particular, in its informal areas seems to be subject to limited projects 
such as the PDP, a few bottom-up initiatives (Miit ‘Uqba), and some research 
projects (GERF 2014). Nevertheless, knowledge is accumulating and interven-
tions that tackle the environmental and heat-related aspects of climate change on 
an urban and built scale are beginning to be incorporated into mainstream devel-
opment and community interventions. One example is the case of Ezzbet El-
Nasr in the GCR, which is subject to development cooperation. 
In respect to Ezzbet El-Nasr, one conclusion is that recognition of the con-
nection between climate, the built environment, and housing is growing as the 
result of exemplary value-based community engagement (i.e., VMEs), and pilot 
projects are being introduced that are related to development cooperation and to 
diversifying the local and international academic discourse. Moreover, increased 
exposure to and growing knowledge on this topic can significantly contribute to 
developing a discourse on climate change across sectors and academic disci-
plines and the consequent complex aspects of adaptive housing. Information 
exchange and cooperation among the different actors across tiers are relevant to 
identifying and implementing co-beneficial measures and in fostering resilience. 
Another conclusion is that measures on the community level can be physical 
or spatial but they need to be linked to communities’ dynamics and diverse com-
positions, with personal and collective values playing a crucial role. Hence, ad-
aptation in this context will require a particular balance between individual and 
collective awareness and community interaction and support, while (potentially) 
facing continuous neglect in the provision of services these communities need 
and also in formal governance. Here, the community and its people need to be in 
continuous communication and negotiation. The link to actual change (i.e., per-
ceived or real improvements in livelihoods), however, will need to be subject to 
further monitoring and research. Moreover, the potential involvement of external 
actors (and champions) who act as catalysts needs to be sensitively built on les-
sons learned from previous experiences. Finally, looking at the question of trans-
fer, a mutual (constructive) exchange between cities and actors on lessons 
learned will be of essence. 
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Chapter 9: From the Hyper-ghetto to State-
subsidised Urban Sprawl 




URBAN POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
Even without climate change, the life of shack dwellers is full of risk due to 
densification, the poor condition of their housing and vulnerabilities to such 
hazards as heavy rains or fires. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the South 
African government has undertaken great efforts to improve the lives of poor 
households by means of a massive programme of state-subsidised housing pro-
duction, the extension of water, sanitation and electricity networks into formerly 
disadvantaged areas, and the provision of free basic services to households that 
fall under certain income thresholds. However, official housing policy soon 
came under criticism due to new settlements being situated in inadequate loca-
tions. Despite policy reforms that aimed at sustainable integrated settlements, an 
initiative set in motion in 2004, for many projects, past mistakes seem to have 
been repeated. Faced with shrinking budgets, an increasing number of house-
holds living in informal structures and growing unrest and demands for lives of 
dignity, the South African government declared the upgrading of informal set-
tlements a national priority in 2010. So far, however, political expediency, en-
 
1 Research for this paper was made possible by funding received from the School of 
Architecture, Urban and Landscape Planning of the University of Kassel and the 
German Research Foundation (DFG). 
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trenched networks of patronage and vested interests in the public housing com-
plex have prevented a reorientation towards more incremental strategies. 
Climate change is affecting South Africa by exacerbating uneven weather 
patterns, where arid settlements are expected to experience more heatwaves, 
drought and fires, while coastal areas are likely to suffer from sea-level rise, 
flooding and landslides. At the settlement level, climate change is likely to ag-
gravate problems caused by poor urban management; for example, poor storm-
water drainage systems that cause soil erosion. Increased storm intensity due to 
climate change will increase the risk of flash flooding in informal settlements in 
flood-prone areas and on sand dunes (Government of the Republic of South 
Africa 2011). 
Urban planning has played ‘a limited role in consciously reducing vulnera-
bility to disasters or everyday risk’ in South Africa (Van Niekerk 2013, p. 2). In 
fact, according to a study carried out by the South African Council of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (CSIR), in some municipalities, ‘planning for everyday 
disaster resilience [...was not even deemed] part of the planning process, but 
rather as part of what the “environmental people” do’ (ibid, p. 4).The pressure to 
provide housing and basic services has fixated planners and government on the 
very near future but it has failed to transform the post-apartheid economy in a 
sustainable way. Bringing together data on population and economic growth 
with climatic projections, like the expected change in the frequency of extreme 
rainfall events, the CSIR has identified regions of socio-economic vulnerability 
(Van Huyssteen et al. 2013). 
The CSIR has stressed the importance of identifying in a timely manner the 
communities and areas at risk of being exposed to hazards, in the hope that geo-
science and the application of spatial analyses will help practitioners determine 
the possible implications of projected risks for settlements and support the re-
spective decision-making (ibid.). More recently, the CSIR was tasked with revis-
ing the Guidelines for Human Settlement Planning and Design (CSIR 2000) in 
order to address the challenges that can be expected as a result of climate 
change. The council’s review points to the need to move toward dense and wa-
ter-sensitive urban designs, among other initiatives (Van Niekerk et al. 2015). In 
this context, this paper traces a local practice of emergency resettlement and 
redevelopment, in a densely populated and highly vulnerable informal settle-
ment, that was triggered by everyday natural disasters. It shows how disaster 
risk, geotechnical assumptions and infrastructural constraints have justified a 
new project of massive relocation to peripheral areas that have an eerie resem-
blance and physical proximity to former apartheid townships. Based on inter-
views with politicians, municipal officials, consultants and shack dwellers, anal-
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yses of plans and budgets, aerial photographs, newspaper articles, and site visits, 
this chapter argues that the relocation that has taken place has created new vul-
nerabilities without doing away with those it was supposed to overcome. 
 
Figure 1a: Metropolitan municipalities of South Africa.  
Source:  Cartography: J.T. Wongnam based on Map of South Africa with district borders, 
2016.svg by Wikimedia Commons. 
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Figure 1b: Main places and built-up area in Buffalo City 2002. 
 
Source: Cartography: J.T. Wongnam based on BCM 2002 (Map B1 study area). 
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SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VULNERABILITY  
IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT 
 
Buffalo City: A low-growth, high-inequality environment 
 
With 810,528 inhabitants, Buffalo City is South Africa’s seventh most populous 
municipality (StatsSA mid-year population estimates for 2016, cited in ECDoH 
2018). The municipality was only formed in 2000 when East London, King Wil-
liam’s Town, Bhisho (the former capital of the homeland Ciskei), several black 
townships and their rural hinterlands were merged. In 2011, Buffalo City was 
elevated to the status of a metropolitan municipality. As a secondary city sur-
rounded by former homeland areas, it must be considered one of the ‘areas under 
the biggest population pressure’ (Van Huysteen et al. 2013, p. 5). Although pop-
ulation growth in Buffalo City has been well below the national average (0.69% 
compared to 1.44%; Stats SA 2011), the incidence of households living in in-
formal settlements is significantly higher than in other metropolitan municipali-
ties (17% compared to the 12% average for all metro areas; StatsSA 2013 cited 
by Graham et al 2014, p. 12). The apparent contradiction between modest popu-
lation growth and the high incidence of shacks may indicate that rural migrants 
use the city as a ‘stepping stone’ on their way to Johannesburg or Cape Town, 
where GDP per capita and chances of finding a permanent job are both much 
higher (Graham et al. 2014, p. 11). Notwithstanding the migration flows, Buffalo 
City is characterised by a discomforting continuity of precarious housing condi-
tions and ‘more and more’ land invasions (interview with a municipal planner, 
March 2018).  
According to Makiwane (2011; cited by Dlani et al. 2015, p. 178), climate 
change could imply that the municipality is faced with ‘more frequent and severe 
flooding as a result of higher intensity storm events [...]. This will impact on 
human settlements, infrastructure, human health and place a greater burden on 
particularly impoverished communities.’ The city’s climate change strategy 
(BCMM 2014, p. 44) highlights the potential impact of increased precipitation 
on informal settlements located on flood plains; the strategy recommends city 
planners ‘remove shacks in flood-prone areas [and] promote climate resilient 
settlements’ (among others). Its authors also think it is ‘likely’ that droughts will 
intensify and it is ‘almost certain’ that there will be more extremely hot days 
with major consequences for vulnerable people and municipal infrastructure, 
possibly leading to an increased cost of water services (ibid., p. 126). Thus, they 
recommend “smart growth” planning a strategy that highlights high density, 
mixed-use, transit-oriented development [...] and directing city resources toward 
224 | Gerhard Kienast 
 
existing communities rather than diverting them to new development in outlying 
areas’ (ibid., p. 81). The following case study shows that the municipality is still 
far from implementing these recommendations. 
 
Duncan Village as a site of struggle and social deterioration 
 
The highest concentration of informal structures can be found only five kilome-
tres from the East London Central Business District (CBD), in Duncan Village, a 
township in the municipality of Buffalo City, Eastern Cape Province, South 
Africa (Figure 1). The area, originally known as the East Bank has been the main 
location of the country’s black workforce since the 1880s and it has remained the 
primary scene of the local housing crisis since the industrial boom in the early 
twentieth century. The history of Duncan Village may be recounted as having 
been a sequence of failed attempts at urban renewal, starting with the construc-
tion of several hundred municipally managed rented homes in the early 1940s, 
under Governor-General Duncan, to whom the area owes its name. As the gov-
ernment could not do away with the village’s wood and corrugated iron shacks, 
‘overcrowding and squalor’ was blamed for a terrible tuberculosis epidemic 
(Ntsebeza 1993). In 1952, after police brutally dissolved an African National 
Congress (ANC) gathering, the area erupted in violent riots that were followed 
by a police massacre (Mager and Minkley 1993; Bank and Carton 2016). 
For several decades, the East London council attempted to restructure the ar-
ea in accordance with the Group Areas Act of 1950. Political activists and peo-
ple without residence permits for the urban area were deported, black and col-
oured inhabitants were separated, and the old location was demolished. Duncan 
Village was supposed to become a settlement of standardised cottage housing 
where only married men with secure jobs were allowed to stay (Bank 2011, p. 
70). In the 1960s and 1970s, the apartheid government built Mdantsane, a huge 
dormitory town 25 km outside of East London. The government’s intention was 
to remove people from East London’s urban areas and mitigate any future rural-
to-urban migration. Although at least 8,000 families were displaced from the city 
(ibid., p. 194) and three quarters of the old East Bank locations were broken 
down, the state never completed these intended relocations. In 1985, the killing 
of an anti-apartheid leader sparked a new rebellion. Government forces commit-
ted another massacre but lost control over the township. The well-organised 
Duncan Village Residents’ Association (DVRA) galvanised resistance and 
‘open[ed] up the township for immigration from surrounding rural areas’ (ibid., 
p. 90). Effectively replacing state authority, the DVRA allowed shacks to be 
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erected in backyards and open spaces, resulting in a population that had more 
than doubled by the time of the first democratic election in 1994. 
In order to ‘deliver concrete benefits to violence torn and crisis driven com-
munities in major urban areas at an early stage’ (SACN 2003, p. 38), the Gov-
ernment of National Unity embarked on six Special Integrated Presidential Pro-
jects (SIPP) and Duncan Village became one of them. Despite the local commu-
nity’s mistrust of the city administration, in an interview conducted in June 
2015, the former project manager noted that a lot was achieved: ‘... we almost 
had to respond to crisis: Install new bulk infrastructure, build new roads, we 
even organised new schools, clinics, early childhood development centres, an old 
age home – still standing today!’ Yet, as the project only built 1.000 housing 
units, it could not do away with the precarious conditions created by apartheid 
and mass migration. The persistence of high population densities and makeshift 
housing made Duncan Village highly vulnerable. 
The biggest risk was people’s dependency on paraffin (petroleum) for light 
and heating. According to Bank (2011, p. 102), between 1986 and 1992, alone, 
there were 208 fires in Duncan Village, destroying at least 1,151 huts. During 
the next six years, the number of destroyed huts doubled, probably due to a fur-
ther increase in building density, and more than thirty people died. According to 
an evaluation done for the Human Sciences Research Council, the SIPP had 
intended to reduce the fire risk by connecting 5,000 illegally constructed build-
ings to the electrical grid, but electricity was too expensive for the inhabitants 
(Morrow and Engel 2003, p. 18). In contrast, the city council rejected the electri-
fication of informal settlements even as a provisional measure and, thus, bears 
responsibility for the continued occurrence of tragedies (Bank 2011, p. 216). A 
particularly bad fire in June 2001 destroyed more than 400 shacks and killed a 
young girl. One year later, in August 2002, Duncan Village was hit by heavy 
flooding when two rivers that ran through the area overflowed. Thirteen people 
died, 3,000 were left homeless, and infrastructure and buildings worth R100 
million (USD 16.6 million) were destroyed (FHISER 2004, cited by Kay 2005, 
p. 62). For the newly formed Buffalo City, Duncan Village represented a disaster 
area that needed massive intervention (Figure 2). According to one of the area’s 
council representatives, there was ‘intense pressure’ to build housing in Duncan 
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Figure 2: Duncan Village study area as defined by the Local Spatial Develop-
ment Framework. 
 
Source: Kay, 2005, p. 17. 
 
The growing impoverishment also added pressure. Due to the abolition of state 
subsidies to homelands industries after the 1994 elections and the resulting cor-
porate closures, the whole region suffered from deindustrialisation. Thousands of 
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs were lost. While in the 1950s only a fifth of 
adults in Duncan Village were jobless, in the mid-1990s almost half of the adult 
population was unemployed (Bank 2011, p. 111). Despite the investments the 
SIPP made and the general recovery of the South African economy in the late 
1990s, in 2001 only 17.5% of the residents were formally employed and only 
11% earned more than R1,600 per month (then about USD 200) (BCM 2009, p. 
27). With the term ‘hyper-ghetto’, taken from Wacquant (2008), Bank character-
ises Duncan Village as a racially stigmatised space trapped in a downward spiral 
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Duncan Village between redevelopment and relocation 
 
In order to improve living conditions and reduce vulnerability in the area, in late 
2003, the municipal planning department started to elaborate a local spatial de-
velopment framework (LSDF). The plan aimed at a holistic renewal described as 
the Duncan Village Redevelopment Initiative (DVRI) in which the construction 
of state-subsidised housing was to gradually replace the area’s shacks.2 Due to 
the housing stock’s high density, it was clear that the traditional typology of 
free-standing minimum-standard houses could only accommodate a very small 
proportion of the local population. Therefore, local urban planners, consultants 
and councillors agreed on the development of terraced row and semi-detached 
housing (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Duncan Village urban and housing design by The Matrix, commis-
sioned for the Local Spatial Development Framework. 
Source: BCMM 2013b, p.93. 
 
2 It also included the pedestrian-friendly rebuilding of the main transport corridor, the 
creation of a multifunctional social infrastructure and the promotion of economic ac-
tivities (Kay 2005, p. 66). 
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However, the people to be affected had little say in the planning process. Par-
ticipation was always filtered through the elected ward councillors and thus was 
prone to political interference (Kay 2005, pp. 109–110; 113–116).3 As newly 
elected leaders insisted on favouring native inhabitants over ‘newcomers’, the 
density target was reduced. In turn, both the number of families that should have 
been relocated and the need for suitable land increased (interview conducted 28 
May 2015; BCM 2009, p.88; Ndhlovu 2015, p. 59). 
According to the LSDF, over a period of twelve years at least 20,000 new 
homes were to be created. Only one-tenth of the new houses were supposed to be 
built in Duncan Village itself, yet even these were lacking in infrastructural pre-
requisites. The municipal engineering department insisted that new construction 
in Duncan Village and adjacent areas could only be permitted after the commis-
sioning of a regional sewage treatment plant and the diversion of sewage to this 
plant. As long as these conditions were not met, only about 300 housing units 
were supposed to be built on this site. Almost 9,000 units were to be built on 
various sites within a ten-kilometre radius, but even these areas were subject to 
constraints. The only area where mass construction and resettlement could begin 
immediately was Reeston, the former buffer zone between East London and 
Mdantsane (see Figure 1). According to the planners, the area could accommo-
date more than 9,500 units. In other words, almost half of the population of Dun-
can Village was supposed to move to a no-man’s land (BCM 2009, pp. 89–90, 
164–168). 
Reeston had been earmarked for low-income housing since the late 1980s 
(Reintges 1992). From a bird’s eye view, the development of the area between 
the core city and its economically dependent satellite makes sense (Figure 1). 
However, if one were to have taken a closer look, one could have seen that Ree-
ston was not very suitable for residential development. Deep valleys with irregu-
lar shapes and steep slopes prevented coherent development. The ridges where 
the housing was to be built upon, without the need for expensive foundations, 
were very narrow (Figure 4). Nevertheless, between 1996 and 1997, plans to 
develop Reeston were revived (interviews conducted 28 May and 10 June 2015). 
Even before work on the Duncan Village LSDF had begun, the Integrated De-
velopment Plan of 2003 to 2004 had earmarked more than R110 million (USD 
 
3 Based on a ‘qualitative attitudinal survey’ and a series of consultative meetings (BCM 
2009, p. 8–9; 31–33), municipal planners had concluded that ‘many people are tired of 
the constant anxiety and suffering [...] and are becoming more willing to allow the 
government to provide a formal house located on a safer piece of land even if that 
means moving out of Duncan Village’ (Foster 2004, cited by Kay 2005, p.63). 
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14 million) for housing construction in the area (BCM 2003, p. 32). Long before 
the Duncan Village LSDF had been officially adopted, Buffalo City Municipali-
ty (BCM) had begun relocating flood and fire victims to Reeston. Further, reset-
tlement was seen as the only option for de-densification and a comprehensive 
redevelopment in Duncan Village. 
 
Figure 4: Unfavourable topography for low-income housing development in 
Reeston (Buffalo City). 
 
Source: Google Earth, Image © 2019 Maxar Technologies. 
(aerial picture taken 17 May 2018; label ‘New Life’ added by the author). 
 
Reeston as an example of state-subsidised urban sprawl 
 
Since the early 2000’s, Reeston has gradually been developed as another dormi-
tory town that consists of far-flung single-family homes that were built to pro-
vide basic needs (Figure 5). However, building standards for the state-subsidised 
sector have improved over the years. At the beginning of the initiative, govern-
ment-built houses consisted of corrugated iron roofs but not plaster walls with 
insulation; now, roofs are tiled and houses are insulated. However, the built 
environments that have been created still have an eerie resemblance to the apart-
heid-era township of Mdantsane, which has been described as a monotonous 
place ‘marked by uniformity and separation, by loneliness and hardship, by star-
vation and unemployment and distance’ (Minkley 1999, p. 217). Formal invest-
ment is limited to houses, internal roads, basic infrastructure (electricity, water, 
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sanitation) and a few schools. All other functions that contribute to the village’s 
social life and everyday commodities are provided from transport containers or 
shack-like structures, similar to the informal settlements Reeston was supposed 
to replace. (Using state-subsidised houses as shops is considered a misappropria-
tion.) Fifteen years after construction began, it is obvious that the education 
infrastructure is insufficient as hundreds of school children rely on busses or 
long walks to attend schools in the town and the only secondary school that was 
established in Reeston has been extended again and again with corrugated iron 
structures.4 
 
Figure 5: Unauthorised shop operating from a state-subsidised house in 
Reeston, Phase 3, Stage 3 (“New Life”). 
 
Source: Author, 2016. 
 
4 On the basis of government-defined ratios, the authors of the DVLSDF had estimated 
that there would be a need for twelve elementary schools, five secondary schools, six 
health centers and two police stations, once the city extension area has reached its tar-
get population of 54,500 inhabitants (BCM 2009, p. 103). Due to the lack of coherent 
official reporting, it is difficult to establish the size of the current population. Based on 
a May 2015 estimate by a senior housing official, augmented by the recently built 
settlement known as “New Life” and assuming an average household size of 3.8 
persons (a factor used by the municipality with regard to informal settlements), the 
area may now host more than 20,000 inhabitants. If the social facilities framework of 
the Duncan Village LSDF had been followed, then at least five primary schools, two 
secondary schools and two clinics should have been operational by now and a police 
station should soon be built. 
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The new housing development certainly does not match the criteria for a 
‘climate resilient settlement’ formulated by the city’s own climate change strate-
gy (see above). Its density is too low, there is no mixed-use development and 
development was carried out without considering people’s transport needs. 
While, so far, Buffalo City has been spared the crisis-level water shortages expe-
rienced, in September 2017, in Cape Town due to falling water levels in storage 
dams; Buffalo City also introduced water restrictions (Daily Dispatch, Sept 8, 
2017). If droughts intensify in the future, then they are likely to be felt more 
severely in an area like Reeston, where almost the entire population depends on 
a free basic water quota and the low-density detached housing provides little 
shade. 
While those parts of Reeston that are close to the watershed and the main 
transport artery5 may be considered reasonably well-located, inhabitants at the 
bottom of the ridges are not better off than those who had to relocate to 
Mdantsane in the 1960s or 1970s. Although distributor roads connect the neigh-
bourhoods to the main road, people are even more dependent on the core city 
than those living in the apartheid-era township, due to the difficult topography 
and the almost total lack of amenities and commercial activities. The situation is 
worse in an area officially described as ‘Reeston Phase 3, Stage 3’ but coined 
‘New Life’ in the vernacular (see Figures 4 and 5). All interior roads were tarred 
but the main road linking the township to the rest of the city is gravel, which 
damages cars that are used as taxis, making some taxi drivers reluctant to travel 
to the area (Daily Dispatch, May 9th 2018). As people living far from the corri-
dor must pay two taxis to take them to town, Reeston is a poverty trap for inhab-
itants who cannot afford to travel where they may find work. 
Although former municipal planners defend their work, stating that they have 
made provisions for clinics, schools and commercial sites, no one claims to be 
proud of the outcome. Some blame other government departments for failing to 
‘follow housing development’. Others describe the project as a mistake ‘because 
in Duncan Village, at least [... people] were close to working opportunities, your 
taxis, your transport and schools.’ Yet, even planners who concede that Reeston 
is ‘a bad example; or a good example of what not to do’ seem to see no chance 
 
5 Both Mdantsane and Reeston are located south of the watershed between the rivers 
Nahoon and Buffalo. Both areas are intersected by irregularly shaped valleys that have 
formed in the catchment area of the Buffalo River. Good access is only provided in 
the North, as the railway line between East London and King William’s Town, the 
National Road No. 2 and the older R102 (the so-called Voortrekker Road) all follow 
the watershed. 
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to correct the error, stating that ‘they have started on it, so we have to see it 
through now’ (Interviews conducted 29 May and 10 June 2015). 
 
Running to stand still: The persistence of informality in spite  
of housing allocation 
 
The number of households from Duncan Village that have benefitted from this 
state-subsidised housing programme is unknown. Astoundingly, there are no 
official figures about relocation. According to a senior human settlement official, 
by mid-2015, around 4,500 households had moved to Reeston (Interview con-
ducted 28 May 2015). Since then, 1,137 additional housing units were completed 
in ‘New Life’. The construction of another 2,500 units was suspended when the 
procurement process was challenged (BCMM 2015a, p. 103). 
Despite massive expenditures for infrastructure provision and housing in 
Reeston and other projects in the municipality, Buffalo City Metropolitan Mu-
nicipality (BCMM) has not managed to reduce its precarious housing conditions. 
Based on the BCMM’s annual reports, the average number of low-income hous-
ing units produced between 2007 and 2012 was calculated as 1,438. At this rate, 
it would take more than 50 years to fill the backlog and provide for future need 
(CS Consulting / Afesis-corplan 2014, p. 8). By 2015-2016, the municipality had 
only completed 936 ‘top structures’ (BCMM 2017, p. 15). In Duncan Village, in 
particular, the municipality had hardly made any progress in reducing its precar-
ious housing conditions. This was also acknowledged by the current portfolio 
councillor for human settlements who explained: 
 
 ‘… we planned for the redevelopment of Duncan Village […] but the challenge is the 
influx. […] there is land invasion, which is the crisis in the whole metro. […] As human 
settlements we are doing our job as per the mandate, but we still have no control 
measures to stop people rebuilding shacks’ (Interview recorded 16 November 2016). 
 
Municipal officials from the planning and engineering departments blame politi-
cal interference and the housing department’s lack of sophistication for the mu-
nicipality’s inability to defend the spaces it created through relocation. One of 
the planners explained that, in order to fulfill his mission, the developer con-
tracted by the municipal human settlements department would have to perform 
three tasks at the same time: while homes are being built at Reeston, residents of 
Duncan Village would have to be moved, block-by-block, into so-called tempo-
rary relocation areas and at these vacated places the company would then need to 
immediately begin preparations for new construction: 
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‘You got to clear a block at the bottom of the hill because your sewerage pipe will work up 
as you go [in order to gradually connect houses to the sewer system]. [...] And you have to 
be building houses here at the same time that you are building elsewhere; because of these 
[issues], 1,000,500 would come back to Duncan Village, 500 would be built in Reeston, 
roughly, and then there is still the question of these guys [residents who have no right to a 
state-subsidised home]. So, you got to be building in two places at once. You’ve got to 
have your admin organised because you have to move people to a TRA [temporary 
relocation area]; make sure that no extra people arrive in that TRA; it’s only the people 
from that block; and then you got to work out: ‘From you guys, who wants to go to 
Reeston? Who wants to come back to Duncan Village?’ and who’s not going to qualify. 
And you got to have a place for all three. [...] You gotto have a production line. Eesh – it’s 
not happening’ (Interview conducted 29 May 2015). 
 
The concept of block relocation was already well formulated during the planning 
process (Kay 2005, p. 152). However, political interference in the processes of 
beneficiary registration and housing allocation undermined implementation. 
According to a senior official from the engineering department: 
 
‘[T]he councillors have got in and they said: ‘no, you cannot only help one area!’ So, 
instead of taking 1,000 people, they would take 50 there, 50 there… the area was still too 
dense! [...] The whole plan fell through because it was not done in a systematic way’ 
(Interview conducted 17 July 2018). 
 
Even a former portfolio councillor who was responsible for housing allocation 
acknowledged that “people were identified, registered and then approved [with-
out...] taking into consideration the block movement”. Yet, according to her 
account, this practice has now been stopped, and the only reason the DVRI still 
has not been able to reduce the number of informal structures is that construction 
was stalled after litigation over procurement processes (Interview conducted 08 
March 2018). 
Be that as it may, in terms of disaster risk reduction, the project was not very 
successful. As is evident from the analysis of aerial pictures, 15 years after the 
floods of 2002 even some areas inside the 100-year flood lines are still being 
invaded. While re-naturalisation along the Amalinda River has managed to re-
duce the risk of another natural disaster, areas along the Umzonyana River, 
which were empty when the 2013 aerial picture was taken, have since been reoc-
cupied (Figures 6a, b and c). 
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Figure 6a: Excerpt of 1-in-a-100-year floodlines included in the Duncan Village 
Local Spatial Development Framework showing the Gesini settlement on the 
west bank of the Umzonyana River before the floods of 2002.  
Source: BCM 2009, p. 35. 
 
Figure 6b: Aerial picture taken in 2013. 
  
Source: Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (unpublished). 
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Figure 6c: Aerial picture taken 31.10.2017. 
 
Source: Google Earth, Image © 2019 Maxar Technologies. 
. 
Everyday risks: The reluctant delivery of basic sanitation and 
electricity services 
 
Even after the launch of the DVRI, living conditions in Duncan Village’s infor-
mal areas remained appalling. Many people who were living in shacks relied on 
public toilets from the apartheid era and the so-called bucket system. Even if the 
redevelopment plan had been followed to the letter, many inhabitants would 
have had to wait a decade before they could have got a fully serviced house. 
Still, there was no plan for interim measures. In May 2009, a study by the East-
ern Cape NGO Coalition showed that, on average, 333 shack dwellers had to 
share one public toilet (Daily Dispatch, 19 May and 27 May 2009). Angry com-
munity protests against the lack of service delivery made it clear that, fifteen 
years after the first democratic elections, shack dwellers had lost patience wait-
ing for fully serviced housing (Daily Dispatch 28 July 2009 and 18 March 2011). 
During the next three financial years, Buffalo City provided 26 ‘movable ablu-
tion blocks’6 (BCMM 2011, p. 45; BCMM 2013a, p. 59). Yet, as the lack of 
maintenance and security persisted (Mbi 2015), it is no wonder that service-
delivery protests became a common feature in the area (Mukwedeya 2016). 
 
6    Although locally described as ‘ablution blocks’, the sanitary facilities do not provide 
showers or wash rooms but only public toilets and open-air sinks. 
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The other main source of vulnerability continues to be the lack of access to 
safe energy, which causes a permanent risk of shack fires. In keeping with South 
Africa's progressive Bill of Rights, the ANC government introduced a policy of 
free basic services for households whose income fell below certain thresholds. 
Part of this policy consisted of a monthly allowance of 50 free kWh of electrici-
ty. Since free basic services could only be delivered to households that were 
connected to the respective (electricity, water and sanitation) networks, shack 
dwellers missed out on most of what should have been provided by law. Yet, 
they developed an impressive ability to illegally tap into these networks. 
In the 2009/10 financial year, the Buffalo City administration reported a 
dramatic increase of illegal electrical connections, called izinyoka (snakes) in the 
Xhosa language. In reaction to this development, the council decided to pilot the 
electrification of informal dwellings in Duncan Village (BCMM 2011, p. 41). 
Since the municipality depended on co-funding from the national government, 
the electrification of shacks only began in earnest in 2013/14. Since then, the 
municipality has connected more than 5,600 households in informal settlements, 
including more than 1,600 in Duncan Village (Figure 7). However, the official 
electrification process also clashed with ‘illegal electrical connections, which 
cause[d] delays on site as they [had] to be removed before work [could] proceed; 
theft of copper [...and] vandalism to equipment’ (e-mail communication with 
BCMM Electrical and Energy Services Department, 15 August 2018). There-
fore, the BCMM electrical department drew up a restrictive list of minimum 




7 Easements, flood-prone areas and private land are considered off limits. In order to 
avoid wasteful expenditures, the department expects assurances that ‘the community 
supports the proposal and is willing to co-operate with the opening up of access roads 
where necessary [...], keep these access roads clear; supply and organize local labour 
where required; and help prevent tampering with or on-selling of electricity supplies’. 
It also requires a ‘formal layout’ from the municipal planning department. The general 
manager is clear that ‘many informal areas do not and will never meet [...these] re-
quirements’ (e-mail correspondence, 17 August 2018). Although several parts of 
Duncan Village have been connected to the grid, he has no optimism that this will 
continue: ‘... in some areas it is so dense, [...] you have got to walk through one shack 
to get to the neighbour behind you. [...] So, we cannot get electricity in there’ (inter-
view conducted with BCMM Electrical and Energy Services Department, 17 July 
2018). 
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Figure 7: Electrification of informal settlements in Duncan Village. 
Source: author, 2015. 
Figure 8: Illegal electricity connections on the floor of a dwelling in Amalinda. 
Forest (Buffalo City). 
Source: author, 2018. 
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Meanwhile, every year in Buffalo City, between 2012 and 2015, there have 
been more than 180 so-called ‘informal fires’ that literally happened ‘every other 
day’. In most cases, the cause of the fire was not reported. Where a cause was 
indicated, candles appear to have been the major cause, followed by arson. An 
analysis of the fuel type used in the affected households seemed to indicate that 
electricity-related problems (exploding electrical cords; illegal connections; 
burnt-out switches, etc.) surpassed paraffin as the major cause of fires8 In 
2013/14 alone, 16 people lost their lives due to ‘informal fires’. In 2014/15, this 
number dropped to 6 (BCMM 2015b, pp. 23–31). 
According to a council report cited in the local newspaper, between July 
2016 and February 2017, alone, the metro lost R95.8 million (approximately 
USD 7 million) in revenue from electrical generation due to illegal connections. 
At the same time, it was reported that 63 people had been killed by illegal elec-
tricity connections in the municipality’s informal settlements over the three-year 
period from 2014 to 2017. 
 
‘The settlement hardest hit by electrocution deaths is Duncan Village which has recorded 
20 between 2014 and 2017, followed by Mdantsane which has recorded 10 deaths. The 
ages of the victims range from two years to 48 and most of those who die are male’ (Daily 
Dispatch, 19 June 2017). 
 
These reports show that even after the initiation of the municipal electrification 
programme, people who are living in shacks still risk their lives (and those of 
their neighbours) to get free access to electricity. Given the programme’s slow 
pace and restrictions, some may never benefit from it and feel conflicted be-
tween waiting to obtain a safe, legal connection to the electrical grid or risking 
the dangers of using paraffin against those of izinyoka. In any case, they are 
subject to everyday risks that may appear much higher and certainly more im-





The paper has traced the history of Duncan Village, an iconic black working-
class neighbourhood which successfully resisted the racist relocations of the 
apartheid era but has become increasingly impoverished. This condition has 
 
8   This interpretation is tenuous since information about the fuel type was available in 
less than 15% of incidents. 
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hardly improved through the recent redevelopment efforts that have taken place 
since the new millennium. This shows that local planners faced with overcrowd-
ing and natural and everyday disasters saw no alternative but to conduct a new 
massive relocation programme to a peripheral area. Since the new settlements 
were only serviced with the most basic infrastructure, due to their lack of inte-
gration in the local economy and the prohibitive costs of transport, resettlement 
has created new vulnerabilities for these inhabitants. The perpetuation of urban 
sprawl through low-income housing is also problematic in terms of climate 
change because the dominant settlement typology is already resource-inefficient, 
so if Buffalo City has less water available in the future it will be even more diffi-
cult to service this population. 
Meanwhile, attempts at de-densification in Duncan Village have failed, part-
ly due to the low pace of new housing construction and partly due to a disingen-
uous resettlement process that has failed to carry through the block clearance the 
planners had promoted. Again and again, new informal housing filled spaces that 
were opened up by the relocation of shack owners. Municipal officials and local 
politicians provide different explanations for this phenomenon. No matter 
whether people allocated to housing in Reeston sub-let their new housing or 
rented out their former shack, no matter whether the space that was vacated be-
came occupied by a rural migrant or a youngster who could no longer stand 
living in a shack with his parents or aunt, the trend in reoccupation points to the 
high demand for a place to live in the city and the fact the state-subsidised hous-
ing programme is nowhere close to filling this gap. 
The DVRI was established on the premise that government would be able to 
replace the informal housing in Duncan Village and create infrastructural pre-
conditions for its redevelopment over a twelve-year period. Fifteen years after 
the start of the planning process and nine years after the formal adoption of the 
plan, these assumptions need to be reassessed. Given the balance of the initiative 
so far, there is a strong argument for shifting the focus toward the provision of 
interim services and disaster management in informal settlements in Duncan 
Village and beyond. The projected risks of climate change point in the same 
direction: If municipalities are serious about reducing the risk of disaster, then 
they must start by accepting the status quo and focus on energy safety, water and 
sanitation, the clearance of flood-prone areas and the implementation of basic 
systems of storm-water management. Although the relationship between energy 
safety, shack fires and climate change may be indirect, given the number of lives 
lost due to fires and electrocution, climate-change adaptation in a poverty-ridden 
area like Buffalo City must be balanced with or include the reduction of such 
everyday risks. 
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CO-PRODUCTION AS AN APPROACH TO LANDSLIDE 
RISK MITIGATION 
 
Low-income communities across the Global South provide themselves with 
housing and services (see, e.g. Casanova in Chapter 3 of this book). There has 
been increasing recognition of this, with urban policy and management initia-
tives focused on supporting and supplementing community-based efforts, rang-
ing from financial mechanisms to co-production arrangements though these are 
still rare. Approaches to co-produced service provision in the urban South have 
been examined in a growing literature, as reviewed, e.g., in d’Alençon et al. 
 
1 This paper has been produced based on the collaborative work of the above authors, 
together with the communities of Pinares de Oriente, El Pacífico and Carpinelo 2 in 
Medellín, and supported by the Mesa de Vivienda y Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 
de la Comuna 8, Mesa de Desplazados de la Comuna 8, Corporación Con-Vivamos 
and Corporación Montanoa; and with the community of Vila Nova Esperança in São 
Paulo, supported by TETO Brasil, and with the active involvement of staff from the 
Instituto Geológico and the Instituto de Pesquisas Tecnológicas of the State of São 
Paulo.  
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(2018). Service co-production is increasingly seen as a way of securing sustaina-
ble access to key services, such as energy, water supply, sanitation and waste 
management, relying on contributions from residents as well as from public or 
private agents (e.g. Allen 2012; Batley and Mcloughlin 2010; McGranahan 
2013; Mitlin 2008; Moretto and Ranzatto 2016). The concept of co-production 
was initially developed in the late 1970s, where it focused on the delivery of 
services, as ‘the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service 
are contributed by individuals who are not “in” the same organisations. Co-
production implies that citizens can play an active role in producing public 
goods and services of consequence to them’ (Ostrom 1996, p. 1073). 
Although various interpretations of co-production have emerged since this 
initial conceptualisation and there is currently a good deal of ongoing experi-
mentation with approaches to co-production, it could be argued that these have 
in common that ‘Co-production stems from voluntary cooperation on the part of 
citizens (rather than compliance with laws or city ordinances) and involves ac-
tives behaviours’ (Brudney and England 1983, p. 63). Watson (2014) identifies 
both commonalities and differences between co-production and approaches to 
participation that have developed in planning, such as collaborative or communi-
cative planning. According to Watson (2014), commonalities include: a concern 
with how state and society can engage in order to improve the quality of life of 
populations; taking an incremental, evolutionary and social learning approach to 
social change and state action; and assuming a context of democracy and the 
ability of ‘active citizens’ to engage collectively and individually. The differ-
ences identified by Watson (2014) include: co-production tends to work outside 
established rules and procedures of governance in terms of engagement with the 
state; co-production focuses more on delivery processes and management than 
participatory planning; bottom-up co-production does not necessarily share the 
belief of collaborative and communicative planning in debate per se as being 
able to address issues of power relationships between the actors involved; some 
co-production approaches rely more on ‘learning by doing’ than on talk and 
debate; and some bottom-up co-production approaches have an intention to up-
scale local practices through global networks, which is not a characteristic of 
state-led co-production or collaborative and communicative planning. 
A particular manifestation of co-production in relation to service provision is 
‘institutionalized co-production’, which according to Joshi and Moore (2004, p. 
40) is ‘the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) 
through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised 
groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions’. This is 
characterised by: (1) long-term arrangements developed on a regular basis; (2) 
Learning from Co-Produced Landslide Risk Mitigation Strategies | 245 
 
moving away from standardised contractual and/or semi-contractual agreements 
towards continual renegotiation; and (3) the sharing of control of resources, 
authority and power between citizen groups and the state. This goes beyond the 
technical organisation of service delivery, involving the political dimension of 
resource management i.e., the distribution of power around service delivery 
(McGranahan 2013). 
However, the co-production of risk mitigation in low-income communities is 
much less common, well-known and understood. Key hazards that low-income 
communities in the Global South often face include landslides, flooding and 
fires, as well as the range of socio-economic, institutional and sometimes politi-
cal threats that heighten their vulnerability. Such events are becoming increas-
ingly frequent and impactful through a combination of ongoing urbanisation and 
the changing weather patterns that accompany climate change. Working in part-
nership, researchers at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín, 
Heriot-Watt University and the University of Edinburgh, together with commu-
nity leaders, identified the need to explore the scope for co-production as an 
approach to help vulnerable communities to address the risk of landslides that 
affects many settlements in the north-eastern sector of Medellín. This resulted in 
the first participatory action research project (November 2016-October 2017) 
called, ‘Resilience or resistance? Negotiated mitigation of landslide risks in 
informal settlements in Medellín’2. Participatory Action Research (PAR) can be 
viewed as a way of ‘bringing participation into action research’ (Elvin and Lev-
in, cited in Khanlou and Peter 2005, p. 2234). In this project, PAR was the 
method used to explore the feasibility of the process of co-production discussed 
earlier, since the outcomes of a PAR methodology should be focused on action 
and developing new knowledge with emancipatory results for the community 
(Khanlou and Peter 2005). 
In this case, a good deal of what we envisaged as being co-produced was 
knowledge: of the landslide (and other) risks the community was exposed to, and 
of the possible ways of addressing these in a way that involved different stake-
holders. The project was undertaken by a multidisciplinary team that covered 
sociology, planning and slum upgrading, geotechnics and environmental engi-
neering, and architecture and construction. The aim of this project was to explore 
the scope for, and acceptability of, landslide-risk-reducing strategies for informal 
settlements from the community and state perspectives. The project also sought 
to understand the barriers to landslide-risk-reducing strategies and to identify 
 
2 This was funded by the UK’s Global Challenges Research Fund / NERC / AHRC / 
ESRC Building Resilience programme as project NE/P015557/1. 
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politically and practically viable approaches to landslide-risk-reducing strategies 
within a wider and more complex context of social and physical risk (see Smith 
et al. 2017). The concept of ‘resilience’ in the project title was interpreted fol-
lowing Vale’s (2014) identification of ‘pro-active preventive resilience’, as op-
posed to ‘reactive/restorative resilience’, and as a politically engaged form of 
resilience with a focus on the issues of ‘whose resilience’ and ‘whose city’, as 
advocated by Vale (2014). In the second part of the title, ‘resistance’ refers both 
to the approach of community organisations in north-eastern Medellín in dealing 
with local government in relation to urban planning and landslide risk, in terms 
of opposing risk-related evictions and defending the right to remain on the land, 
as well as to ‘resistance’ as a form of ‘resilience’ – see Alvarez et al. (2019). 
The exploration of community-based disaster-risk management (CBDRM) 
harks back to Maskrey (1989) and subsequent literature, with most of this focus-
sing on what communities can achieve through spontaneous community disaster-
risk management organisation (CDRMO) or in collaboration with universities 
and/or NGOs (see, e.g., Tanwattana 2018). A few initiatives have been docu-
mented and promoted in the literature involving communities working together 
with government organisations in monitoring landslide risk and implementing 
landslide-risk mitigation measures, such as MOSSAIC in the Caribbean (Ander-
son and Holcombe 2013), and Alerta Rio in Brazil. The latter collects relevant 
data in every neighbourhood of the city, with community involvement, and pub-
lishes its results online, with residents developing small emergency plans and 
mitigation strategies using updated data (Rahman 2012). These initiatives, how-
ever, have not tended to be conceptualised or analysed in terms of co-production. 
In the area of Medellín, there has been increasing interest in finding ways of 
involving the community in risk monitoring, such as the project undertaken by 
the Universidad de Antioquia and the Corantioquia Foundation from 2011-13 to 
design and put in place an environmental monitoring social network for early 
warnings of flooding, flash floods and landslides in strategic locations across the 
80 municipalities where Corantioquia operates.3 Key actors were communities 
and municipalities, using social cartography as a basis for the design of the mon-
itoring network and hand-made easy-to-use instruments to measure rainfall, etc., 
 
3 Corantioquia is a state-financed organisation that operates within the Colombian 
Department of Antioquia with the institutional objective of managing the implementa-
tion of policies, plans, programmes and projects related to the environment and re-
newable natural resources. Additionally, Corantioquia oversees that all statutory 
activities are undertaken according to the guidelines issued by the Ministry of the 
Environment. 
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supplemented by electronic instruments for verification. The project trained 
community members and installed pluviometers (devices used to measure rain-
water) and water-level recorders, and was followed up by a further project in 
2015 that took place in three municipalities. However, these experiences do not 
appear to have been evaluated. 
In terms of mitigation, Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM – the municipal 
utilities company) has established a programme of ‘community brigades’ to 
detect water leaks in the water supply system, which are rife particularly in in-
formal settlements. These ‘brigades’ are formed temporarily to undertake 3 to 4 
days of work every year, managed by EPM, and identify leaks and replace in-
formal water supply systems with non-conventional temporary systems installed 
jointly by community members and volunteers from EPM (EPM 2015). These 
‘non-conventional temporary systems’ are those that are neither structural nor 
permanent and can provide physical, social or environmental aid, such as under-
taking basic upgrades to internal plumbing fixtures within individual houses; 
helping to manage an overgrown tree within the immediate vicinity of a neigh-
bourhood; and establishing community links within different neighbourhoods 
(EPM 2015). This is not primarily a landslide-risk reduction initiative, nor a 
permanent form of co-production, but it reflects the increasing (though still 
scarce) attempts to address the complex issues of risk mitigation and service 
provision in vulnerable urban areas a context within which the ‘Resilience or 
resistance?’ project experimented further with encouraging results. 
 
 
PILOTING THE CO-PRODUCTION OF LANDSLIDE RISK 
MONITORING AND MITIGATION IN MEDELLÍN, 
COLOMBIA: THE EXPERIENCE  
OF PINARES DE ORIENTE 
 
The first project piloted the co-production approach during 2017 in a neighbour-
hood in Comuna 8, Medellín, where the international Colombia/UK research 
team worked with volunteer community researchers to: understand the percep-
tions of risk (among community, public sector and third sector); pilot communi-
ty-based monitoring of landslide risk using mobile phone technology; test low-
cost community-built emergency landslide-risk mitigation works; and identify 
mechanisms for joint decision-making between community and public sector 
agencies to mitigate risk. 
The activities developed to reach these objectives were centred in a neigh-
bourhood located in the upper part of the central-eastern area of Medellín, in 
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Comuna 8, called Pinares de Oriente (see Figure 1). It is located between 1,738 
and 1,824 metres above sea level, covers 1.52 hectares, and is inhabited by 180 
families – approximately 800 inhabitants – 80% of whom are victims of the 
internal social and armed conflict that Colombia has gone through. Colombia has 
been ‘hostage to an intermittent internal war’ causing a rural exodus to cities and 
placing particular pressure on the country’s largest cities, such as Medellín (Gar-
cia Ferrari et al. 2018). This conflict has been endured as ‘three key waves’. 
There is little reliable data quantifying the number of deaths and internally dis-
placed people in the first wave, La Guerra de Mil Dias, (1899–1903); the second 
wave (1946–1957) led to an estimated death count of 200,000 to 300,00 and the 
forced migration of 2 million people, which was equivalent to a quarter of the 
national population. In the third wave (1984–1999), the continued political vio-
lence led to 1.7 million people being forcefully displaced from their homes (Gar-
cia Ferrari 2018, p. 4). Low-income settlements that are informally built and 
outside of the municipal land-use plan, are to a large extent inhabited by the 
internally displaced people (IDP) that had arrived in Medellín during the last 
wave. According to the municipal land-use plan, part of the Pinares neighbour-
hood is on urban expansion land that has been identified for integrated upgrading 
and part is outside the urban perimeter; i.e., on rural land. ‘La Loquita 1’ ravine 
crosses the settlement, but it only carries water during periods of heavy rain. The 
local authority has identified in the neighbourhood an area of no risk in the lower 
part, an area of mitigatable risk, and a non-recoverable area of high risk, which is 
also the area outside of the urban perimeter, where approximately 70 families are 
located. 
Figure 1: Location of Pinares de Oriente, El Pacífico and Carpinelo 2 in the city 
of Medellín, Colombia. 
Source: Adapted by the authors from a map by Alcadía de Medellín. 
Learning from Co-Produced Landslide Risk Mitigation Strategies | 249 
 
Perceptions of risk 
 
Exploration of the perceptions of risk included two focus group meetings with 
residents and community leaders; sixteen semi-structured interviews with com-
munity leaders and residents of Pinares; and six semi-structured interviews with 
key players from the public sector, in meetings with the people directly respon-
sible for institutional relations with the community on the issues directly related 
to the process. In addition, workshops and working processes involved third 
sector organisations. Perceptions of risk among informal settlement residents 
were explored at different times, from when they arrived in the settlement to 
during the project implementation. Most interviewed residents have known some 
risk during their lives, including floods, landslides and fires. The perception of 
whether they currently live in a risk area is more varied, from ignorance or lack 
of concern for the conditions of the site due to other concerns that are more ur-
gent and immediate such as subsistence, to knowledge of the risk and willing-
ness to face the consequences. This is influenced by how they see the role of the 
municipality in relation to risk, which they link to the possibility of eviction. 
Public sector interviews revealed that state organisations agree on the im-
portance of intervening on the edge of the city and on the need to control new 
land occupation and to have a positive view of emergency mitigation interven-
tions while integrated neighbourhood upgrading also takes place where condi-
tions permit. 
 
Monitoring of landslide risk 
 
The research team collaborated with a group of residents who were interested in 
the process and who participated as volunteer community researchers as they 
were motivated by the knowledge that their participation would bring improve-
ment to their neighbourhood and subsequently to their individual home. The idea 
was to establish several WhatsApp groups, each of these groups being responsi-
ble for taking photographs at several predetermined monitoring points. The pho-
tographs were received in Edinburgh and analysed by looking at the following 
points: chronological comparisons of the images; comparisons and correlations 
of the images with the average monthly rainfall level; evaluations of mass 
movements; identification of the most critical points from the point of view of 
the hazard. These WhatsApp groups became general platforms for monitoring, 
and volunteer community researchers uploaded various media: photographs, 
audio clips and videos (Figure 2). 
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The monitoring work started with the technical team taking preliminary re-
connaissance walks with community residents (community researchers) so as to 
identify hazards, risk conditions and potential monitoring points. Interviews with 
residents had identified concerns about moisture, water springs and floods. Us-
ing the information provided by the community and the technical team’s ap-
praisal, fourteen initial points where the community monitoring work would take 
place were defined in a joint participatory mapping workshop. Once the points 
were known, the technical monitoring group in Edinburgh prepared a detailed 
guide to facilitate monitoring by the community, which indicated the point to be 
monitored, the frequency of observations, and the safety conditions that needed 
to be taken into account during these activities. 
 
Figure 2: Screenshots of one WhatsApp Group (‘Grupo 4’), showing the images 
taken by volunteer community researchers of various monitoring points within 
Pinares de Orente. 
Source: Images uploaded by volunteers from the Pinares de Oriente community and 
screenshots by Helena Rivera, 2017. 
 
The manual or guide was used as the basis for a workshop/training session with 
community volunteers who were interested in participating in the monitoring. 
Topics covered included clarifying the meaning of the term ‘monitoring’ and its 
importance in a community risk management process, as well as the great im-
portance of taking photos periodically and systematically. The images thus pro-
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duced could then be technically analysed by the Edinburgh-based group. The 
initial selection of monitoring points was extended by participant residents dur-
ing a subsequent field walk, in which each of the volunteers was given instruc-
tions on the specific way in which the photographs should be taken, indicating 
the importance of the physical feature to be observed. 
The monitoring was carried out between the months of May and October 
2017, covering a dry period and a rainy one. At the end of this monitoring, the 
experience was evaluated in two community workshops, and the community 
researchers, supported by the academic team, shared their experience in the pro-
ject and its results with the local authority organisations and NGOs. 
Through their participation in the monitoring process, community research-
ers demonstrated that residents in low-income neighbourhoods, with appropriate 
technical support, are able to be involved in a landslide hazard monitoring sys-
tem and to collaborate with academic researchers in data collection for analysis. 
Community researchers took part in the experience in order to improve the 
community and because they understood the importance of the process. Lessons 
were learned during this pilot experience about the limitations faced by this type 
of community participation and on the possible ways in which these community 
research processes could be optimised. These included the following: 
 
• difficulties regarding the regularity of photograph taking and sending, linked 
to other priorities and events in the volunteers’ daily lives; 
• decrease in the number of participants, with only two out of the six initial 
monitoring groups sending photos throughout the process, due to technical 
difficulties with the mobile phone, changes of the residence of some 
participants, and family circumstances; and 
• the detail of the photograph: some sent small videos which, although 
important in communicating the seriousness of flooding in the settlement 
during heavy rain, did not contribute to the specialists’ technical analysis of 
the images. 
• feeling fully engaged: relying exclusively on the technical analysis of the 
photographs being done by experts in geolog and geotechnics led to the 
community researchers feeling less engaged in the pilot experience because 
they never saw or understood how their photographs were being analysed and 
used. 
• the factors that were identified, together with the community researchers, as 
possibly leading to more continuous participation, were: local administration 
of the WhatsApp networks, instead of abroad; closer accompaniment of com-
munity researchers through the more frequent presence of a member of the ac-
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ademic research team, or possibly students of the university that accompany 
the process; concentration of effort in a smaller number of monitoring points 
within the community; and activities in which the methods and results of the 
analysis of the images collected by the community researchers are shared, so 
as to reinforce these volunteers’ understanding of the process. These informed 
the strategy adopted in the second project, which is described in the next main 
section of this paper.  
 
Mitigation of landslide risk 
 
This action research component was based on two main elements: technical 
analysis of the conditions of the land and buildings, identifying factors that could 
contribute to landslide hazards, and linking this analysis to the identification of 
monitoring points; and the establishment of action strategies that are the result of 
community collaboration and intervention. Therefore, the priorities identified 
during the project were the result of multidisciplinary workshops, taking into 
account the knowledge of the expert members of the project’s technical team 
(geologists, engineers, architects, sociologists, etc.), and the community. During 
these workshops, the community shared their concerns, particularly during the 
rainy periods, their specific knowledge of the area, identifying key points, and 
their willingness to take part in the participatory monitoring and risk mitigation 
processes. 
For the technical analysis, an initial roof survey was carried out with the 
support of university students and two local NGOs: Con-Vivamos and Corpo-
ración Montanoa. This was supplemented by perceptual surveys that enabled the 
establishment of a hierarchy of spaces and networks that, in turn, enabled the 
prioritising of the points of intervention as well as the more detailed definitions 
of the character of the works to be executed in each place. This analysis required 
a considerable investment of time by the technical staff of the research team, 
given the precariousness of the graphic and cartographic information available. 
Analysis of open spaces, buildings and drainage identified four levels of wa-
ter management linked respectively to four levels in the drainage network, which 
provided a basis for the prioritisation of low-cost community-built emergency 
mitigation works. These levels are: (1) at the municipal level, a drainage network 
situated under the main access roads, which are under the responsibility of the 
Municipality; (2) at the community/street level, drainage along lanes and stair-
ways, which are the responsibility of the neighbourhood association; (3) at the 
lane and alley level, drainage in semi-private areas between houses, which are 
the responsibility of groups of residents living around these houses; and (4) at 
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the residential level, individual houses, which are the responsibility of their own-
ers. The project gave priority to the tertiary network, with some interventions in 
the secondary network when deteriorating or deficient areas were identified. A 
number of interventions were also carried out in individual dwellings, generally 
in the case of houses that affect others, always seeking to benefit the neighbour-
hood. 
 
Figure 3: Mitigation works in a semi-private area between houses (tertiary 
network), in Pinares de Oriente. 
Source: Wilmar Castro, 2017. 
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The works were arranged to be carried out by groups of neighbours through 
‘receptions' (convites) or community events during the weekends, supplemented 
with partially paid work during the week (Figure 3). The construction was led by 
the consultant architect for the project, and guided and coordinated by a local 
builder. The community self-build works were carried out during the months of 
September and October 2017. The initial intention had been that some of the 
sites where works were carried out were to be included in the monitoring pro-
cess, but this was not possible as these works were carried out in the final stage 
of the project. At the end of this period, the mitigation experience was evaluated 
in a community workshop, and the residents who took part in the convites shared 
the results from their evaluation with local government organisations and NGOs 
in subsequent workshops, supported by the academic team. The project demon-
strated the potential of mitigating risk, throughout an informal settlement, with a 
very low budget, community self-build and technical advice. 
 
Seeking community-state agreements over landslide  
risk mitigation 
 
Ultimately, the pilot project sought, through a collaborative process, to identify 
ways and mechanisms for developing a sustainable process for the co-creation of 
a risk mitigation strategy and its implementation through agreements between 
the communities in the informal settlements and the relevant state agencies at 
different scales, based on the lessons learned from the activities carried out in 
relation to perception, monitoring and mitigation. In Spanish, this agreement-
seeking process is referred to as concertación. 
Agreement (concertación) was achieved at two levels: At the district (co-
muna) level, within the wider community, addressing the deep differences be-
tween the Local Administration Board (Junta Administradora Local) and the 
Working Groups on Housing and Internally Displaced People (Mesas de Vivien-
da y de Desplazados): a meeting between these organisations and a joint call for 
an open council meeting (Cabildo Abierto – a legally-binding type of meeting). 
This is important for two reasons: (1) because the local administration board, 
which is the lowest level of local government in Colombia, with administrative 
responsibility at the district (comuna) level in urban areas, and is elected by 
residents, has the capacity to convene meetings with the municipality at the city 
level: and (2) the Working Groups on Housing and Internally Displaced People 
can mobilise the community due to their constant work in the neighbourhoods 
these are community-based organisations that coordinate community action 
across districts and across the city, and are increasingly vocal in relation to the 
Learning from Co-Produced Landslide Risk Mitigation Strategies | 255 
 
need to address risk mitigation in addition to other issues that have traditionally 
been on their agendas, such as recognition of informal settlements, land regulari-
sation and titling and neighbourhood upgrading. 
At the level of the community of Pinares, after the Cabildo, a working group 
was established with participation of the community of Pinares and four depart-
ments of the municipality (Planning (DAP), Disaster-Risk Management 
(DAGRD), Housing (ISVIMED) and the Urban Development Company (EDU)), 
which are to look at the possible ways forward for the settlement’s at-risk area, 
once the risk survey plans have been approved. In addition, it was agreed that the 
larger interventions required to mitigate risks (channelling of La Loquita, box-
culvert and screens to protect from rock falls) would be analysed to see if these 
could be addressed using municipal resources. 
The community-local government working group around Pinares was estab-
lished during a series of steps designed to provide opportunities to establish co-
working practices between the local government and the community, which had 
the following sequence: 
 
• A community evaluation workshop, with the participation of the community-
based researchers (residents of Pinares de Oriente) and leaders, which included 
a role play exercise to help the community prepare for the multi-stakeholder 
workshop at neighbourhood level. 
• A multi-stakeholder workshop at neighbourhood level, with the participation 
of representatives of the community and those responsible from the main 
relevant public organisations, which took place in the settlement and included 
an opportunity for the community volunteers to show the local government 
officials the results from the monitoring and mitigation pilots on-site. 
• A workshop with NGOs and other organisations that work with the 
community, and whose participation the research team considered important 
towards the roll-out of the experience in the follow-on project.  
 
Evaluation of the pilot monitoring and mitigation projects, and multi-stakeholder 
workshop discussions showed that the following factors can facilitate the process 
of reaching agreement among the different stakeholders involved in landslide-
risk mitigation (in this case mainly community and local government): (1) en-
gagement with the different stakeholders from an early stage, though not neces-
sarily together in the beginning; (2) knowledge of the capacities and responsibili-
ties of each stakeholder; (3) consideration of timescales (in this case, a focus on 
the short term – ‘the meantime’ – was key in achieving agreement between 
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community and local government); and (4) consideration of the resources that 
can be brought to bear, including community resources. 
 
 
THE ROLL-OUT OF CO-PRODUCTION OF LANDSLIDE 
RISK MONITORING AND MITIGATION  
IN MEDELLÍN AND SÃO PAULO 
 
The above pilot experience was rolled out, during 2018, in two further communi-
ties in Medellín, and another one in São Paulo, in order to explore and identify 
the issues that may arise in transferring the pilot experience to different socio-
economic and political contexts within the same city (but in neighbourhoods and 
districts with different histories) and in a city in a different Latin American coun-
try. This was achieved through a project called ‘Co-production of landslide risk 
management strategies through development of community-based infrastructure 
in Latin American cities’, which ended in May 2019.4 
 
The experience of replicating co-production of landslide risk 
monitoring and mitigation in El Pacífico and Carpinelo 2  
in Medellín 
 
In Medellín, the follow-on project was implemented in one settlement within the 
same district (Comuna) as the pilot project and in another in a different district 
(Figure 1). El Pacífico is located at the high end of Comuna 8 (not far from Pina-
res), on land that is partly classed as at high risk because of its being within the 
officially required setback from ‘La Rafita’ ravine, partly outside the official 
urban perimeter, and partly within a forest reserve. According to a community 
census undertaken in 2016, there are 184 households, with the majority age 
group being that between 18-29 years old and with 79% of the population having 
been displaced by the armed conflict. Originating around 1995, this densely 
built-up and consolidated settlement has a strong history of community organisa-
tion, with a Junta de Acción Comunal and a track record in engaging with the 
municipality (Figure 4). 
 
 
4 Funded by the UK’s Global Challenges Research Fund / The British Academy Cities 
& Infrastructure programme – project number CI170338. 
Learning from Co-Produced Landslide Risk Mitigation Strategies | 257 
 
Figure 4: El Pacífico (left) and Carpinelo 2 (right), in Medellín. 
Source: Images taken by the Medellín research team, using a drone, 2018. 
 
Carpinelo 2 is a more recent and much less consolidated settlement. It is located 
in Comuna 1 at the north-eastern tip of Medellín, high up above the city on a 
steep slope overlooking the next municipality to the north. On the upper edge of 
a wider neighbourhood called Carpinelo, which started to form in the 1970s and 
was recognised in 1993, Carpinelo 2 started to form in the late 1990s and early 
2000s and became a neighbourhood in its own right in 2012. Carpinelo as a 
whole has approximately 2,600 households, and Carpinelo 2 is a less densely 
inhabited part of this, with a considerable amount of open space and lower ac-
cess to public services, with untreated water, e.g., being tapped into it from a 
pipe higher up the hill and distributed to houses via pipes installed and charged 
for by people linked to the armed groups that control the territory. There have 
been recent instances of evictions and house demolitions in the neighbourhood 
due to imminent landslides, but residents continue to engage in cutting into the 
hillside and moving earth to build homes (Figure 4). 
 
Perceptions of risk 
In both communities, the research team went through a lengthy negotiation pro-
cess with locally-based NGOs that have been supporting the two communities 
(respectively, Convivamos and Corporación Montanoa), establishing rules of 
engagement with the community in setting up the processes and looking towards 
the future sharing of the results and the appropriate acknowledgement of those 
involved in the co-production of knowledge. The process of interviewing com-
munity residents and leaders faced some interruptions due to national events, 
such as the presidential elections, but was eventually completed with 13 inter-
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views in El Pacífico and 15 in Carpinelo 2. Perceptions of risk in each settlement 
vary somewhat, with residents in El Pacífico being more concerned about rock 
falls, as well as reporting some flooding and problems with poor building quali-
ty, while in Carpinelo 2 there was more explicit concern with landslides and with 
water including the link between water and landslide risk. 
 
Monitoring of risk 
Building on the lessons learned from the pilot project in Pinares, the participa-
tory mapping and training of the volunteers who were to undertake community-
based monitoring took longer, with more sessions taking place with the commu-
nity members, while at the same time limiting the number of monitoring points 
(4 in El Pacífico and 6 in Carpinelo). In addition, the technical problems and 
perception of distance between data collection and data analysis that were found 
in the pilot project were addressed by establishing a system of small weekly top-
ups of volunteers’ mobile phone allowances in exchange for weekly photo-
graphs, with the latter being sent to a WhatsApp group that was managed by a 
community leader in Medellín (who is part of the research team), rather than to 
the UK-based researchers. 
 
Figure 5: Community volunteers in Medellín analysing the landslide-risk 
monitoring data they had collected. 
Source: Carlos Montoya, 2018. 
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This resulted in more consistent participation of community volunteers and 
therefore in more systematic data collection. In addition, instead of relying ex-
clusively on technical analysis of the photographs by experts in geological and 
geotechnics a process that had not led to the community researchers feeling fully 
engaged in the pilot experience in the follow-on project, community workshops 
were held at regular intervals so as to allow joint analysis of the sets of photo-
graphic data by community volunteers together with the research team (Figure 
5). This not only helped towards developing the community’s knowledge of their 
own territory but also, and even more importantly, towards their capacity to 
engage other stakeholders with systematically collected data of their own, thus 




In terms of mitigation, a major difference with the pilot project was the lack of 
funding available to implement small self-built works. In the follow-on projects, 
the emphasis was on the co-production of a strategy for each of the settlements, 
which provided the respective community organisations with a document that 
recorded possible interventions and mapped the stakeholders that would need to 
be involved in their implementation, for the Junta de Acción Comunal to take 
forward. It was considered that the hierarchy of spaces and networks developed 
in the pilot project remained valid for the two further communities in Medellín, 
while the importance of the principle of linking walking routes with water drain-
age became more evident. A particular challenge was faced in El Pacífico, where 
the high ratio of land occupation by construction and the little amount of space 
for circulation (of both people and water) raised the possibility of proposing a 
certain level of building removal, which in itself would risk creating conflict 
within the settlement. 
 
Agreement-seeking (concertación) 
In relation to agreement-seeking, the follow-on project benefitted from both 
what was shown to be possible by the pilot project and a general move towards 
an improving community/state relationship in the city (whereas the communi-
ty/academia relationship has already been positive for a much longer time). The 
state has tended to feel under pressure from community mobilisations, but more 
sophisticated forms of engagement between the two have been lowering the 
tensions. An example of this is the in municiaplity having awarded a prize for 
citizen participation to the ‘Hillside Neighbourhoods School’ (Escuela de Bar-
rios de Ladera), an initiative that brings together academia and community or-
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ganisations in NE Medellín, with the support of Convivamos, and which has 
incorporated the experience of the projects that are presented in this paper. In 
addition, almost as a repeat of the research team’s experience of presenting the 
pilot work at a public Cabildo in 2017 for Comuna 8, in 2018 the Medellín re-
search team leader was invited to facilitate a further Cabildo that addresses 
neighbourhood improvement and risk management across the whole of north-
eastern Medellín. Comuna 8 civil society has become a spearhead in the demand 
for appropriate risk management, resulting in the municipality prioritising the 
commissioning of micro-zoned risk assessments for this city district, ahead of all 
the others. This is seen as a first step toward a risk management plan for the 
whole of north-eastern Medellín. 
 
Transferring the experience of landslide risk management  
co-production to São Paulo 
 
The transfer of the pilot experience and lessons learned in the case of Medellín 
to the context of São Paulo was facilitated by two visits of the Brazilian research 
team to Medellín, where they took part in the final forum that was held there to 
disseminate the results of the pilot experience and where they also visited and 
took part in workshops in the participating communities; participation in theme-
focused webinars involving the three research teams in Brazil, Colombia and the 
UK; and weekly project management skype meetings. Replicating and contextu-
alising the experience in São Paulo was not an easy task, with initial reflections 
mainly highlighting the differences in socio-political and security contexts and in 
the way that contact between the research teams and potentially participating 
communities was established. 
In early 2018, the São Paulo research team had started working with an in-
formal settlement in the south-east of the city, Morada do Sol, which consists of 
areas at risk of landslides. Contact was initiated with the community through a 
relationship that the University of São Paulo has with state-level civil defence in 
the district of Butanta, where the settlement is located. Representatives from 
Civil Defence recommended working in this settlement because of its level of 
community organisation, and the research team visited the area and held a com-
munity workshop. However, visits soon had to be suspended because of clashes 
between police and druglords, which turned the settlement into a no-go area for 
outsiders. The Brazil-based research team then turned to a contact within the 
NGO CEDECA (Centro de Defesa da Criança e do Adolescente – Centre for the 
Defence of the Child and the Adolescent), an organisation that is working in a 
low-income settlement in Sapopemba, on the eastern edge of the city. The set-
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tlement is divided into two parts, a cluster of dwellings at the top of a hill that is 
partly constituted by rubbish the inhabitants tip down the hill, and another cluster 
in the valley. Landslide risk here involves not only soil movements but also 
rubbish sliding as well as catching fire. Initial meetings with the CDEC and a 
community leader were promising, but it eventually became clear that powerful 
individuals who were building relatively high buildings for rent in the settlement 
did not welcome external interference, and the research team had to discontinue 
the engagement. 
 
Figure 6: Location of communities where the transfer of experience was attem-
pted in São Paulo (left) and an aerial view of Vila Nova Esperança (right). 
Source: Prepared by the authors using Google Maps. 
 
Eventually, through the NGO Teto, the Brazil-based research team established 
contact with the main community leader of Vila Nova Esperança, a 450-
household settlement in the south-west of the city, which has landslide-risk is-
sues, including areas classified at high and very high risk. The 60-year old 
neighbourhood, which is surrounded by a protected forest, is involved in a pro-
cess of land regularisation which in principle is not applicable to high and very 
high-risk areas unless mitigation works are carried out hence the community 
leader’s interest in involving the community in the project. Having finally agreed 
to a collaboration with the community by August 2018, the Brazilian team was 
able to adapt the Medellín experience to Vila Nova Esperança. It undertook 
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interviews with the community, started a community-based monitoring system 
based on four agreed monitoring points, and assessed the requirements for com-
munity-based mitigation. 
The experience of transferring the approach internationally from Colombia to 
a Brazilian context allowed the team to draw out preliminary lessons regarding 
the limitations faced by this type of community involvement and on the possible 
ways in which these community research processes can be optimised. These 
lessons included the following: 
 
• different participatory surround: understanding the socio-political and security 
contexts is fundamental and will have an impact on the way a project is co-
produced. The socio-political and security contexts will vary widely even 
amongst continental neighbours, so addressing this at an early stage is 
fundamental; 
• including a community member within the academic research team: the way 
that contact between the research teams and potentially participating 
communities is established has an impact on the level of trust that the 
academic team has within the community. This ‘trust’ is fundamental for co-
production; 
• linked to the above point, different socio-economic processes within the 
neighbourhoods can enable or hinder community willingness to engage with 
external actors, and the involvement of a community member in the research 
team from the outset can help understand these processes; 
• landslide diversity: the type of potential landslide and its secondary effects 
will, like all so-called ‘natural’ hazards, vary widely between geological 
regions and settlement characteristics. In this case, the project had to 
momentarily contend with rubbish sliding and the secondary effect of catching 





The research shows that different levels and ways of understanding landslide risk 
can be found within different communities, linked to the history of each particu-
lar settlement, which in turn affects how such communities engage with external 
agencies (e.g., local government) in relation to this endeavour. In addition, risk 
governance and management involve different approaches in different cities and 
are linked to the general approach to informal settlements in each city and to 
state capacity. The tendency has been to focus on post-disaster attention and 
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recovery rather than prevention and mitigation, with the latter manifesting most-
ly in interventions which run counter to establishing relationships of co-
production (e.g., preventative evictions). 
The projects described in this chapter have explored alternative ways of en-
gaging vulnerable communities and the local government in each city in co-
producing landslide risk management strategies. Lessons learned along the way 
suggest the need to engage the community as much as possible not only in data 
collection and in implementation of emergency mitigation works but also in the 
analysis of the data they collect, in developing their own knowledge and under-
standing of their territories, and in the development of settlement-level strategies 
they can use in lobbying local government for resources and in prioritising ac-
tions together with local government agencies. The experience of trying to roll 
out the pilot project to other communities in Medellín and to transfer it to a dif-
ferent context in the city of São Paulo highlights the influence the socio-political 
and security context can have on such replication as well as the importance of 
considering the routes to engaging vulnerable communities in this kind of work. 
As climate change and the continued informal growth of cities on hazardous 
terrains increase their inhabitants’ exposure to potential disasters, developing 
ways of co-producing landslide-risk mitigation that optimises the use of commu-
nity and state capacities to provide safe homes is becoming increasingly urgent. 
The two projects that are described and analysed in this chapter have shown both 
the potential and the challenges not only of developing such co-produced land-
slide-risk-management approaches but also of the co-production of knowledge to 
underpin the development of such approaches through collaboration between 
academia and the community primarily, as well as with NGOs and the relevant 
legal government organisations. On reflection, a key element underpinning suc-
cess in the co-production of research appears to be the existence of shared objec-
tives between academia and community, as it can be achieved especially in the 
Colombian cases, and the open acknowledgement of these as well as of the dif-
ferences in the agendas of the key actors. This also applies to the involvement of 
other actors, with an example being the protracted and detailed negotiations that 
took place between the academic researchers and the NGOs supporting the two 
communities that the experience was rolled out to in the second project in Co-
lombia. This ranged from dealing with issues around what the project delivera-
bles would be, to the recognition of joint authorship. Thus, our experience in 
these projects tells us that co-produced research requires transparency in the 
agendas, confluence in the objectives, and a willingness to negotiate and resolve 
differences that may emerge during the research process, which is inevitable 
given the open-endedness of participatory action research. 
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